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COMMON INTEREST TRAGEDIES
Lee Anne Fennell*
INTRODUCTION
No one working in property theory can ignore the anticommons.
This upstart doppelganger of the commons began its intellectual life as an
imaginary regime in which everyone had the power to prevent everyone
else from using a particular resource.' Michael Heller's subsequent con-
struction of a recognizable category of "anticommons property" corre-
sponding to situations in lived experience2 represented an important
advance in the property lexicon that sparked a surge of scholarly interest.'
Over a half-dozen years, 4 the term "anticommons" has moved from near-
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I The notion of an anticommons originated in Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law
of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (1982); see Robert C. Ellick-
son, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22 (1993) (describing the anticommons problem and
attributing the roots of the idea to a hypothetical regulatory regime developed in Michelman, supra).
2 Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). Heller's principal example involved empty storefronts in Moscow, which
he posited were the result of a regime in which multiple permissions to use the resource had to be assem-
bled from various parties.
3 E.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-Property, 102 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming); James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,
43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000); Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041
(2003); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyz-
ing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813 (2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and
the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 509-14 (2003); Francesco Parisi et al., Du-
ality in Property: Commons and Anticommons, INT'L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-224844 [hereinafter Parisi et al., Duality]; Francesco Parisi et al., Simultaneous and
Sequential Anticommons, 17 EuR. J.L. & ECON. 175 (2004).
4 Heller's reformulation of the anticommons, Heller, supra note 2, was cited in draft and forthcom-
ing form before it was published; hence, the impact of the article predated its publication somewhat.
E.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 56-57 (4th ed. 1998); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1063 n.332 (1997).
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obscurity to general use;5 it now flows easily from the lips and pens of
nearly every property teacher and scholar in the land.6
The recent concentration of attention on the anticommons has been
constructive and revitalizing. Resources under common or interdependent
control-from fisheries and grazing lands to metropolitan spatial configura-
tions and scientific knowledge-present a daunting array of problems that
profoundly affect large populations.' While a rich body of literature on the
commons has evolved in response to these concerns,8 the anticommons no-
tion provides a fresh and critical perspective on this set of issues. Already,
it has yielded important insights into a number of discrete, applied problems
associated with multi-player resource dilemmas.9 The anticommons idea
5 See Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain, and History in the New Law and Economics of Prop-
erty, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 480 n.2 (2000) (noting the rapid and widespread acceptance and use of the
term "anticommons" in the wake of Heller's article). Rose found sixty-six law review articles (not
counting Heller's original article) using the word "anticommons" in the LEXIS database since the publi-
cation of Heller's 1998 article; now the count exceeds 300 (Mar. 30, 2004 search, LEXIS database of
U.S. and Canadian Law Reviews, combined).
6 A discussion of the anticommons in the first chapter of the best-selling property casebook in the
country has not only ensured the transmission of the concept to the next generation of law students, but
has also assisted the spread of the idea among teachers of property law. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, su-
pra note 4, at 56-57; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 56-57 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter DUKEMINIER & KRIER 5TH]; see also Peter T. Wendel, The Perfect Blend of Methodology, Doctrine,
and Theory, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 n. I (1999) (identifying the 4th edition of Dukeminier &
Krier's Property as "the most widely adopted property casebook" and listing about 120 law schools at
which it had been adopted by at least one professor).
7 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (1990) (observing that "[m]uch of the world is dependent on resources that are
subject to the possibility of a tragedy of the commons").
8 A crucial catalyst to work in this field was Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968) [hereinafter Hardin, Tragedy]. Recent collections on the commons include, for
example, THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS (Nives Dolak &
Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003); THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002); MANAGING
THE COMMONS (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998); and Symposium, The Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (James Boyle ed., 2003) (addressing various aspects of the in-
formation commons). Many closely related bodies of work bear on the problems of the commons, in-
cluding scholarship on collective action, see, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982)
[hereinafter HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION]; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965), game theory, see, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989), public and club
goods, see, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS,
AND CLUB GOODS (1986); James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (Feb.
1965), and norms, see, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977).
9 The anticommons idea has been applied in settings as diverse as biotechnology and land use. See,
e.g., Dibadj, supra note 3 (arguing that anticommons problems can be created by regulatory "givings");
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3 (applying anticommons analysis to the biomedical field); Hunter, su-
pra note 3, at 509-14 (discussing dangers of a "digital anticommons"); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling
the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 700 & n.130 (2003) (citing Heller's work
on the anticommons in discussing the difficulties downstream users of copyrighted music face in obtain-
ing multiple clearances); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3 (assessing positive potential of anticom-
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has thrown into bold relief theoretical and practical problems that had pre-
viously languished unnoticed in the background, and has generated renewed
attention and excitement for addressing difficult problems involving the al-
location of resources.
Despite its success, the emerging concept of the anticommons requires
further clarification and refinement if it is to serve the diverse array of pur-
poses for which it is now being deployed. This Article begins with a quite
basic question that has not received a satisfactory answer in the literature:
What distinguishes the problems associated with the anticommons from those
associated with the old-fashioned tragedy of the commons? Significantly,
some of the key criteria scholars have offered for identifying an anticommons
and distinguishing it from an ordinary commons collapse upon scrutiny, as
soon as one moves from the pure or prototypical versions of these forms of
property to applied incarnations of them. The fragility of the boundaries be-
tween commons and anticommons suggests a deeper conceptual blurring that
is likely both to impede the development of meaningful theoretical ap-
proaches and to hamper efforts to devise appropriate legal responses to real-
world resource-allocation problems. Pushing a bit on the anticommons idea,
then, leads to a broader rethinking of the nature of commons dilemmas and
the prospects for their solution. These efforts open up the larger question that
takes center stage here: How might the universe of common and interde-
pendent resource problems be most usefully carved up?
In addressing that question, this Article makes three significant contri-
butions. First, it develops and applies a new functional taxonomy capable
of providing greater traction on problems involving the allocation of com-
mon resources. This taxonomy installs the fledgling anticommons concept
more usefully and securely within the family of common resource dilem-
mas. My analysis, which both builds on and challenges existing ap-
proaches, emphasizes underappreciated structural connections between the
commons and anticommons problems, and clarifies the nature of each di-
lemma. Far from being diametric opposites, the tragedies of the commons
and the anticommons actually converge when taken to their logical conclu-
sions.'" Moreover, they often appear together or in sequence. Indeed, a po-
tential anticommons problem stands between every garden-variety
commons tragedy and its solution.
The Article makes a second contribution by emphasizing that we often
must choose between potential tragedies in contexts involving common re-
mons dynamic in land use settings). I take no position here on the degree of empirical fit between the
anticommons story and the various real-world phenomena to which it has been applied. However, to the
extent that the anticommons notion helps illuminate problems that either already exist at some level, or
that could potentially exist under some set of plausibly imaginable circumstances, it is a useful notion to
have around.
10 Their structural symmetry has already been recognized. See Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3.
However, the ways in which they merge into each other upon close examination have not, to my knowl-
edge, yet been studied.
98:907 (2004)
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sources." Commentators have observed that an anticommons can result
from overly "propertized" or "privatized" responses to commons dilemmas,
so that efforts to solve one tragedy may introduce another. 2 However, too
little attention has been given to the factors creating this tension, 3 or to the
fact that an anticommons-like dynamic also underlies unaddressed com-
mons dilemmas. 4 Understanding these additional points requires an appre-
ciation of the nature and significance of property interest fragmentation-a
phenomenon that is more pervasive and less avoidable than the literature on
the anticommons problem might suggest.' In complex, interdependent set-
tings such as neighborhoods, the apparently unified property interests that
we enjoy are made possible only by fracturing other interests that could
have been bundled together instead. 6 The key question, then, is not
11 Cf GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (discussing the inevitability
of tragedy under conditions of scarcity). In this Article, I use the term "tragedy" in a somewhat special-
ized sense, to reference inefficient outcomes. Hence, a tragedy occurs when individual decisions fail to
maximize the "pie" (the total value capable of being derived from a resource system) available for the
parties to divide among themselves. Purely distributive changes do not constitute tragedies, on this
definition. This fits with the standard usage of the term "tragedy" in the commons and anticommons
literature, and with the recognition that there is little societal consensus about how one would begin to
compare wins and losses that affect various parties in common resource settings. Distributive considera-
tions remain important to my analysis, however, and will be referenced throughout the Article.
12 See Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, in 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
INTO LAW 79, 89 (2001) ("Constructing the anticommons ideal type helps to show why privatization
must be more carefully deployed."); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 698 (arguing that
"[p]rivatization can solve one tragedy but cause another"); Norbert Schulz et al., Fragmentation in
Property: Towards a General Model, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 608 (2002)
(explaining that "'propertization' may be a good antidote for offsetting commons deadweight losses,
but, if carried out to excess, may lead to yet greater losses from anticommons problems").
13 As will be explained, the tension is primarily driven by the inverse relationship between holdout
problems and externalities-a relationship identified and lucidly explained by Richard Epstein some
years ago. Richard Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993); see infra Part II.B (drawing functional distinctions between com-
mons and anticommons problems based on whether the primary impediment to an efficient outcome re-
lates to externalities or holdout problems); infra Part III.D (discussing tradeoffs between these
problems).
14 The intuition behind this point was articulated by Harold Demsetz three decades before the word
"anticommons" came into common usage. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-55 (1967) (explaining that an effort to solve a commons problem by mu-
tual agreement may be blocked by a "hold-out" who, in the meantime, retains "the right to work the land
as fast as he pleases"); see also James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 325, 335-36 (1992) (presenting an example that illustrates Demsetz's recognition of the
problem of assembling the entitlements necessary to overcome the commons tragedy). A recent articu-
lation of a similar point is found in Robert H. Nelson, Private Neighborhoods, ch. 12, at I I n.* (unpub-
lished book manuscript, on file with author). Nelson observes that a commons can lead to resource
depletion that presents the potential for restoration, but that this restoration may be blocked by an anti-
commons dynamic. Id.
15 See infra Part III.B (discussing property interest fragmentation).
16 It is certainly true that, over the course of history, property has become less cohesively bound up
in particular "things" and has become pervasively splintered along conceptual, temporal, and physical
dimensions. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY (J.
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whether one arrangement is more or less fragmented, but whether it tends to
generate collective action problems that are more costly or harder to solve
than those presented by some other arrangement.
The Article's third contribution involves an exploration of functionally
relevant heterogeneities among tragedies. I first break tragedies into cate-
gories at the macro level based on the pattern of strategic interaction they
embody. Doing this illuminates choices among ways of assigning and pro-
tecting entitlements. For example, it facilitates application of insights re-
garding the relative advantages of property rules and liability rules.' I then
differentiate among tragedies at the micro level based on the shape of the
production function for the deficit (or forgone surplus) that each generates."
This focus on production functions provides guidance in choosing the lesser
of two tragedies.
The analysis proceeds in three Parts. The first Part lays the ground-
work for dividing up the universe of common interest tragedies function-
ally. To do this, I carefully parse the tragedies of the commons and
anticommons, as these terms have been used to date. In each case, I sepa-
rate out purely distributive questions from efficiency questions.
In Part II, I consider how the universe of "common interest trage-
dies"-my umbrella term for tragedies of the commons and anticommons-
might best be divided up for analytic purposes. I begin by critiquing at-
tempts to draw a line between commons and anticommons tragedies based
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (making this observation). Nevertheless, even a
"thing-bound" property system necessarily splinters other interests, although these other interests may
have little importance during historical periods featuring low population densities, few interdependen-
cies, and a low incidence of conflicts over property use.
17 The article that launched this field of study is Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
Literature analyzing and building upon Calabresi & Melamed's taxonomy includes, for example: Ian
Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001); lan Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440 (1995); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219 (2001); Madeline Mor-
ris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling
Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics
of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980); Symposium, Property Rules, Li-
ability Rules, and Inalienability: Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2083 (1997); Ronen
Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, INT'L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2005).
1 For example, some tragedies are "lumpier" than others. See, e.g., GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA
OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 23 (1993) (distin-
guishing goods that are available "in (almost) continuously divisible increments" from those that "are
available only in large, 'lumpy' units"); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy
Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing
goods that do not smoothly increase in a linear relationship with inputs).
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on whether resource "overuse" or "underuse" results, or based on whether a
"privilege of use" or a "right to exclude" was granted to group members. I
then suggest that resource problems can be more usefully divided up based
on the strategic interaction that is most likely to block the efficient alloca-
tion of entitlements. Dividing up common interest tragedies functionally
paves the way for addressing the strategic dilemmas directly through legal
or nonlegal means.
In Part III, I demonstrate the payoff of this approach. I begin by show-
ing how the functional taxonomy I have presented facilitates use of the
large and intricate body of literature on choices about the assignment and
protection of legal entitlements to engineer better solutions to resource-
allocation problems. 9 This corpus of scholarship has particular traction in
interdependent resource settings in which policymakers must steer a careful
course between the Scylla of the commons and the Charybdis of the anti-
commons. Using a stylized example, I examine how heterogeneity in the
production functions of common interest tragedies provides a reasoned ba-
sis for choosing between potential tragedies, and show the implications of
this analysis for entitlements and their protection.
I. THE COMMONS AND THE ANTICOMMONS
In this Part, I lay the groundwork for what follows by closely scrutiniz-
ing the tragic tendencies that can emerge in multi-party resource contexts.
In subpart A, I focus on those tendencies toward tragedy that are usually
placed under the rubric of "tragedies of the commons" and in subpart B on
those associated with "tragedies of the anticommons."2 In each case, I dis-
tinguish problems that affect only distribution from those that affect effi-
ciency.
Before I begin parsing the tragedies, one point deserves emphasis:
While certain resource arrangements seem to set the stage for tragic tenden-
cies to manifest themselves, tragedy is not the inevitable result.2' Tragedy
19 See supra note 17.
20 The terms "commons" and "anticommons" are not always given consistent meanings in the litera-
ture, and there are a variety of things that people may mean when they speak of the tragedies associated
with these property regimes. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 2, at 667-69 (describing the difference be-
tween his definition of an anticommons and the earlier meanings given the term); Charlotte Hess & Eli-
nor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114-28 (2003) (discussing differing uses of the term "the commons" and detail-
ing some sources of confusion).
21 Many scholars have challenged or qualified the view that that a commons ineluctably leads to
tragic consequences. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 7, at 35-37, 88-89, 205-07 (stressing the role of
norms in managing common pool resources); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Com-
mons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (presenting a model of a "liberal commons" designed to foster coopera-
tive interactions while preserving to each member autonomy and a right to exit); Carol Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
770 (1986) (suggesting that "doctrines of custom" explain "why certain kinds of property-particularly
those necessary to commerce-were presumed to be more valuable if access were open to all").
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can be averted not only through legal rules and state regulation, but also
through de facto arrangements that mimic formal legal entitlements,22 norms
or other social factors that alter the payoffs group members face and thereby
induce cooperation, 23 and related constraints on behavior that arise when
part of what group members seek in a common resource context is a satisfy-
ing social interaction. 4 Hence, the tragic tendencies described here may be
absent or blunted in many real-world settings, without the intervention of
law. This Article does not seek to add to the extensive literature on these
informal, nonlegal solutions; instead, it concentrates on understanding and
categorizing the impediments to efficient outcomes.25
A. Tragedies of the Commons
Scholarship about the commons often distinguishes a "limited-access"
commons to which a limited number of people have access, from an "open-
access" regime that is open to "everyone. 26  As a matter of historical fact,
limited-access commons, such as common grazing lands, have often oper-
ated pursuant to a set of explicit or implicit usage and membership con-
straints that avoid or limit tragic outcomes.27 Given my focus in this subpart
22 See, e.g., Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An
Empirical Analysis, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL SOLUTIONS
TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM 13, 19-21 (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Simmons eds., 1993) (discuss-
ing de jure and de facto rights to common property).
23 See, e.g., ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 8, at 37 (describing how factors like esteem and dis-
honor alter payoffs for soldiers confronting a strategic dilemma).
24 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 21, at 552 (discussing importance of a framework that takes into
account contexts in which "the social gains from cooperation are not just fringe benefits, but instead are
a major part of what people seek").
25 When considering how legal entitlements might best be structured to minimize the fallout from
such tragic tendencies, the prospects for informal solutions under various alternatives must be taken into
account, along with a number of other factors. See infra text accompanying notes 281-85.
26 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 7, at 48 (distinguishing limited-access from open-access common
pool resources); Dagan & Heller, supra note 21, at 557 (distinguishing open-access from commons
property on the basis that the latter is open to only a limited number of people); Ellickson, supra note 1,
at 1322 (distinguishing an open-access regime from ownership by a close-knit group or a larger
"horde"). Because a limited-access commons endows the group of insiders with the power to exclude
outsiders from the common pool resource, it looks like ordinary private property from the outside. Carol
M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Eco-
systems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998). This power to exclude outsiders may be de facto (as where
a group of local surfers protects "its" waves) or de jure (as where the law protects a tenancy in common
or other collective ownership form). See Schlager & Ostrom, supra note 22, at 19-21.
27 See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 99-100 (2d ed. 1997)
(citing and discussing the descriptions of English villagers' use of commons contained in CARL J.
DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC
INSTITUTION (1980)); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD 160 (2003) (noting scholarship that indicates grazing lands have empirically operated
pursuant to constraints and hiave not resembled the tragedy-prone open-access commons described by
Garrett Hardin); Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1390-91 & nn. 380-82 (discussing scholarship on this
point).
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on simply understanding and classifying potential impediments to efficient
outcomes, I will discuss tragic tendencies in the commons without explic-
itly noting where on the spectrum of limited to open access a particular
common resource system falls."
1. Two Tragic Tendencies.-Tragedies of the commons stem from
two tendencies that are usually denominated "overuse" and "underinvest-
ment."2 Although these terms turn out to be more malleable than they ap-
pear at first, they are helpful in gaining an intuitive understanding of
commons tragedies. The tendency towards overuse is typified by Garrett
Hardin's example of grazing cattle;3" hence it is sometimes also termed an
"overgrazing" problem. The basic idea is that grass is a replenishing re-
source that only can flourish when it is not constantly being trampled and
eaten by cattle. Add too many cattle to a grazing field, and eventually the
total amount of grass available for the entire group of cattle becomes de-
pleted. Each additional head of cattle generates benefits that are wholly in-
ternalized by the animal's owner, but the owner internalizes only a fraction
of the costs that the animal imposes on the grazing lands. Hence, the ten-
dency is to add too many cattle."
The same analysis applies to fishing from a common pool, harvesting
fur-bearing creatures from a woodlands, drawing oil or water from the
earth,32 or sending spain through the internet. Whether the situation in-
28 When choosing between structural arrangements, however, it becomes important to know when
tragic tendencies are likely to be self-limiting or self-correcting, and when they are likely to spin out of
control. See infra Part II. That question depends on many factors, including some that track the "lim-
ited-access" versus "open-access" distinction, such as the stability, size, and homogeneity of the group.
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 7, at 88-102 (discussing the features shared by successful self-governing
common pool resource institutions).
29 Dagan and Heller have characterized "wasteful struggles regarding the fruits and revenues that a
commons may produce" as a third potential source of inefficiency in a commons. Dagan & Heller, su-
pra note 21, at 582. However, as I will explain, that source of inefficiency can be understood as the
overuse of (or underinvestment in) a different "commons"-that of the resource-gathering environment
(as opposed to the resource itself),
30 Hardin, Tragedy, supra note 8, at 1244.
31 Adding "too many" cattle in this context does not mean that the person has added more than
"their share" of cattle (based on some notion of distributive justice), but rather that cattle are added be-
yond the point that they produce marginal benefits for anyone-that is, they are added to the point that
they decrease the overall benefit ("shrink the pie") available for the group as a whole. See infra Part
.A.2 (distinguishing distributive problems from a true tragedy of the commons).
32 Oil presents a tragedy of the commons to the extent that the total amount ofoil available for any-
one's use diminishes with overly-speedy extraction, or to the extent such rapid extraction ushers in other
inefficiencies that reduce the total benefits to be gleaned from the resource (such as private storage
costs). See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002) (detailing some of the costs historically asso-
ciated with "extractive anarchy" in oil, including fires associated with surface storage, and excessive
drilling that decreased pressure and made extraction more difficult or that permitted water or gas to enter
and trap oil). Similar problems attend excessive withdrawal of groundwater. See, e.g., Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles To Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 250
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volves "taking out" valuable resource units from the system33 (e.g., fish, oil,
water, beavers), or "putting in" something that is harmful (e.g., grazing cat-
tle, spain, litter, pollution), the individual making the decision about re-
source use enjoys all of the benefits of that use but does not bear all of the
costs.3 4 Put differently, these represent cases of negative externalities asso-
ciated with resource use. a" Because the resource-appropriator is not taking
all the costs of her appropriation into account, she is likely to do too much
of it from the standpoint of allocative efficiency. 6
The second tragic tendency associated with a commons-
underinvestment-is typified by shirking on a communal farm; hence, we
might also term this problem "undercultivation." Here, the problem is a
function of positive externalities, not negative externalities. 7 The person
who cultivates a garden, for example, internalizes all of the costs but (in a
setting where the produce is open to the group as a whole) does not inter-
nalize all of the benefits. Therefore, she will invest too little time and effort
(2000) (explaining how "overdrafting" of aquifers can lead to more costly pumping, contamination from
salt water (in the case of coastal aquifers), and degradation of the surface).
33 See Hess & Ostrom, supra note 20, at 121 (distinguishing between a "resource system" such as a
fishery, and "resource units" that can be extracted from that system, such as individual fish); Dean
Lueck, First Possession as the Basis of Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND
LAW 200, 202 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (distinguishing between resource
"stocks" and "flows").
34 There may be other differences between the "taking out" and "putting in" situations, however,
that call for different management strategies. See Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Prop-
erty, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environ-
mental Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 8, at 233, 245-47 (distinguishing
between "'taking-out' or extractive issues" and "putting-in" issues, and discussing possible differences,
such as ease of monitoring, between these two classes of problems).
35 See ROBERT A. MUNDELL, MAN AND ECONOMICS 185 (1968) (defining externalities as "those
benefits or costs of decisions not accruing to the choice unit in question, but rather received or paid by
others").
36 See id at 182 (explaining that "those industries producing harmful by-products causing damage
or creating costs for others, would tend to produce too much for the good of society"). The mere fact
that appropriation generates externalities does not establish that inefficiency will necessarily result. See
DUKEMINIER & KRIER 5TH, supra note 6, at 51-52 (explaining how externalities foster inefficiency, but
do not guarantee that it will occur); infra Part IIB.I (distinguishing Pareto-relevant from Pareto-
irrelevant externalities).
37 Some treatments of commons tragedies have focused exclusively on the negative externalities as-
sociated with overuse. See, e.g., Parisi et al., Duality, supra note 3, at 9 (suggesting that "the problem of
the commons is related to a negative externality of use rights"). However, the problem of underinvest-
ment turns up ubiquitously in the commons literature. See, e.g., Thrdinn Eggertsson, Open Access Ver-
sus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 33, at
73, 77 (explaining that the economic consequences of an open access regime include "supply side" ef-
fects, such as the disincentive to invest, as well as "demand side" effects on appropriation behavior);
ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 14-15 (1994) (discussing
problems of underprovision, as well as problems of overuse). Moreover, it is often possible to couch a
particular decision as either creating negative externalities (e.g., "shirking") or failing to produce posi-
tive externalities (e.g., "not working"). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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into cultivation, because she will not receive the benefits of her work.38 A
similar dynamic obtains when initial work is necessary to sever a resource
unit from the common pool, but another party has the ability to swoop in
and take the resource after these initial investments have been made. This
is the familiar problem presented by the case of Pierson v. Post.39 Underin-
vestment can thus lead to underuse of the resource in question, rather than
overuse.
40
Both tragic tendencies depend on the existence of private property
rights in the resource that one harvests from, or fails to contribute to, the
collectivity. 4' A moment's reflection establishes that the overgrazing ex-
ample only works if the rancher "owns" the meat that results from grazing
cattle on the common land; that is, if we have some coherent idea of what is
meant by "his cattle" that affords him the benefit of the product of the ani-
mal and the grass that it eats.42 In other words, even though the resource
system in question is under common ownership, individuals have a right to
capture and own specific resource units.43 Likewise, an individual's failure
to contribute labor to the collective farming enterprise only makes sense if
the individual otherwise owns her human capital and can glean the benefits
of using it in other ways (whether for leisure or money-making endeavors).
Thus, the tragedy of the commons boils down to this: inefficient deci-
sions regarding the allocation of property interests between the collectivity
and one's personal stock. In a commons situation, each group member has
the unilateral ability to transfer commons resources to herself and to trans-
fer her own resources to the collectivity. We would expect to see too much
of the former and not enough of the latter. This can be understood as a pric-
ing flaw. Transferring commons resources to oneself comes "too cheaply"
38 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1326 (discussing incentive to shirk when land is commonly
owned).
39 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). In Pierson, one hunter (Post) had begun pursuit of a fox with
his hounds and was on the verge of capturing it when another hunter (Pierson) arrived on the scene and
nabbed the fox. The majority held that Post had no claim to the fox because he had not yet "deprived
him of his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control." Id. at 178. However, the dissent
worried that this rule would remove the incentive to invest in foxhunting. What person, asked the dis-
sent, would invest in hounds, rise at the break of day, and spend hours chasing "the windings of this wily
quadraped, if... a saucy intruder, who had not shared in the honours or labours of the chase, were per-
mitted to come in at the death, and bear away in triumph the object of pursuit?" Id. at 181 (Livingston,
J., dissenting).
40 See Heller, supra note 2, at 675 (presenting example of "Poach Pond"-a communal fish pond in
which no person owns a fish until the moment of consumption). Heller's "Poach Pond" will be under-
used because the entitlement structure creates a disincentive to invest in catching fish; one can instead sit
on the banks and take fish from those who have caught them. Id.
41 See id. at 675 n.246 (recounting a conversation with William Miller on this point).
42 Cf BARZEL, supra note 27, at 85 (observing that "[t]he ability to consume commodities, includ-
ing those necessary to sustain life, implies possession of the rights over them").
43 See supra note 33 (distinguishing between resource systems (or "stocks") and resource units (or
"flows"); Lueck, supra note 33, at 202 (providing examples where people are allowed to appropriate
resource units such as grass, oil, and fish, while the resource stock remains under common ownership).
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when one does not have to take account of the costs the transfers inflict on
the commons. Likewise, one's own contributions to the common enterprise
are compensated at less than full value, where one cannot capture the bene-
fits bestowed on the collectivity.'
It is often possible to cast a particular collective action problem as either
a problem of underinvestment or a problem of overuse. For example, con-
sider a dirty carpet in a common room of a group house. The problem could
be couched either as "overuse" of the carpet by people with muddy shoes, or
as "underinvestment" in mud-avoidance, shoe-cleaning, or carpet-protection
activities.45 Nothing turns on which way a particular commons problem is
classified, as long as the dynamic creating the specific problem in question is
well-understood.46 Alternatively, one tragic tendency might anticipate and re-
inforce the other. Knowing that other ranchers will overgraze the field, no
rancher has an incentive to irrigate the land to encourage the growth of grass.
The anticipation of overuse thus exacerbates the preexisting tendency to un-
derinvest in a resource whose benefits will be shared by others, because it
suggests that the investor will receive an even smaller return on her invest-
ment as a result of the dissipation generated by later overuse.47
44 This does not mean that people will always fail to engage in activities that produce positive ex-
ternalities; the internalized portion of the reward may be sufficient to prompt their actions. See DAVID
D. HADDOCK, IRRELEVANT INTERNALITIES, IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES, AND IRRELEVANT ANXIETIES
28-29 (Northwestern U. School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper, No. 03-16, 2003), available
at http://www.papers.ssm.com/abstract=437221. Likewise, people will not always engage in activities
that produce negative externalities; the internalized portion of the cost might itself be a sufficient deter-
rent. There is also a flip side to each of these observations: People who engage in activities with nega-
tive externalities, or refrain from activities with positive externalities, might still do the same even if the
costs and benefits were internalized. See infra Part lI.B. 1.
45 A classic example of this potential for alternative characterizations of the same phenomenon is
found in Pigou's discussion of smoking chimneys. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-61
(1920) (observing that "resources devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys" provide
an "uncompensated service," while the smoke itself "inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the commu-
nity"); see, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 35 (1960) (observing
that Pigou characterizes those who keep their chimneys from smoking as "render[ing] services for which
they receive no payment"); Krier, supra note 14, at 325-26 n.3 (discussing Pigou's view of pollution
control as generating a positive externality). This observation lines up with a broader point about the
permeability of the line between harms and benefits. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1024 (1992) (noting that the challenged land use restriction could be characterized either as secur-
ing a benefit or preventing a harm); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation'Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-97 (1967) (discuss-
ing difficulty of distinguishing harm-producing actions from those that fail to confer benefits).
46 But see OSTROM ET AL., supra note 37, at 14-15 (suggesting that it is analytically useful to distin-
guish "supply side" problems of provision and maintenance from "demand side" appropriation problems).
While I agree that separating out different problems within the context of a complex resource system is cru-
cial to understanding what might be done to improve matters, the question of whether any particular prob-
lem is best classified as one involving the "supply side" or the "demand side" seems to me of little
significance, especially in contexts where the suppliers and the appropriators are exactly the same people.
47 See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 351 ("Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is
in no person's interest to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of game.").
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Other examples of these mutually reinforcing tragic tendencies are ar-
guably found in certain intellectual property contexts. Scientific research
and other forms of creative and innovative work exhibit complementarities
and synergies, so that freely sharing them in an intellectual "commons" can
yield benefits, including ideas for new work, that will exceed the sum of the
contributions.4" However, if the group members cannot capture a share of
the resulting benefits that is roughly proportionate to the contributions that
each member makes, we would expect fewer contributions.49 The situation
becomes even more difficult and interesting when we recognize that a form
of "overgrazing" can also occur simultaneously in conjunction with an in-
tellectual commons.
Intellectual goods exhibit "nonrivalry" in consumption, insofar as the
transmission of a song or theory from me to you does not leave any less of
the song or theory for me.5" Nevertheless, these goods are subject to a form
of overgrazing, insofar as consumers have limited attention.5 The replica-
tion of a given expression or innovation may simply spread surplus around
to other producers or to consumers through competition, or it could actually
reduce the total amount of surplus associated with that particular product. 2
48 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 203 (2001) (observing that "[i]ntellectual property is both an input and an output in
the creative process"); Rebecca Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting
Controversy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633 (1994) (observing the extent to which biomedical research has
grown through building upon past work in the public domain); Lemley, supra note 4, at 997 (discussing
cumulative nature of knowledge); Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 145 (1996) (noting value to researchers of shared
access); cf. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in
the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 97-98 (2003) (noting that commerce and com-
munications exhibit synergies and network benefits, justifying public access to them).
49 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 48, at 95-96 (noting concerns with providing appropriate incentives
to produce intellectual goods); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38 (6th ed. 2003)
(observing that, in the absence of patents, innovation may suffer or may be skewed "toward inventions
that could be kept secret").
50 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 48, at 22, 94-95 (discussing the nonrivalrous character of intellectual
property); Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411, 413 (1983) (discussing the distinction between infor-
mation, which many can share without reducing the value of the information to each other, and a tangible
resource like wheat, which cannot be possessed in its entirety by more than one person simultaneously).
51 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 471, 485-86 (2003) (discussing forms of "overgrazing" possible in the case of intellectual prop-
erty, including the chance that overuse of a particular image might generate "confusion, the tarnishing of
the image, or sheer boredom on the part of the consuming public"); see also Michael J. Meurer, Copy-
right Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 96-97 (2001) (observing that limited
consumer attention is a common pool resource that producers of works will tend to overharvest).
52 See Landes & Posner, supra note 51, at 486 (distinguishing between "pecuniary" externalities
that alter wealth distributions and "technological" externalities that lead to a net reduction in overall util-
ity). The former is not, strictly speaking, an "overgrazing" problem, insofar as the appropriations in
question do not operate to reduce the total amount of surplus associated with the existing intellectual
product. However, such appropriations would still have the effect of reducing the expected return on
intellectual work, and intensifying the tendency toward underinvestment.
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The tendency towards overgrazing could thus reinforce one towards under-
investment,53 leading to a commons featuring too few, and too intensively
exploited, intellectual products-at least in the absence of legal rules or
norms designed to cabin these tendencies. 4
These questions are tremendously complex ones that have been exten-
sively analyzed by other scholars; I raise them here only by way of illustra-
tion. What drives the reinforcing tendency in these examples is the fact that
the group members' investments create a common pool resource that fea-
tures both difficult exclusion and subtractibility, such that individual re-
source units (grass, fish, or consumer attention ) can be taken away, leaving
less behind for others.55 A true public good, on the other hand, features
nonexcludability coupled with nonrivalry in consumption-that is, each
person's use of the resource does nothing to diminish anyone else's. 6 In
cases where investments combine to produce a public good, such as public
television, the fact that free-riders cannot be excluded from the good still
creates a problem of underinvestment.57 But it will not in those cases be ex-
acerbated by the further prospect of overextraction, because the resource in
question does not exhibit subtractibility.55
2. Distributive Questions Distinguished.-In order for a situation to
take the shape of a tragedy of the commons, two basic requirements must
53 The compound problem I describe here is present when consumer interest is generated and fo-
cused through specific investments and thereafter "overgrazed." However, we might also worry about
races to harvest preexisting, unfocused consumer attention that is not the product of any specific, identi-
fiable investment. See infra note 54. Recent literature on competition for attention includes, for exam-
ple, THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW
CURRENCY OF BUSINESS (2001), and JOSEF FALKINGER, ATTENTION ECONOMIES (CESifo Working Pa-
per, No. 1079, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=466580.
54 Securing strong property rights in creators to address underinvestment concerns may generate other
problems, of course, including the possibility of wasteful races to obtain those rights. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 49, at 37 (analogizing difficulties presented by patents to wasteful races to salvage sunken treas-
ure); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 179-80 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (summarizing and citing the literature
on races to innovate); Meurer, supra note 51, at 96-97 (describing wasteful races to get to market first).
55 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Private and Common Property Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 332, 337-38 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999), available at
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/index.html (discussing subtractibility).
56 See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 8, at 6-7 (1986) (discussing characteristics of public
goods); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 37, at 7 & fig.1.1 (presenting a schema that distinguishes public
goods from common-pool resources based on the degree of subtractibility that the good exhibits).
57 See HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining that "the costliness or de facto
infeasibility of exclusion from consumption of a collectively provided good usually eliminates any di-
rect incentive for individual consumers to pay for the good").
58 The situation might be different if watching public television increased one's access to scarce re-
sources or opportunities-for example, if it enabled one to make more intelligent conversation and to
compete more effectively in professional or personal spheres. In that case, more widespread watching
of public television could diminish one's ability to profit in these ways from watching public television.
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be met. 9 First, the individual actors must fail to internalize all the costs or
benefits of their actions. The tendencies towards overgrazing and undercul-
tivation both arise from a failure to concentrate within the same decision-
maker all of the costs and benefits associated with a given action.6" This
mismatch between internalized and actual costs and benefits skews a deci-
sionmaker's assessment of whether a given action is beneficial, and can
lead to inefficient choices about resource use.6
Second, the total returns to the group's members must be larger in the
case of cooperative action than in the case of defecting action.62 To put it
59 These criteria bear some resemblance to the two that Elinor Ostrom and her coauthors associate
with common pool resource dilemmas: "suboptimal outcomes" and "institutionally feasible alterna-
tives." OSTROM ET AL., supra note 37, at 15-16. My focus on the total size of the pie, see infra text ac-
companying notes 62-63, captures the idea of "suboptimal outcomes," and the requirement that
externalities be present, see infra text accompanying notes 60-61, signals at least some hope for im-
provement (through, for example, mechanisms designed to internalize the externalities). While I do not
focus on whether improvements are institutionally feasible, this is consistent with the fact that I am here
attempting to set out the conditions for "tragedy"-which could exist even if no improvement were in-
stitutionally possible. In contrast, Ostrom and her coauthors were focusing on defining a category of
"dilemmas" from which escape was possible; they recognized that other common pool resource "situa-
tions" could exist. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 37, at 16.
60 See, e.g., MUNDELL, supra note 35, at 185 (defining externalities as benefits and costs that do not
accrue to the chooser); POSNER, supra note 49, at 71-74 (discussing incentive problems that can result
when one does not reap the full benefit of one's inputs); Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1326 (making the
same point in the context of group-owned land).
61 Of course, outright owners of resources sometimes engage in objectively wasteful or destructive
conduct, even though all of the costs and benefits of that conduct are concentrated on them. See, e.g.,
Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, supra note 54, at 76 (discussing common law right to destroy one's
own property); Symposium, Time, Property, Rights, and the Common Law-Round Table Discussion,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 793, 845-46 (1986) (comments of R. Ellickson) (questioning whether people can
really destroy their own property without being restrained or committed); LIOR STRAHILEVITZ, THE
RIGHT TO DESTROY, (U. Chi. Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 205, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-488847 (assessing legal limits on the right to destroy). One might explain some
instances of destruction (or inadequate cultivation) of one's own property by invoking the notion of "in-
ternalities"-costs imposed on (or benefits enjoyed by) later selves, which the current self does not
properly take into account. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Case Study: Government Policy Towards Smok-
ing: A View from Economics, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & ETHICS 119 (2002) (discussing internalities
in context of the self-damaging behavior of smoking); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 23-24 & nn. 76-77 (1995) (dis-
cussing myopic decisionmaking and the notion of "internality"). In other words, people might suffer
from an internal tragedy of the commons in which each successive self overextracts or underinvests
without heed for the costs imposed on later selves. As intriguing as this line of inquiry is, I will set it
aside here to focus on spillovers that affect other people.
62 Sometimes this point is made explicit in discussions of common pool resources. See OSTROM ET
AL., supra note 37, at 15-16 (discussing "suboptimal outcomes" as a feature of common pool resource
dilemmas). It is also implicit in the goal of ensuring that a resource system remains "sustainable" over
time. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 55, at 338 (discussing the goal of sustainable use in designing a
property regime for governing a common pool resource). The notion of sustainability implies that a dif-
ferent set of actions would make the resource nonsustainable and hence incapable of producing as valu-
able a stream of resources.
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another way, cooperation has to do more than merely change the distribu-
tion of a pie of fixed size; it must actually increase the amount of pie that
there is to go around. For this reason, any tragedy of the commons is by
definition an inefficient occurrence, although it often also has results that
seem distributionally unfair.63
Focusing on these two criteria in tandem allows us to distinguish a true
tragedy of the commons from mere distributive realignments of resources
that may occur in a commons. The latter exhibit the first criterion, but not
the second. For example, imagine a fixed pile of money that four individu-
ally sequestered people can draw upon via a computer interface. This is a
pure game of distribution. People may behave selfishly or unselfishly in
their appropriation behaviors, but it does not change the overall amount of
money in the pile available for someone to get. The gain to one person
from selfish behavior is not outweighed by a larger social cost; instead, the
rest of the group loses by exactly the amount that the greedy person gains.64
There may be opportunism and unfairness, but there is no inefficiency.65
Likewise, no true problem of inefficient underinvestment is present
when the cooperative contributions in question will not increase the total
amount of resources involved, but will only facilitate redistribution. If peo-
ple with a fixed amount of money choose to pool their funds, their contribu-
tions to the common fund do nothing to increase the financial resources
available to the group members as a whole.66 The pooling arrangement will
likely alter the distribution of those resources, but any loss that one group
member suffers as a result of having contributed to the pool is exactly offset
by gains to other group members.
63 This convergence of distributive justice and efficiency concerns turns the "tragedy of the com-
mons" into a story with a strong moral: greed ruins things for everyone. This is an interesting inversion
of the usual market rhetoric in which greed (more palatably termed "self-interest") helps everyone by
generating a larger social product. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannon ed., 1994) (1776) ("It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own inter-
est."). The inconsistency can be reconciled by making out a moral claim for private property as a
mechanism for channeling self-interest. See Heller, supra note 12, at 86 (observing that "the tragedy of
the commons metaphor" can be used, inter alia, "to provide moral justification for private property re-
gimes").
64 I set aside here the possibility that the distribution itself can have efficiency impacts due to the
diminishing marginal utility of money or other differences in the utility that money generates in different
hands. I will take up that complication below. See infra notes 72-73, 108, and accompanying text.
65 In other words, the game is zero-sum. Each move in the appropriation game generates winners
and losers, but the wins precisely balance out the losses. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1982) (describing zero-sum games). Moreover, once the appropriations game has
been completed, nobody can be made better off without making someone else worse off. See infra note
102 (discussing Pareto efficiency). The proviso that the people be individually sequestered avoids a
source of inefficiency that will be discussed infra Part I.A.3.
66 1 set aside here the possibility that the pooling itself generates gains by, for example, enabling
contributors to diversify their holdings or to secure access to a lumpy good. Similar gains from entitle-
ment assembly will be taken up presently. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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These examples elide the question of where the money came from, and
it is certainly true that the distributive consequences could generate ineffi-
ciencies by reducing each group member's willingness to earn money and
to participate in such pooling arrangements. But the concept of a fixed pot
of resources is highly relevant to many nonrenewable natural resource con-
texts where such incentive effects operate more weakly or not at all; no hu-
man agent created the resource or can add to its quantity, except perhaps at
the margin through more careful extraction methods.
3. Fixed-Pot Resources and the Resource-Gathering Environment.-
Of course, in most real-world situations, even if the resource itself does
not shrink as a result of selfish behavior, other costs are imposed on the par-
ties as a result of such behavior that reduce the net value of their draw. For
example, imagine a large cache of gold has just been discovered. Mining
faster does not alter the total amount of gold to be distributed among the
miners, but it may impose other kinds of costs on participants in the form of
overinvestment in mining equipment, accidents resulting from mining too
many hours each day or attempting to extract the gold too quickly, fights
among rival miners, and so on.67 All of these costs reduce the net benefit
associated with the gold that the miners obtain.68
One way of thinking about these fixed resource situations is to recog-
nize that they involve not only the fixed common resource (e.g., a fixed
quantity of gold) but also another "commons" that is relevant to the partici-
pants' payouts-the resource-gathering environment. The overlay of this
second commons adds the second criterion for tragedy: the total returns
available to the group are larger under cooperative conditions than under
noncooperative conditions. That one individual ends up with a bigger share
67 See Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Introduction: The Economic Approach to Property
Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 33, at 1, 5 ("The competi-
tion for open access resources is costly because the same time and effort spent competing for resources
could be expended in other ways."). The same problem is presented by sunken or buried caches of treasure,
which are likely to elicit excessively costly recovery efforts. See POSNER, supra note 49, at 35-36.
68 A growing body of literature addresses the societal arrangements that actually governed gold
mining in California. See, e.g., Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the
Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001) (focusing on the
role of norms in establishing order); John Umbeck, Might Makes Right: A Theory of the Formation and
Initial Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38 (1981) (providing a somewhat different
account); see also Andrea G. McDowell, From Commons to Claims: Property Rights in the California
Gold Rush, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2002) (providing an historical account of the evolution of prop-
erty rights during the gold rush, based primarily on a review of numerous letters and diaries); John Urn-
beck, The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST.
197 (1977), discussed in BARZEL, supra note 27, at 85-86 (observing that, notwithstanding the limited
amount of violence in the gold rush, many costs were incurred in establishing and delineating rights);
KAREN CLAY & GAVIN WRIGHT, ORDER WITHOUT LAW? PROPERTY RIGHTS DURING THE CALIFORNIA
GOLD RUSH (Stanford U. Economics Working Paper, No. 03-008, 2003), available at http://
www.ssm.com/abstract-id=420960 (emphasizing the importance of understanding gold mining as a
high-stakes race to capture shares of a nonrenewable resource).
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is not socially costly in itself (the gain to that individual perfectly offsets the
loss imposed on other members of the pool), but the way in which the indi-
vidual makes that appropriation is likely to involve actions that are on net
costly in the linked commons of the resource-gathering environment.
When the two commons are considered together, we see that people
are merely "overgrazing" in the usual sense when they fight over resources.
People take resource-appropriation actions that are socially costly because
they internalize the benefits of those actions (by capturing a larger share of
the underlying resource) without also internalizing all of the associated
costs. This is obvious where the resource-appropriation activities involve
costs that are wholly or partially externalized (e.g., shoving aside other
people, or fighting with them, in an effort to get more gold). But it is also
true in the case where the wasteful costs incurred in the resource-gathering
environment are internalized to the actor (e.g., accidentally driving a pick
into one's own hand as a result of haste and exhaustion, or paying a team of
workers for overtime). There, the action imposes externalities on the other
participants by creating a rate of resource depletion that forces the other ac-
tors to either accept a smaller share of the underlying resource or incur ad-
ditional appropriation costs of their own (their own accidents and
overinvestments). The net result is less value distributed among the group
as a whole than would be achievable through cooperation.
We can also see the underinvestment problem at play in the resource-
gathering environment. It might be the case that everyone would enjoy the
activity of harvesting the resource more if the individual actors took time
with pleasantries, treated each other with civility, and so on. Yet these ac-
tivities generate positive externalities in the resource appropriation envi-
ronment that are not wholly internalized by those making the contributions.
Moreover, these activities tend to reduce the share of the underlying re-
source that the actor in question can gather. In deciding how to behave in a
resource-gathering situation, people will, of course, take account not only of
the resources they obtain, but also the costs that are incurred (or benefits en-
joyed) in the gathering. Therefore, they would be willing to trade off some
amount of the underlying resource in exchange for a better resource-
gathering environment. But even if everyone would prefer somewhat less
of the resource and a nicer resource-gathering environment, it is impossible
to achieve this result unilaterally.
Once we begin to recognize the resource-appropiation environment as
a commons unto itself, we can see that tragic tendencies can play out even
with regard to resources that are allocated through market mechanisms or
that enjoy various sorts of property protections. Arguably, uncivil or ag-
gressive conduct does not influence the share of the underlying resource
one receives in a privatized system to the same extent as it does where the
resource is under common control; hence, we might expect fewer deviations
from the social optimum in the resource-gathering environment where mar-
ket-rationed resources are involved. For example, if prices are set appropri-
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ately, ordinarily one need not trample or elbow one's fellow shoppers to get
to the cheese display first; one's willingness to pay the going price is
enough to secure one's appropriation rights.69
However, more subtle tragedies of the commons can occur in the re-
source-gathering environments associated with market capitalism. For ex-
ample, perhaps every member of a community enjoys strolling and
browsing through a quaint downtown filled with unique, locally-owned
shops, but prefers to purchase products at lower prices at bland suburban
supercenters. This problem can be characterized as one of underinvestment
in the ambience produced by the local businesses. Each member of the
community who pays a higher price at the local stores bears the full finan-
cial burden of doing so, but enjoys only a share of the ambient benefits pro-
duced as a result of the solvency of the Main Street businesses. Because
everyone is better off letting someone else pay the higher prices, nobody
shops on Main Street.7" The result is a net drop in the overall surplus asso-
ciated with the shopping experience.
Where a fixed pool of resources is involved, and where no gains or
losses attach to actions in the resource-gathering environment, are gains and
losses still possible as a result of the distribution itself? There are at least
two distinct reasons for thinking this could be the case. The first stems
from the impact of resource distribution on wealth.7 If one assumes a di-
minishing marginal utility of money, wealth differences wrought by initial
resource distributions could influence aggregate utility.72 Here, we confront
69 This does not work perfectly. For example, there can be "runs" on popular items that result in
costly rushing. Likewise, if identically-priced items are heterogeneous, early arrivals can pluck up the
best deals, and later arrivals must make do with the "picked over" remains. See BARZEL, supra note 27,
at 102 (explaining that "[w]hen supermarket shoppers are allowed to choose items such as apples, they
are in a position to capture the value of the better apples, which are sold at the same price as the inferior
apples" even though this selection effort is costly).
70 This simple summary suppresses an important aspect of this example: The good in question-
ambience from thriving local merchants-is probably close to being a "step good," if we assume that
there is relatively narrow range of cooperative activity (Main Street shopping) that makes the difference
between a viable Main Street and a defunct Main Street. See infra Part II.C.2 (defining and discussing
step goods).
71 If transaction costs are sufficiently low, trade following the initial distribution or harvesting of re-
sources will move the resources themselves into the hands of those who value them most highly. For
example, if one fisher more highly values a particular type of fish, the fish would end up in her hands,
even if someone else initially withdrew the fish from the pond. Nevertheless, the transaction will leave
the purchasing fisher with less wealth than she would have had if she had initially withdrawn the fish
herself. Hence, the initial distribution has lasting implications for the distribution of wealth, even after
all efficient trades have been completed.
72 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 80 (1981) (explaining that utilitari-
ans often "derive an income-equalization goal from a combination of the principle of diminishing mar-
ginal utility of money income and the hunch that people's utility functions are pretty much alike (or at
least not positively related to wealth)"); AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 95-96 (1992)
(explaining that Hugh Dalton combined assumptions about identical utility functions with the assump-
tion of a diminishing marginal utility of money to conclude that transfers toward equality would increase
total social welfare).
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familiar problems about the difficulty of making interpersonal utility com-
parisons. 73 A second reason that distribution could produce gains and losses
relates to the optimal degree of fragmentation or aggregation of resource
units. For example, the total value of a tract of land will fall if it is broken
up into pieces that are each too small to be of much use. In other words,
fragmentation itself can generate a loss. 74 This might be because boundary
problems or coordination problems are exacerbated, 75 because economies of
scale or other complementarities among resources cannot be realized,76 or
because additional transactions are necessary in order to aggregate a usable
physical quantity of the resource.77 Such possibilities lead us directly to the
conceptual twin of the commons, the anticommons.
73 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 49, at 470 (observing that the utility curves of different individuals
might vary in height and shape); Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48
ECON. J. 635, 636-37 (1938) (noting difficulties in assessing levels of satisfaction experienced by dif-
ferent individuals), cited in AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 81 (1973). Abba Lerner sug-
gested that this difficulty could be overcome by focusing on expected marginal utility, based on a
probabilistic analysis. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 30 n.58
(2002) (explaining that, under Lerner's approach, differing utility functions do not weaken the argument
for equal distributions); SEN, supra, at 83-85 (giving a formal presentation of Lerner's result). But see
POSNER, supra note 49, at 470 (observing that Lerner's approach does not allow for the possibility that
wealthy people, on average, derive greater pleasure from money than poor people-a possibility that
Posner finds plausible); Bertrand De Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution, in INEQUALITY AND
POVERTY 6, 7 (Edward C. Budd ed., 1967) (noting that Lerner's solution assumes "that the holders of
incomes have not developed their lives and tastes in accordance with their incomes"). Our inability to
prove that people have identical utility functions does not, of course, establish the contrary proposi-
tion-that each dollar generates the same utility regardless of the wealth of its holder-a view that is
"equally unjustified and quite contrary to the subjective experience of most individuals." Herbert Ho-
venkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 848-49 (1990).
74 In fact, this is just one subset of a more general difficulty: Where transaction costs are signifi-
cant, resources may never make it into the hands of those who value them most highly, or may do so
only after significant value has been dissipated in the process. Even where there is no issue of fragmen-
tation or aggregation, inefficiencies could result from an initial distribution that vested ownership in a
lower-valuing party, where transaction costs are positive. This is one reason why it is difficulty to find
real-world examples of "purely distributive" resource problems. See infra note 108.
75 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1332 & n.62 (noting the inverse relationship between tract size
and the per-acre cost of fencing or monitoring the perimeter); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmen-
tation, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 323-36 (2002) (discussing the increase in boundaries that accompanies
fragmentation of land and the related increase in opportunities for spillovers to cross boundaries).
76 See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 51 (1991) (presenting a land as-
sembly example that assumes that scale economies will be realized). I am setting aside in this paper the in-
triguing problems presented by that most heterogeneous and interactive of resources, human capital. The
possibility that the patterns of pools into which people sort themselves for various purposes could have im-
pacts on the total social value created has been explored in, for example, Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit
and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2001).
77 This would be the case when an entitlement is split up functionally so that no one person holds
the right to make meaningful use of it, or when individual resource units that fit together in ways that
add value are extracted separately. An example of this latter sort of fragmentation occurs whenever a
habitat is overfished or overharvested, so that too many pieces of the overall system have been removed
to leave the balance viable.
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B. Tragedies of the Anticommons
As the discussion above indicated, one of the possible costly outcomes
of a tragedy of the commons is the creation of inefficiently fragmented
property. This can happen spontaneously (for example, through the split-
ting of land into uselessly tiny pieces),7" or it can be the result of responses
to the tragedy of the commons (e.g., assignment of legal or de facto veto
rights over resource use to a variety of parties). In either case, the resulting
fragmentation of entitlements may generate inefficiencies of the sort associ-
ated with the tragedy of the anticommons.
1. Two More Tragic Tendencies.-The most commonly discussed
tragedy of the anticommons is usually termed "underuse."79 In the proto-
typical anticommons, everyone has the power to exclude everyone else
from a resource, but nobody has the power to enter or use that resource
without the permission of everyone else."0 In the real world, we are more
likely to encounter a limited-access anticommons-a resource use over
which some limited number of people have independent veto power.8' Mi-
chael Heller posited that this structure of entitlements contributed to the
persistence of empty storefronts in post-socialist regimes, given the number
of permits that were required from different actors in order to set up shop.82
The same structural problem exists any time a number of entitlements
must be assembled together (or "bought up") in order to enjoy any particu-
lar use of a given resource. Recognizing the conceptual commonalities,
scholars have applied the anticommons metaphor to a diverse array of re-
78 See Heller, supra note 2, at 651 (discussing "spatial anticommons" that results when land is split
into parcels too small to be used). Heller discusses an extreme example: the Quaker Oats "Big Inch"
promotion, in which millions of customers were granted 1-inch square pieces of property in the Yukon.
Id. at 682-83. More pressing problems of excessively fractionated land interests developed on Indian
reservations as land allotments held in trust splintered again and again while descending to successive
generations. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707-08, 712-13 (1987) (describing situation in
which the ownership of many land parcels was divided among multiple individuals, and one notable
forty-acre parcel had 439 owners); Heller, supra note 2, at 685-87 (discussing the fragmentation of Na-
tive American land holdings).
79 E.g., Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3, at 1; Heller, supra note 2, at 624; Hsu, supra note 3, at
814. While the term "underuse" produces a striking mental image of a valuable resource lying fallow
and simply "going to waste," it is important to understand that it is not the lack of use itself that consti-
tutes the anticommons problem, but rather the processes that cause this to happen. Outright owners of
resources can also fail to make good use of them, and this does not present an anticommons problem.
Nevertheless, like the striking mental image of greed that supplies a moral undertone for the commons
tragedy, see supra note 63, the idea of idle resources adds a moral undertone to the anticommons idea
that likely adds to its intuitive resonance. For a discussion of the ethical and economic implications of
leaving nonlabor resources idle, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ETHICS AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 120-28
(1994).
80 See Michelman, supra note 1, at 6, 9 (describing this idealized anticommons); Ellickson, supra
note 1, at 1322 n.22 (discussing same).
81 See Heller, supra note 2, at 667-69 (redefining anticommons property in this way).
82 Id. at 633-40.
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source use problems.8 3 Because obtaining permission from any significant
number of people is likely to be prohibitively costly, the result is a resource
which nobody is able to use. Often, although not always, this leads to an
inefficient result.84 Where this is the case, the result is usually understood
as a tragedy of the anticommons.
The term "anticommons," then, has become a shorthand way of refer-
encing a broad class of entitlement assembly problems. Of course, the dif-
ficulties associated with assembling entitlements for resource use was
recognized well before the anticommons terminology came into vogue,85
but the term "anticommons" has made these difficulties more salient. In-
stead of everyone having too much freedom to allocate resources between
themselves and the collectivity, as was the case in the tragedy of the com-
mons, 86 participants in an anticommons dilemma lack the ability to put to-
gether entitlements into bundles that would make them usable.87 This
powerlessness can be better understood as a dispersal of power-the power
of individual fragment holders to refuse a transfer at a price acceptable to
the would-be assembler.
The high price placed on the fragment by the fragment holder could be
an entirely honest expression of its value to the fragment holder. If so, and
if the would-be assembler is unwilling to pay the prices honestly set by the
fragment holder, then assembly would not have been efficient, and no inef-
ficiency results when it fails to materialize.88 However, the fragment
holder's price might instead be strategically set in an effort to garner a lar-
ger share of the surplus that will be generated by the assembly of the frag-
ments.89 If so, then inefficiency results if the artificially-high prices (or
strategic refusals to deal) prevent assembly of the interests in the hands of
83 See supra note 9 (citing sources that have made varied uses of the anticommons template).
84 Fragmentation does not necessarily portend inefficiency. Indeed, it is possible that fragmentation
is functional, as where it generates transaction costs that stop bargains that would otherwise have oc-
curred, but that would not have been efficient because they would not have taken into account the inter-
ests of all of the affected parties (e.g., future generations). A recent paper extolling the virtues of
blockage associated with fragmented interests is Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3.
85 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under In-
complete Information, in ECONOMICS AND HUMAN WELFARE 23, 24-25 (M. Boskin ed., 1979), re-
printed in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 216, 217-
18 (1984) (discussing the difficulties that a factory owner might face in attempting to buy the rights to
clean air held by a number of nearby landowners, and the resulting impediments to efficient bargaining
outcomes).
86 See supra Part I.A.
87 See Heller, supra note 2, at 640 (explaining that "[m]oving a storefront from anticommons to pri-
vate property ownership requires unifying fragmented property rights into a usable bundle"); Heller, su-
pra note 12, at 88 (observing that "[o]nce an anticomnons emerges, collecting rights into usable private
property is often brutal and slow").
88 The distributive results may be undesirable, however. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing distributive
issues).
89 Arrow, supra note 85, at 218 (discussing the incentives that landowners would have to misstate
their preferences, when approached by a factory owner seeking to buy permission to emit smoke).
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the person who values them more highly. Importantly, the strategic behav-
ior in question can be anticipated rather than actual, discouraging a would-
be assembler from bothering to incur the cost of attempting an assembly.9"
Holdout behavior9 imposes externalities on other people in two ways.
First, it generates costs 92 that are borne in part by the would-be entitlement
assembler, rather than wholly by the holdout. The assembler cannot simply
take the holdout at her word when she says she will not sell at a particular
price, for this could be a strategic ploy. Hence, the assembler must spend
time and effort attempting to determine the true reservation prices of all the
fragment holders before she can determine whether the deal is viable. Sec-
ond, if the transfer of the fragment does not occur, the opportunity cost as-
sociated with unfulfilled gains from trade are not wholly internalized to the
holdout, but instead destroy surplus that would otherwise be enjoyed by the
90 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 76, at 359 (noting that entrepreneurs who anticipate significant hold-
out and free rider problems may either abandon their projects or engage in costly efforts to keep their
assembly plans secret); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 445 n.167 (1977) (assuming, for purposes of an example, "that fear of hold-
outs would deter suburbs from trying to buy up consumers' and landowners' rights to enjoin efficient
antigrowth programs"); Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Art of Land Assembly 5 (Jan.
2004) (unpublished partial draft, on file with author) (noting that would-be assemblers' anticipation of
holdout problems may lead them to choose other investments or delay assembly efforts), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/Heller.pdf.
91 By "holdout behavior," I mean strategically-motivated refusals to deal, or price demands that are
in excess of private valuations, arising out of a desire to obtain a larger share of the surplus that will be
generated through the assembly of the entitlements. See Cohen, supra note 76, at 362 (defining a hold-
out as an owner who recognizes that, because of scale economies or other advantages generated by as-
sembly, his parcel has become "more valuable to the entrepreneur"); Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an
Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 936 (explaining that "[a] holdout
problem develops when one party insists on more than a proportionate share of the price that a willing
buyer will pay for a right held jointly by all members of a group, or when that party insists on more than
the value he places on the right simply because others are receiving a higher amount."). I do not number
among the holdouts those who honestly value their fragments at a prohibitively high price. See Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Eco-
nomics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 128-29 (2004) (limiting the term "holdout" in this fashion and using the
term "holdin" to designate a person who chooses not to sell because of a high subjective valuation); in-
fra Part I.B.2 (discussing distributive results associated with holdins).
92 The costs associated with holdout behavior are sometimes treated as an important subcategory of
transaction costs. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J.
75, 103 (1998) (observing that "holdout strategies" could greatly increase transaction costs); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 273 (1986) (discussing "transaction costs in the form of 'hold out' prob-
lems"). At other times, holdout problems are treated as a separate category from transaction costs. See,
e.g., Cooter, supra note 65, at 17 (suggesting that parties to bargaining interactions face "another obsta-
cle of an entirely different kind" from transaction costs when they must decide how to divide up the sur-
plus in the absence of a fixed price). This ambiguity is a function of the imprecise and varying ways in
which the term "transaction costs" has been used. See id. at 16 (noting that "[t]he meaning of transac-
tion cost is not well-standardized in the literature"). Here, I will use the narrower term "holdout prob-
lem" or "holdout cost" to specifically designate the class of strategic bargaining difficulties associated
with holdouts, and the broader term "transaction costs" as a catch-all that encompasses a wide array of
transaction-related problems, including holdout problems.
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would-be assembler and all of the other fragment holders who are now pre-
cluded from engaging in mutually-beneficial trades leading to entitlement
assembly. To put it another way, the fact that a deal does not occur will
hurt the holdout, but the pain will be shared by all of the other would-be
parties to the transaction who would otherwise reap benefits from the deal.93
The second tragic tendency associated with an anticommons also re-
lates to fragmentation, but this time the fragmentation gives rise not to inef-
ficiently overprotective assertions of rights over a resource, but to
inefficient underprotection of a resource.94 Consider a case where anyone
who wishes to use a park must go through a door secured by ten locks, keys
to which must be obtained from each of ten entitlement-holders. Here, the
entitlement to enter the park has been fragmented among ten people, and
must be reassembled in the hands of the would-be parkgoer before she can
enter the park. But imagine further that a simple set of burglar's tools con-
tains a skeleton key that opens every lock, so that an interloping parkgoer
can gain entry through illicit means, without permission from any of the ten
fragment-holders. Any fragment-holder could block this interloper's unau-
thorized action by enforcing her property entitlement. However, the fact
that the illicit user has trenched on the property rights of not just one person
but of many simultaneously means that any property owner who stands up
for her own rights will also be standing up for the rights of all the other vio-
lated property owners. Hence, a free-rider problem develops.95 Any en-
forcer must bear the full cost of enforcement, but enforcing an entitlement
in this context generates positive externalities for all of the other fragment-
holders. As each fragment-holder attempts to bluff other fragment-holders
into enforcing exclusion rights, inefficient incursions into the jointly held
resource can result.
What makes a tragedy of the anticommons "tragic" are the same two
ingredients that we saw in the context of the tragedy of the commons: first,
that the individual actors fail to internalize all the costs or benefits of their
actions; and second, that the total returns to the group's members are larger
in the case of cooperative action than in the case of defecting action. Here,
the externality-generating actions involve either inefficiently blocking re-
source use through refusal to transfer a fragmentary interest, or protecting a
resource from illicit appropriation by someone who has not, in fact, legiti-
mately assembled the necessary fragmentary interests. In the former case,
the externality involved is negative; in the latter case, it is positive. Conse-
quently, we would expect to see too much blocking where assembly would
93 See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that both commons and anticommons
tragedies arise from the fact that "separate decision makers, each of whom acts in exercise of assigned
rights, impose external diseconomies on others who hold similar rights"); Parisi et al., Duality, supra
note 3, at 3, 6-7, 8 (discussing externalities associated with exclusion in an anticommons).
94 See Heller, supra note 2, at 676 (describing this possibility, using the example of a California
coastal area along which any community member could block development).
95 Id.
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be the efficient result, and n3t enough enforcing where protecting the frag-
mented rights would be the efficient result.96
Cooperation capable of generating larger total returns means one of
two things in this context. It could mean playing one's part in a set of trans-
fers that will consolidate a fragmented entitlement and thereby facilitate its
highest and best use. For this to be the case, there must be an increment of
surplus associated with the assembly qua assembly. That is, the assembled
entitlement must be worth more in one person's hands than its parts are
worth, in the aggregate, when dispersed among many hands.
Alternatively, cooperation could mean stepping in to prevent someone
from simply grabbing entitlements that she does not own. In this case, fail-
ure to prevent illicit encroachments only turns "tragic" (inefficient) if the
fragments are more valuable when enforced as fragments than they are
when gathered together in the hands of the interloper. If the interloper actu-
ally values the fragments when assembled more highly than the fragment-
holders value them in the aggregate, the unchecked interloping introduces
no inefficiency. However, because lack of enforcement encourages ineffi-
cient transfers as well as efficient ones, a general breakdown of enforce-
ment would likely lead to inefficient results over time.
2. Distributive Questions Distinguished.-Here too, it is useful to
distinguish situations in which the second of the tragic ingredients is miss-
ing from an anticommons setting, such that the problem is one of distribu-
tion rather than efficiency. Consider first the person who blocks assembly
of a set of entitlements that, to an outside observer, appears as if it would be
much more valuable if brought together in the hands of an assembler. The
blocker might be a strategic holdout who is refusing to make the transfer in
the hopes of gaining a larger portion of the surplus-that is, demanding a
price in excess of her subjective valuation. If her bluff does not work and
the deal fails to occur, then the result is inefficient; surplus that might have
been enjoyed by the parties is lost.
However, if the bluff does work-that is, the other parties back down
and accept smaller shares of the available surplus in order to finance the
larger share of surplus that the bluffer is demanding-the deal occurs not-
withstanding the holdout behavior. Putting aside for a moment the dissipa-
tion of surplus associated with the bluffing itself and the responses to it,97
the outcome remains efficient; only the distribution of available surplus is
96 It is possible that both lapses could occur simultaneously. Imagine a neighborhood whose mem-
bers are bound together through a set of reciprocal land use covenants. One member would like to as-
semble permission to do something forbidden by the covenants that will yield a net benefit, such as
install a safety fence in the backyard, and the rest of the neighbors become embroiled in a strategic
holdout game (excessive blocking). Meanwhile, these same neighbors allow someone else to get away
with a covenant breach that does not, in fact, yield more benefits than it imposes on the neighbors as a
group (insufficient enforcement).
97 This will be discussed infra Part 1,B.3.
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affected.98 If we posit a perfect bluffer who can costlessly and convincingly
force others to take smaller shares of surplus, the resulting realignment of
surplus is a distributive matter, not a source of inefficiency. There is no a
priori reason to cast moral aspersions on such a bluffer, either-without a
well-defined theory of who "deserves" the surplus, the fact that one party
ends up with a larger or smaller share of the available surplus merely con-
stitutes a neutral fact.99 After all, someone has to end up with each incre-
ment of available surplus, if the surplus-generating realignment of
entitlements occurs.
There is another possibility as well. The person who seems to be
"holding out" might instead be what Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter
Siegelman term a "holdin"°° -someone who subjectively values her share
of the fragmentary interest above the amount that the assembler is willing to
pay her."' If a deal fails to happen because of the intractability of a person
who genuinely values the fragment in excess of the best offer she receives,
there is no efficiency loss.0 2 However, the distributive outcome could be
questioned. Perhaps the holdin's tastes seem so idiosyncratic or selfish as to
make her refusal to deal appear unfair. Another possibility is that intractabil-
98 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 76, at 352-53 (observing that the ability of parties to extract some of
the surplus associated with a consolidation project is a "purely distributive" matter, where transaction
costs remain unchanged and the project proceeds as planned); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 17, at 226
n.25 (observing that, in efficiency terms, "[t]he distribution of the gains from the transaction between the
parties is not important, as long as it does not affect total efficiency"); Polinksy, supra note 17, at 1077-
78 (explaining that the argument about "extortion" being available to property holders "relates to the
goal of distributional equity, not economic efficiency").
99 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 466-67 (critiquing the view that a holdout is engaged in a
form of extortion, where there is no reason to believe that she is any less entitled to the surplus than the
other parties, and observing that even a liability rule solution-which avoids holdout problems-assigns
the surplus to one party rather than another).
10 Parchomovksy & Siegelman, supra note 91, at 128-29; see Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security,
and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1403, 1412
(1982) (explaining that "[s]ometimes that purported holdout has a genuine interest in his property right,
however irrationally inflated that interest may seem to the world at large").
101 As Parchomovsky & Siegelman note, it is possible for someone to be somewhere between a
"holdout" and a "holdin"-that is, a person might state a genuine reluctance to sell, but have in mind the
possibility of selling at a high enough price. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 91, at 129-30. It
is indeed also possible that the person holding the entitlement does not even fully know to what extent
her reluctance to sell arises out of a deeply-held subjective valuation as opposed to an ingrained strategic
reflex to respond to inquiries about sales with great reticence.
t02 Forcing the holdin to sell to the assembler at a price below the holdin's true reservation price
would clearly make the holdin worse off, preventing the transaction from being a Pareto improvement.
See POSNER, supra note 49, at 12 (defining a Pareto improvement as "one that makes at least one person
better off and no one worse off"). Nor would it be efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, because the
amount of gain that the assembler would receive would not, in fact, be enough to truly compensate the
holdin at his subjective valuation of the fragment. See id. at 13 (explaining that an efficient transaction
in the Kaldor-Hicks sense is one in which the "winners could compensate the losers, whether or not they
actually do"); see also JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95-132 (1998) (discussing
these criteria of efficiency).
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ity of the holdin comes not from "rational" valuation of the fragment, but
from an "irrational" desire to harm someone else by withholding the frag-
ment.' °3 Perhaps we think that it is distributionally better to transfer the en-
titlement over the objections of the spiteful or eccentric holdin, if we
believe that these distributive improvements swamp any associated losses.
We might also question the fairness of the allocative process that endowed
the holdin with veto power in the first place.'" The important point for pre-
sent purposes is to recognize where an efficiency problem is created by an
anticommons structure and where instead the problem is one of distribution
only. 05
3. Dividing Surplus and the Surplus-Dividing Environment.-If we
understand the tragedy of the anticommons as being animated by a struggle
over surplus, the problem begins to look analytically much like the fixed-
pot resource games described earlier.0 6 If a particular assembly of frag-
ments (or, alternatively, enforced nonassembly) yields some specific
amount of surplus, the only interesting question would seem to be how the
surplus will be divided. But, just as in the case of a fixed-pot resource like
a cache of gold, the actions of the parties in their attempts to gain larger
shares of the surplus will impact the value that each member of the group is
able to carry away from the interaction. Like competing gold miners who
sustain injuries from haste or overinvest in mining equipment, parties spar-
ring over the distribution of the surplus associated with an assembly of
fragmented interests dissipate some of that surplus in the process.
What is remarkable about the anticommons situation is the possibility
that strategic posturing and wrangling may sink a deal altogether, so that the
103 In contrast to the rational actor who is concerned only with her own outcome and is indifferent
to the outcomes of others, people often behave in ways that suggest they do care about the outcomes
others receive and can be motivated by factors such as spite. See, e.g., Arthur Leff, Injury, Ignorance,
and Spite. The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970) (discussing willingness to pay
for spite); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990) (discussing the possibility that a party to a strategic
interaction might have atypical preferences, and introducing one character, Malice Aforethought, who
most prefers the payoffs that give his opponent the least). Empirical research suggests that people are
often willing to incur positive costs in order to punish perceived unfairness. See, e.g., RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 22-35 (1992) (dis-
cussing experimental literature on the ultimatum game); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 21-23 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(noting that in "ultimatum games" parties typically reject offers of less than 20 percent of the total, dem-
onstrating a willingness "to punish unfair behavior, even at a financial cost to themselves.").
104 The existence of an endowment effect that heightens attachments to held entitlements could rein-
force fairness concerns by suggesting that a different initial distribution might have generated a differ-
ent, but equally efficient, end result. See infra note 281 (citing sources that discuss the implications of
the endowment effect for entitlement choices).
105 I do not mean to suggest that distributive concerns are less important than efficiency concerns,
only that the latter fits with the typical meanings given to the tragedies in question. See supra note 11.
106 See supra Part 1.A.2-3.
Common Interest Tragedies
entire surplus that might have been shared among the parties vanishes out-
right. In that case, each person walks away empty-handed. Each party
would have been better off taking a "sucker's payoff'-a smaller than aver-
age share of the surplus rather than undertaking actions in the surplus-
dividing environment that destroyed the entire surplus.
II. A FUNCTIONAL TAXONOMY OF TRAGEDY
The system of classification I propose begins by bringing together both
commons and anticommons tragedies under the umbrella heading of "com-
mon interest tragedies."'t7 Although the term "common interest tragedies"
encompasses a very broad category, it does not include problems of pure dis-
tribution that do not alter the size of the total "pie" available for the parties."°8
The potential for increasing the total amount of value for the parties through
cooperation is what makes the problem one of "common interest" for the par-
ties. While it is true that the parties have interests that conflict in these set-
tings (hence, the potential for tragedy), they simultaneously have a common
interest in maximizing the total sum of value available to share.
How can this broad category of common interest tragedies be most use-
fully subdivided? In subpart A, I present a series of examples that illustrate
weaknesses in the distinctions often drawn between tragedies of the commons
and tragedies of the anticommons. I also show that the tragedies are linked to
each other in interesting and underappreciated ways. In subpart B, I propose
a functional distinction based on the strategic patterns that present stumbling
blocks to an efficient outcome. In subpart C, I examine some wrinkles in this
system of classification and add some further elaborations.
107 To my knowledge, no such umbrella term is in current usage. The generic term "collective action
problem" encompasses both sorts of tragedies, but is not limited to resource-related dilemmas. It seems
helpful to have a more precise term for referencing problems surrounding a resource of common interest to
the group. The term "resource dilemma" is a promising candidate, but it has been employed in a somewhat
more limited fashion to reference dilemmas that present a threat of resource depletion from overharvesting.
See Kimberly Wade-Benzoni et al., Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric, Environmental
Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 111, 112 (1996) (defining "resource dilemma").
108 It is unclear how prevalent pure problems of resource distribution are in the real world. As ex-
plained above, actions in the resource-gathering or surplus-dividing environments can "shrink the pie,"
as can the degree of aggregation or fragmentation of a given resource. More generally, the fact that dif-
ferent people can attach different subjective values to different resources presents a challenge to the no-
tion of pure distribution. If transactions costs were zero, resource units would readily move into the
hands of the person who valued them most highly, regardless of the initial distribution. Where transac-
tion costs are significant, however, the distribution can itself "shrink the pie" if transfers from low-
valuing owners to high-valuing owners do not occur or occur only at significant cost. Moreover, to the
extent one is interested in maximizing welfare rather than merely wealth, the diminishing marginal util-
ity of money suggests that allocations of wealth, which depend on allocations of resources, are very
likely to affect efficiency. See supra notes 71-73. Nevertheless, some resource-allocation problems,
such as divisions of resources among people with relatively homogeneous preferences and relatively
similar wealth levels, approximate problems of pure distribution.
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A. One Big Tragedy, After All?
A careful look at the tragedies of the commons and the anticommons
reveals a number of similarities. Tragedies of the commons and the anti-
commons both arise from the same two conditions: a failure of actors to in-
ternalize all costs and benefits associated with a given resource, coupled
with a situation in which net gains can be achieved through cooperation.
Hence, the problems exhibit a certain symmetry. °9 The commons and the
anticommons both arise out of a fragmentation of interests, if we allow the
idea of "interests" to be broadly understood."' In the case of the tragedy of
the commons, individual people have atomistic, uncoordinated self-interests
that conflict. What is splintered in that case is access to the resource in
question. Everyone has his or her own door to the common pool, so to
speak, and can withdraw or damage the resources found within."' In the
case of the anticommons, the fragmentation is reflected in a dispersal of
complementary property interests among a number of individuals. The
problem here can be understood as a single door that can be legitimately ac-
cessed only by obtaining keys from a number of individuals, but which may
in some circumstances be vulnerable to breach.
But how can we really tell a commons problem from an anticommons
problem when we encounter one in the real world? Two distinctions are
commonly employed: a distinction between overuse and underuse, and a
distinction between use privileges and exclusion rights. Neither distinction
withstands scrutiny. I will consider each in turn.
1. Overuse Versus Underuse.-In the literature, commons problems
and anticommons problems are typically associated with overuse of a re-
source and underuse of a resource, respectively."2 Examination of the
tragedies, as surveyed above, reveals that this distinction is problematic.
The second type of commons tragedy (undercultivation) tends to generate
underuse of a resource, while the second type of anticommons tragedy (un-
derprotection) tends to generate overuse of a resource." 3 Yet even if we
109 Indeed, Buchanan and Yoon have termed them "symmetric tragedies." Buchanan & Yoon, su-
pra note 3.
110 See Parisi et al., Duality, supra note 3, at 9 (observing that it is the lack of alignment between
use privileges and exclusion rights that creates tragedy in both cases).
I To put it another way, members have "first possession" rights in the resource flows that they can
individually capture. Lueck, supra note 33, at 202. Alternatively, members can effectively use up re-
source units by offloading "bads" into the commons, or reduce the number of resource units by with-
holding their own cultivation efforts.
112 See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3, at I (analyzing "the anticommons problem in which
resources are inefficiently underutilized rather than overutilized, as in the familiar commons setting");
Heller, supra note 12, at 87 (associating the tragedy of the commons with a tendency towards overuse
and the tragedy of the anticommons with a tendency towards underuse); Hsu, supra note 3, at 814
(same).
113 Heller points out that underuse in a commons and overuse in an anticommons are "theoretically
possible," but goes on to note that most real-world examples seem to follow the patterns with which the
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dismiss these "second tragedies" as less important or ignore them alto-
gether, the distinction still does not withstand scrutiny. Even when we limit
our attention to just the first tragedy of the commons (overgrazing) and the
first tragedy of the anticommons (overexclusion), taking either idea to its
logical conclusion demonstrates the vulnerability of any simple dichotomy
between overuse and underuse-at least insofar as we associate "overuse"
with more intensive resource use, and "underuse" with less intensive re-
source use.
First, while the prototypical examples of commons tragedies involve a
too-intensive use of a common pool resource, the same logical problem at-
tends "draws" against a common pool resource-such as space-that actu-
ally result in a less intensive pattern of use. Consider the appropriation of
empty space in a common parking lot. Unless guided by painted lines or
parking attendants, people create their own space buffers between cars. The
fact that these space buffers are not always of an optimal size can be readily
understood as a tragedy of the commons. A person parking her car on the
end of an existing row of cars can appropriate a buffer that is nearly as large
as the smallest vehicle that could potentially park in the lot and thereby gain
some incremental comfort in exiting the car and some marginal increase in
protection against door dings. She does not, of course, bear the costs asso-
ciated with the appropriation of this extra-large space buffer; those costs are
borne by later-arriving would-be parkers who find the lot less than densely
filled, but without any usable parking spaces remaining. The result is too
little use of the parking lot.
To be sure, once the lot is inefficiently filled with cars, we could recast
the resulting problem as an anticommons dilemma. The extra fragments of
space between cars are unusable unless aggregated together, and this is im-
possible without the consent and participation of a number of car owners
(who would have to be persuaded to give up or sell their buffer spaces, and
move their cars over to make room for a new car). However, the initial de-
cision to take "too much" space fits neatly within the usual notion of a trag-
edy of the commons. This example illustrates not only how a commons
tragedy can result in underuse (that is, a less intensive use), but also how an
anticommons problem may follow upon the heels of a commons problem.
Likewise, although the tragedy of the anticommons is usually stated in
prototypical form as a problem of physical exclusion from a commons re-
source and a resulting "underuse" of the resource, the tendency in question is
actually much broader in scope and encompasses all inefficiencies resulting
from an inability to aggregate the requisite property rights in order to enjoy a
particular resource. Fragmentation of property rights can keep people from
enjoying a resource cleared of certain kinds of intrusions, just as surely as it
can prevent people from using a resource in a particular way themselves.14
terms are more usually associated. Heller, supra note 2, at 675-76 & fig.6.
114 Cf Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
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This is really just a question of properly specifying the resource in question.
For example, the resource in question might be "silence" or "clean air" which
nobody can "use" without obtaining consent from every noisemaker and pol-
luter with the power to "exclude" people from their enjoyment of these re-
sources. Enjoying the resource of silence or clean air precludes, and requires
the relinquishment of rights over, a myriad of other uses."' In these cases as
well, the problem can be couched as "too much property""' 6 in too many
hands-here the entitlement to make noise or emit pollution is fragmented
among a set of people within earshot and airflow range.
One might argue that this is really a garden-variety tragedy of the
commons, a case of "overgrazing" the air, not a tragedy of the anticom-
mons. It seems more accurate to suggest it is both. The individual actions
that people take with regard to making noise and polluting have the charac-
ter of actions taken in a commons without regard for negative externalities.
But if we posit a person (or set of persons) interested in aggregating the
necessary entitlements to stop the air and noise pollution, then the difficul-
ties that they face in doing so look remarkably like the sort of fragmentation
challenge associated with an anticommons. Thus, a tragedy of the com-
mons (the tendency to overgraze the air) can morph before our eyes into a
tragedy of the anticommons once we take note of the fragmentary interests
that facilitate the overgrazing and consider the possibility of putting them
together under one person's control to stop it from happening." 7 Indeed,
any tragedy of the commons contains within it the potential for a surplus as-
sociated with moving from universal defection to universal cooperation. To
simplify a little, the tragedy of the commons tells us why things are likely to
REv. 711, 750 (1980) (describing a large-scale anticommons-like regime, in which everything, including
labor, is owned by "the whole world"--so that one must gain the consent of everyone in the world to do
things or use resources and also to refrain from doing things or using resources). As this example
shows, a structural problem associated with acquiring consent can exist regardless of the content or va-
lence of the choice or benefit that requires consent.
115 Consider the following analogy: an empty canvas, a set of people who would like to paint on it,
and one person who would like to keep it empty. If the would-be painters all have paints and paint-
brushes in their hands and are allowed to use them, the person who wants to keep the canvas empty must
buy the paints and brushes from the individual painters if she is to keep the canvas empty. If she suc-
ceeds in this, the resulting "use" of the canvas is of a field-occupying nature-it precludes all of the
other intended uses. This observation echoes Coase's point about the reciprocal nature of land use con-
flicts. See Coase, supra note 45, at 2.
116 The anticommons has been associated with the existence of "too much" property. E.g., Heller,
supra note 12, at 92. Of course, the commons also involves a problem of "too much" property, to the
extent parties have entitlements that let them capture resource units at will, withhold their own contribu-
tions, and despoil the resources within the commons with impunity.
117 In some contexts, such a solution may seem wildly implausible. For example, Freyfogle sug-
gests that we cannot "hope to solve the tragedy of the commons by awaiting a wealthy patron who pays
all graziers to refrain from overgrazing." FREYFOGLE, supra note 27, at 198. While awaiting a benevo-
lent donor to solve a commons dilemma is surely foolhardy, the solution of buying up grazing privileges
would not sound so implausible if there were a way for an entrepreneur to capture the gains associated
with the resulting grazing reductions.
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fall apart, and the tragedy of the anticommons helps explain why it is often
so hard to get them back together.
A legal response that grants everyone the right to stifle offending uses
would skip past the anticommons difficulty just described and provide an
immediate antidote to the commons dilemma."' However, it would intro-
duce a new problem. Under such an entitlement regime, anyone wishing to
engage in one of the forbidden uses would have to assemble permission
from all of the rights-holders, and as a result, we would be likely to see too
few of these uses." 9 This, of course, is a standard anticommons problem,
and the basis for the tradeoff that anticommons scholars have identified:
Attempting to solve the commons problem through increased "propertiza-
tion" risks an anticommons'2 The less-recognized point is that leaving a
commons dilemma unsolved also presents a difficulty that is structurally
similar, in that it likewise involves a dispersed set of entitlements capable of
blocking access to a desired resource.
2. Use Privileges Versus Exclusion Rights.-The anticommons has
also been distinguished from the commons based on the nature of the entitle-
ments that the parties hold, as follows: In a commons, the parties hold use
privileges but do not hold the right to exclude each other, while in an anti-
commons, the parties hold exclusion rights but not use privileges."2' This dis-
tinction works well enough when the anticommons is considered in its pure
or prototypical form as an entirely empty, unused resource-as it was in its
118 Ezra Mishan developed a theory of "amenity rights" decades ago that contemplated granting in-
dividuals veto authority over all manner of spillover-causing uses. Anyone who wished to engage in
such a use would have to buy up the rights. Mishan explains how these rights might operate with regard
to a gasoline-powered lawnmower in a residential neighborhood:
The din produced by any one man [operating a lawnmower] is invariably heard by dozens of fami-
lies who, of course, may be enthusiastic gardeners also. If they are all satisfied with the current
situation or could come to agreement with one another, well and good. But once amenity rights
were enacted, at least no man could be forced against his will to absorb these noxious by-products
of the activity of others. Of course, compensation that would satisfy the victim (always assuming
he tells the truth) may exceed what the offender could pay. In the circumstances, the enthusiast
would have to make do with a hand lawn-mower until the manufacturer discovered means of ef-
fectively silencing the din.
EZRA J. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 71 (1967).
119 James Buchanan recognized this flaw in Mishan's theory of "amenity rights." See JAMES
BUCHANAN, The Institutional Structure of Externality, in 15 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN:
EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE THEORY 174, 179 (2001) (explaining, after presenting an
example of how such a regime might overrestrain, that "[tihis possible tendency toward an underproduc-
tion of the externality-generating good or service is the central flaw in the proposals to resolve environ-
mental quality problems by the creation and assignment of new 'amenity rights' to citizens").
120 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
121 See Heller, supra note 2 (suggesting that a tragedy of the commons may follow "when too many
individuals have privileges of use in a scarce resource," while a tragedy of the anticommons may ensue
"when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource"); see also Dibadj, supra note
3, at 1050 (defining an anticommons "as a legal regime where the Hohfeldian right to exclude is created
without granting the 'bundle of rights' that constitutes property").
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original "thought experiment" incarnation.'22 But the distinction becomes un-
stable when one attempts to spot an anticommons in its natural habitat. The
reason is suggested by the discussion above. When people hold one sort of
use privilege in a densely-interwoven social context, they also implicitly have
the ability to exclude each other from an enjoyment of the resource free of the
limits imposed by exercise of that use right. For example, if everyone is al-
lowed to run screaming through a public green space, each such screaming
person effectively excludes everyone else from the resource of a reasonably
quiet park site for hearing subtle musical performances or carrying on an or-
dinary conversation.
To take another example, consider a swimming pool frequented by some
people who would like to swim laps, and others who would like to randomly
bob around in the water. If the bobbers could leave a contiguous strip of water
free of bobbing, the lap swimmers could swim laps. The amount the lap
swimmers would gain from this arrangement, let us assume, would far exceed
the marginal cost to the bobbers in restraining their movements. Is the pool
"commons property" or "anticommons property"?'23 Do the bobbers have "use
privileges" or "exclusion rights"? On the one hand, the bobbers are taking up
more space with their movements than is efficient; they garner all the benefits
of free movement, but bear none of the costs they impose on the lap swimmers
(or, indeed, on each other). This makes it look like a commons problem. But
from another perspective, it looks like an anticommons problem. The bobbers
are effectively excluding the lap swimmers from enjoying a whole lap lane at a
time. The would-be lap swimmers would need to buy up "bobbing rights"
from each bobber with respect to a contiguous, swimmable strip of the pool in
order to be able to gain access to the resource of a lap lane.
Such interactions between use privileges and exclusion rights are not
limited to a small class of idiosyncratic examples; rather, they are at the
heart of most, if not all, real-world resource conflicts. It is not even neces-
sary for there to be two conflicting uses of a given resource in order for this
use/exclusion interface to exist. For example, overfishing is a standard
commons tragedy, but it also (at the extreme) breaks up a viable population
of fish into harvested fragments that are scattered to the four winds. Get-
ting (or keeping) those fish into one place so that they can continue to re-
produce is a prerequisite to anyone's enjoyment of the resource of a viable
fish population, but this result cannot be guaranteed without buying up fish-
ing privileges from all of the people presently holding them. Absent this,
any fisher can exclude all the other fishers from access to a viable fish
population by taking too many fish out of the pond. This convergence of
122 See Michelman, supra note 1, at 6, 9 (presenting the hypothetical regulatory regime that became
known as a prototypical anticommons); DUKEMINIER & KRIER 5TH, supra note 6, at 56 (describing the
original formulation of the anticommons as a "thought experiment").
123 Heller, supra note 12, at 87 (suggesting that "[a]nticommons property can be best understood as
the mirror image of commons property").
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use and exclusion in one resource problem exists even when we assume that
the reason people desire access to a viable fish population is the very same
reason that people are tempted to overfish in the first place-the wish to de-
rive profits from extracted, marketable fish.
One might object that I am using "exclusion" in a nonstandard way
when I use it to refer to the blocking associated with incompatible resource
use."' To be sure, the kind of exclusion that typically accompanies private
property ownership involves the "fencing in" of a resource so that it may be
used without interference in any number of ways, or in no way at all,"25 by
its owner, and by those whom its owner chooses to admit.'26 In the standard
anticommons story, however, the excluders are not full owners, and hence
do not enjoy discretion to choose among an array of resource uses behind
an exclusionary fence or even to selectively permit others to access the re-
source.2 7 Instead, each person holds only the bare right to block others
from using the resource. The same blocking ability is conferred upon any-
one who is granted a privilege of use that is inconsistent with access to the
resource in question.'28 In the latter case, each person's privilege to engage
in an incompatible use constitutes a barrier to any other person's unimpeded
enjoyment of the resource.
Another possible objection to this line of reasoning would focus on
Wesley Hohfeld's distinction between privileges and rights.'29  In
Hohfeldian terms, a right has the backing of state force, while a mere pivi-
124 This notion of exclusion is directly analogous to the exclusion that accompanies consumption of
a rival good (when I eat a berry, I am effectively excluding everyone else in the berry patch from any
use of that berry as a resource).
125 See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 745 (1996)
(conceptualizing the right of property "not only as an interest in dealing with things without interference,
but as an interest in dealing with them or not dealing with them, as one chooses").
126 J.E. Penner has said that "[tihe right to property is a gate, not a wall," id. at 744, to emphasize
that the exclusion associated with property ownership also encompasses the power to selectively include
others in one's use of resources.
127 Access depends on the unanimous consent of everyone holding a veto right, which makes it be-
yond the power of any individual veto-holder to confer.
128 One could argue that in some settings an incompatible use is capable of blocking only another
specified use, rather than blocking a set of uses broad enough to be understood as foreclosing "access to
the resource." See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467 (observing, in distinguishing "exclusion" from "gov-
ernance," that "[e]xclusion bundles a large class of uses together such that we can speak of regulating
access to a resource"). But this distinction, which is highly useful in assessing the relative costs and
benefits of broad-gauged exclusion technologies as opposed to finer-grained governance mechanisms
for controlling property rights, see generally id., holds no significance here. The narrowness or breadth
of the entitlement at issue may bear on the stakes involved in assembling fragmented pieces into a us-
able whole, but it does not systematically change the shape of the strategic interaction associated with
that assembly.
129 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 36-42 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964) (1919).
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lege cannot command the coercive power of the state. 3 ' Hence, private ac-
tion can counter a privilege and keep it from being exercised.' Based on
this, one might be tempted to argue that a "right" of exclusion blocks access
to a resource in a different and more meaningful way than can any "privi-
lege" of use.'32 But the Hohfeldian correlative to a "privilege" is "no-right,"
which means that the force of law cannot be brought to bear against a per-
son who is exercising a privilege.'33 Most of the imaginable private means
of keeping a person from exercising a use privilege would not only be tem-
porary, labor-intensive, and unpleasant, but would also be very likely to
violate some right of the privilege-holder, such as a right against trespass or
assault, to which the law would appropriately respond. Finally, even a
"right" of exclusion does not guarantee that exclusion will be perfect; not
every violation will be detected, and not every detected violation will be
prosecuted. Hence, whatever metaphysical distinction may exist between
the strength of the two sorts of entitlements does not form a robust basis for
distinguishing between types of common interest tragedies.
If "commons" and "anticommons" retain a core of meaning that makes
the concepts useful as ordinarily employed, then it might seem a pointless
stunt to show that they can be logically stretched to the point of overlap and
made to shape-shift into each other. My reason for demonstrating their
conceptual overlap and logical resemblance, however, is not to debunk their
use as shorthand terms, but rather to suggest that the usual bases of distin-
guishing between the dilemmas-overuse versus underuse, and use privi-
leges versus exclusion rights-are inherently unstable and ultimately less
useful than a different, functional understanding of the dilemmas, based on
types of strategic interactions.'34
130 See Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 229 (1920)
(explaining that if person A has a "right" within Hohfeld's schema, this means that the "giant" of the
law will "aid A by forcibly controlling B's conduct," whereas the holder of a "privilege" is merely free
of legal constraint).
131 Hohfeld explains, building on an example about a shrimp salad that was originally introduced by
Professor Gray:
A, B, C, and D, being the owners of the salad, might say to X: 'Eat the salad, if you can; you have
our license to do so, but we don't agree not to interfere with you.' In such a case the privileges ex-
ist, so that if X succeeds in eating the salad, he has violated no rights of any of the parties. But it is
equally clear that if A had succeeded in holding so fast to the dish that X couldn't eat the contents,
no right of X would have been violated.
HOHFELD, supra note 129, at 41.
132 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 17, at 832 & n.28 (1993) (describing a right as "a more robust grant
of access" than a privilege, and arguing that only the former can confer the ability to exclude others).
133 See HOHFELD, supra note 129, at 36, 38-39; see also Corbin, supra note 130, at 229, 233 (defin-
ing "privilege" and its correlative, "no-right," and offering an example in which person A gives person
B leave to knock A's hat off; B has a "privilege" in this case, and the "social giant" of the law "would
neither help B to get the hat off nor help A to keep it on").
134 As Felix Cohen explained in his dialogue regarding the meaning of private property,
asking whether a definition is true or false is a meaningless question. But we can ask whether a
definition is useful or useless. And that may depend upon whether the definition can be used in a
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B. Drawing Functional Distinctions
There are many reasons why people-individually and collectively-
make suboptimal decisions with regard to resources under common or in-
terdependent control. They may lack information or the means to commu-
nicate with each other, they may fall prey to cognitive biases or strong
emotions, or they may suffer from wealth, liquidity, or power differentials
that leave some options unavailable. However, two specific reasons why
people often make suboptimal resource-allocation decisions are at the heart
of what is most uniquely interesting and maddening about common interest
tragedies. First, people often effectively wear blinders in making allocation
decisions, insofar as they do not account for positive and negative external-
ities that their decisions generate.'35 Second, people often recognize and at-
tempt to capitalize on opportunities to bluff each other into ceding more of
a given surplus or bearing more of a given cost.'36 I posit that these are the
signature difficulties associated with the commons and the anticommons re-
spectively, even though many other things might be going on in any real-
world resource-allocation problem.'37
The functional taxonomy that I develop here categorizes tragedies
based on the strategic interaction that forms the primary stumbling block to
an efficient outcome. The tragic tendencies that have been most closely as-
sociated with the commons and the anticommons, respectively, can be un-
derstood as roughly corresponding to two strategic templates: the
Prisoner's Dilemma'38 and the Chicken Game.'39 The Prisoner's Dilemma
self-consistent manner and whether it can help to clarify the problems with which we want to deal.
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954).
135 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 559 (explaining that "[tihe social problem with externalities
arises because A does not take into account the welfare, negative or positive, of B when A is able to act
unilaterally"). I use the notion of "blinders" here not to suggest that people are literally unaware of the
costs and benefits that fall on others, only that they ignore them in making their decisions.
136 See id. (describing holdout problems that can develop under circumstances in which consent
must be obtained from multiple parties); id. at 557 (identifying holdouts and externalities as the two key
impediments that must be taken into account in choosing a legal rule).
137 Although I will use the words "commons" and "anticommons" to designate resource allocations
plagued by the "blindered" and "bluffing" strategic interactions, respectively, nothing turns on whether a
reader agrees with my reformulated usage of these terms; we could use different words to signify the
functional differences I am here highlighting without altering the analysis.
138 In the original Prisoner's Dilemma story, each of two prisoners must individually choose
whether to cooperate (with the other prisoner) by remaining silent, or defect by confessing. Because of
the payoff structure of the sentences, each prisoner does better by confessing, regardless of what the
other prisoner does, even though the pair would do better jointly if both refused to testify. See BAIRD ET
AL., supra note 8, at 33; CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 8-17
(1984); infra Part II.A. 1.
139 Chicken takes its name from a dangerous driving game played by reckless teens: Two cars drive
toward each other, and the first driver to swerve is called a "chicken" and loses the game. However, this
ignominious outcome is better for the loser than a head-on collision-the result if neither party swerves.
See GOETZ, supra note 138, at 17; infra Part II.A.2.
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has often been explicitly equated with the tragedy of the commons.4 ' The
Chicken Game has been explicitly invoked to describe land assembly prob-
lems "'41 which involve an anticommons-like structure;'42 the link between the
Chicken Game and the anticommons is also implicit in the focus on holdouts
in the anticommons literature.'43 While not all strategic interactions fall into
one of these two structural patterns,'" these game templates provide a good
starting point for distinguishing among common interest tragedies.
Significantly, my approach abandons the use of the terms "commons"
and "anticommons" to denote formal differences in property entitlements or
in the intensity of resource use. Instead, it brings to the forefront the strate-
gic interactions involved. By focusing on the strategic "sticking points"
that accompany a resource-allocation dilemma rather than on linguistically
pliable descriptors, this approach better advances the project of devising
workable solutions.
1. Externalities as Blinders.-Rational actors make decisions based
on the costs and benefits that those decisions will generate for them. This
implies an indifference to externalities.'45 Externalities may be benign
(from an efficiency perspective) in a given instance, or over a given
range.'46 Externalities only lead to tragedy when they cause actors to do
things differently than they would have if the costs were internalized. This
will not always be the case. For example, people taking fish for personal
consumption from a well-stocked pond might pay no heed to the costs that
their fishing imposes on the group, but the benefits of their extractions
might easily exceed the costs imposed on the whole group. If so, the ex-
traction is efficient, notwithstanding the blindered character of the extrac-
tion decisions.'47 Alternatively, people will not extract fish in situations
140 See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 21, at 555 & n.12; OSTROM, supra note 7, at 3.
141 See, e.g., GOETZ, supra note 138, at 35 (describing a land use assembly problem as "chicken in
action").
142 See Heller & Hills, supra note 90, at 3.
143 See, e.g., id. passim (discussing holdout problems in the land assembly context); Dibadj, supra
note 3, at 1050 n.42, 1114 (discussing the link between holdouts and the anticommons).
144 See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing this point).
145 As a result of interdependent utility functions, norms, conscience, and many other factors, peo-
ple may actually care about the costs and benefits that fall on others. To the extent this is the case, pay-
offs will incorporate additional elements, altering the game structure and likely strategies undertaken
within it. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
146 See James M. Buchanan & Win. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 380-
81 (1962) (distinguishing Pareto-relevant externalities from externalities generated in situations in which
"[t]he internal benefits from carrying out the activity, net of costs, may be greater than the external dam-
age that is imposed on other parties"); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER 5TH, supra note 6, at 51-52 (dis-
cussing the possibility that externalities will not generate inefficiencies); HADDOCK, supra note 44
(discussing irrelevant externalities).
147 See, e.g., Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 33, at 90, 91 (observing that "[o]pen access does not present a problem
as long as the supply of a resource is so great relative to the demand that there is no (net) gain from
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where their internalized shares of the cost are larger than the benefits they
stand to gain, even though their fishing might also impose externalities on
other people. In either case, the existence of externalities does not change
behavior. In other cases, however, externalities are likely to distort deci-
sions. If the personal benefit of fishing is well above the fisher's internal-
ized share of the costs, but well below the total costs imposed on the pool,
overfishing is likely to result.148
The same logic holds for positive externalities. In deciding whether to
put a rose garden in my front yard, I will (let us assume) pay no heed to the
positive externalities the garden will generate. The presence of external-
ities, and my choice to ignore them, may not lead to an inefficient decision.
I might internalize so much enjoyment from the rose garden that it is worth
the full cost to me; in that case, I will install it anyway, even though I ig-
nore the positive externalities.149 Alternatively, I might decide in a blin-
dered fashion that the garden is not worth the cost. This would be a
completely benign result if the benefits for the whole neighborhood would
not have justified the cost, even had I taken them into account. On the other
hand, my disregard of positive externalities might lead me to make a deci-
sion that is inefficient. If my internalized benefits from the rose garden do
not justify its cost, but the total benefits of the garden (including those be-
stowed on my neighbors) make the garden worthwhile, I may decline to put
in a garden that would have been efficient.
Figure 1 shows the possible impacts of blindered decisionmaking.
conserving or improving it"); Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Prop-
erty, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 17, 28 (Ellen Frankel Paul et at., eds. 1994) (explaining that when water is
abundant, "an initial low-level set of diversions should, at least under some circumstances, produce pri-
vate gains that exceed the losses to the commons").
148 Of course, there are many informal mechanisms that can restrain selfish behavior, and many set-
tings in which interdependent utility functions create their own brakes on self-interested behavior. This
makes it impossible to predict with perfect accuracy when a particular individual will begin to engage in
noncooperative behavior as a result of externalities. However, the structure of the payoffs just described
would be expected to induce such defection in the absence of countervailing considerations.
149 This assumes that there is nobody else around whom I could potentially bluff into paying for
part or all of the garden. If there is such a bluffable other, then the outcome becomes less certain. See
infra Part II.C.I. A parallel possibility exists in the case of activities producing negative externalities.
A party might engage in an annoying activity that yields her less utility than it costs her (or threaten to
do so) if others who will be affected by the activity could be bluffed into paying her to desist.
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Figure 1: Decisionmaking with Blinders
Internalizing All Internalizing All Costs
Costs and Benefits and Benefits Yields
Yields Same Decision Different Decision
Negative Benign Grazing Overgrazing
Externalities or
Self-Motivated Restraint
Positive Benign Neglect Undercultivation
Externalities or
Self-Motivated Provision
A resource-allocation situation can shift from the left-hand column (in-
ternalizing all costs and benefits yields the same decision) to the right-hand
column (internalizing all costs and benefits yields a different decision), or
vice versa, as conditions change over time. For example, a bucolic fishing
scenario featuring benign draws against a common pool could escalate into
a situation involving quite inefficient extractions. 5 ° In a typical commons
scenario, one will continue making draws against the commons until the
marginal benefit one gleans just equals one's internalized share of the mar-
ginal cost.'5' In any situation involving negative externalities, one's inter-
nalized cost of an additional draw will be lower than the cost imposed on
the whole group. Hence, a rational actor would be expected to continue
making draws beyond the efficient stopping point, because she is only in-
ternalizing some of the costs. Even if extractions generating externalities
are efficient within some range,'52 ultimately extraction reaches a point
where it becomes inefficient. Once within that range, the situation resem-
bles a Prisoner's Dilemma.
To illustrate, consider a simple example involving just two individuals,
Rowena and Columbo, who share a grazing land between them. When we
first meet them, they have already added cattle up to the point that is opti-
mal for the land. Now each must decide whether to add yet another head of
cattle. At this point, suppose that each additional head of cattle generates
ten in benefits but imposes costs of fourteen on the grazing lands. How-
ever, each party gains the full ten by adding a head of cattle, but suffers
only half of the cost to the grazing lands, so that each addition still yields a
personal benefit of three,'53 even as it imposes a net social cost of four.'54
150 Cf Demsetz, supra note 14, at 351 (discussing historical changes in the market for fur and posit-
ing that the increasing value of the fur trade increased the costs associated with externalities).
151 Beyond that point, one's own internalized share of the cost exceeds the benefits one receives, so
that one begins to exercise self-motivated restraint-a move back to the left-hand column in Figure 1.
152 The range could be different for different actors, given the possibility of heterogeneity in the
benefits that each derives from resource extraction.
153 10 - (14/2) = 3.
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Adding cattle is inefficient, but rational players will still do it. Figure 2 de-
picts the payoffs the players face.
Figure 2: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Payoffs for (Rowena, Columbo)
Columbo Refrains Columbo Adds
From Adding Cattle Cattle
Rowena Refrains From I. (0, 0) II. (-7, 3)
Adding Cattle
Rowena Adds Cattle III. (3, -7) IV. (-4, -4)
Each person must choose between the cooperative action (here, refrain-
ing from adding another head of cattle) and the defecting action (adding the
cattle).'55 Rowena must choose between the two rows, and Columbo must
choose between the two columns. Their payoffs are shown by the paren-
theticals at the intersection of their two choices.
If both choose the cooperative action (Cell I) the result is the mainte-
nance of what is presumably a profitable status quo; the zero payoffs merely
indicate that neither party gains or loses anything as a result of the interaction,
because both parties have refrained from adding any cattle. However, each
party can improve her or his personal payoff by defecting, regardless of what
the other party does. First look at things from Rowena's point of view. She
recognizes that if Columbo does not add any cattle, she can improve her posi-
tion by adding a head of cattle. This combination of actions will generate the
payoffs shown in Cell III. In that instance, she receives a net benefit of three.
This represents her internalized benefit of ten, counterbalanced by fifty per-
cent of the cost of fourteen that her action imposes on the grazing lands.
Columbo in this instance would receive the "sucker's payoff' of negative
seven. He gains none of the benefits associated with Rowena's cattle-adding
action, but bears half of the costs to the grazing lands.
Seeing this, Rowena must consider the possibility that Columbo will
refuse to be a sucker and will defect instead by adding his own head of cat-
tle. But by comparing her payoffs in Cell II and Cell IV, Rowena can see
that she does best defecting in this case as well. If Columbo is going to de-
fect and Rowena is fool enough to cooperate by refraining from adding cat-
tle, she will get the "sucker's payoff' of negative seven. If she also defects,
then she at least improves her position to a negative four. Therefore, she is
better off defecting no matter what Columbo does.
154 10- 14 =-4.
155 The game works just the same way when an action that produces a positive externality is at
stake; in that case, the cooperative action is to take the action, and the defecting action is to not take the
action.
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Of course, Columbo faces precisely the same structure of payoffs and
would be expected to look at things exactly the same way. Hence, the Nash
equilibrium is for both to defect, a result that leaves both parties signifi-
cantly worse off than in the case of mutual cooperation.'56 This basic game
structure works the same way in the case of many players.'57
2. Bargains and Bluffs.-If blindered decisionmaking typifies the
tragedy of the commons, the tragedy of the anticommons is more com-
monly associated with the strategic move of bluffing. The notion of bluff-
ing, as I use it here, denotes a situation in which one would be better off
going ahead and bearing a cost or accepting a smaller surplus, but one
would prefer to bluff someone else into bearing the cost or taking the
smaller surplus. Bluffing can either be successful or unsuccessful. If it is
successful (another party bears the cost or accepts a smaller share of the
available surplus), then a distributive event has occurred but no inefficiency
has resulted-the efficient deal or action has been made possible by the
other person's response to the bluff.'58 If bluffing is unsuccessful, then the
result is painful to both the unsuccessful bluffer and those she unsuccess-
fully attempted to bluff.
The strategic interaction takes the shape of a game of Chicken. In the
familiar game of roadway Chicken, cooperation means "swerving" to avoid
a collision. The worst outcome occurs if nobody swerves and a crash en-
sues, while the best outcome for each player occurs if the other party
swerves. A player who swerves while the other party drives straight ahead
suffers the second-worst outcome. When both parties swerve, both parties
enjoy a second-best outcome-it is better than swerving while the other
party drives straight ahead, and better than crashing, but worse than being
the one to drive straight ahead while the other party swerves. This same
structure captures, in rough form, many bargaining interactions.'59 For ex-
ample, two parties to a sales transaction might each attempt to capture more
than a proportionate share of the surplus that the deal will generate. 6 ° If
156 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 8, at 33-34 (discussing the Prisoner's Dilemma); id. at 19-22 (de-
scribing and discussing the Nash equilibrium).
157 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 27-28 & fig. l.3 (1989) (presenting a multi-party
Prisoner's Dilemma, using a graph type introduced by Thomas Schelling); see infra text accompanying
notes 186-89 (describing a multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma).
158 See supra note 98 (discussing the purely distributive impact of successful bluffs). For purposes
of the present discussion, I assume that bluffing and other strategic interactions are themselves costless.
In fact, the posturing that accompanies strategic behavior can dissipate surplus, even if a bargain is even-
tually reached. See supra Part I.B.3.
159 See Cooter, supra note 65, at 20 (presenting a bargaining model "in which everyone has an in-
terest in avoiding the worst outcomes, but the outcome which is best from one player's viewpoint is not
best from another's").
160 Fixed "no haggle" pricing reduces these costs in most consumer markets. As Herbert Hovenkamp
explains, "[t]he general theory of price provides fairly determinate rules for how surpluses will be di-
vided up in neoclassical markets." Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes
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one or the other (or both) back down, then a deal will occur. If neither
backs down, no deal will occur-the worst outcome for both. Figure 3 de-
picts the payoff structure represented by this scenario.
Figure 3: Chicken Game
Payoffs for (Rowena, Columbo)
Columbo Cooperates Columbo Defects
(accepts a smaller (demands a larger share
share of the surplus) of the surplus)
Rowena Cooperates I. (4, 4) II. (1, 7)
(accepts a smaller share
of the surplus)
Rowena Defects III. (7, 1) IV. (0, 0)
(demands a larger share
of the surplus)
Here, the parties have the opportunity to strike a deal with each other
that will generate a total surplus of eight. The worst outcome for both par-
ties, the failure to make a deal, is shown in Cell IV; there, both parties re-
ceive a payoff of zero. The best outcome for each player is for that player
to garner a disproportionately large share of the surplus-Cell II for Co-
lumbo and Cell III for Rowena. However, this payoff is available only if
and Alternative Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 523 (2002). More problematic are what Hovenkamp
terms "Coasean markets"-settings in which no fixed prices exist and "the division of the surplus is
generally indeterminate." Hovenkamp, supra, at 523; see Cooter, supra note 65, at 17 (noting the bar-
gaining costs that accompany situations in which no competitive price exists, and the parties must decide
how to split up the surplus from trade). Even where prices are in use, they may not be set optimally. Of
particular interest for present purposes are settings in which producers of complementary goods each set
prices without internalizing the full impact of their own price level on the demand for the other good.
See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNOMics 309-10 (8th ed. 1997) (presenting an exam-
ple involving monopolistic producers of complementary products, and describing the resulting potential
for bluffing over price levels); Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 616-17 (2000) (discussing pricing externalities). Buchanan and Yoon model
the anticommons problem in an analogous manner. See Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3, at 5 n.5 (ex-
plaining that "[t]he price-theory analogue [to the anticommons] is the model in which there exist inde-
pendently acting monopolists who market fully complementary goods (for example, left and right
shoes)"); see also Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Pricing in
Anticommons Property Arrangements (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presenting results
of experimental work examining pricing in anticommons settings). Buchanan and Yoon present an ex-
ample in which the consumer must purchase a parking pass from each of two independent monopolistic
suppliers in order to use the parking lot. Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 3, at 4-5. Prices for both passes
are set too high, as each supplier tries to obtain a supernormal share of the surplus, and the quantity of
transactions drops. See id. We might think of the fixed prices in this example as constituting irreversi-
ble bluffs. Some customers will still engage in the two-part transaction, accepting whatever surplus re-
mains, while others will not engage in the transaction because the combined prices exceed their own
reservation prices.
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the other party agrees to accept a smaller share of the surplus (i.e., agrees to
"swerve"). If both parties demand a disproportionately large surplus, no
deal will occur. This is because the total demands of the parties cannot ex-
ceed the available surplus associated with the deal--eight in this example.
If both parties demand payoffs of more than four, then their total demands
sum to more than eight, and the deal is no longer worth doing. If both par-
ties "swerve," then the surplus can be shared equitably and the deal will oc-
cur (Cell I).
What is most significant about this game structure is the fact that there
is no one dominant strategy for either player. Each party's best move de-
pends on what she or he expects the other party to do. If the other party is
not going to swerve, one does best by swerving. Capturing a disproportion-
ately small share of the surplus is an unattractive outcome, but it is still bet-
ter than the situation in which the deal fails to occur at all. But if the other
party can be bluffed into swerving, one does best by holding out for a larger
share of the surplus.
Here we see the critical difference between the Prisoner's Dilemma
structure and the Chicken Game structure-a distinction that can also be
used to differentiate commons tragedies from anticommons tragedies. In
the Prisoner's Dilemma, one always does best by defecting (failing to coop-
erate) regardless of what others do. For the strategic holdout in Chicken,
refusal to cooperate generates opportunity costs that are always on net
worse than cooperation, regardless of what the other person does. Never-
theless, competing desires to capture a disproportionately large share of the
surplus may lead the parties to a stalemate. If the total demands for surplus
made by the parties exceed the total amount of surplus available from the
aggregation, the deal will not occur.
Figures 2 and 3 together show how a Chicken Game might follow di-
rectly on the heels of a Prisoner's Dilemma. In Figure 2, Rowena and Co-
lumbo were trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma in which each person's
dominant strategy was to defect by adding another head of cattle. However,
as an examination of the payoffs in Figure 2 shows, the Prisoner's Dilemma
structure contains within it some unexploited surplus that the parties could
enjoy through mutual cooperation, as compared with the world in which both
defect.'6 ' To see this, compare Cell I of Figure 2 (mutual cooperation, total
payoff of 0) with Cell IV (mutual defection, total payoff of negative eight).
The difference between these two figures represents a surplus of eight that the
parties could enjoy between them if a cooperative bargain could be struck.
This is the same surplus that the parties are now contesting over in Figure 3.
161 The parties might agree on any number of institutional solutions that would secure access to the
surplus. See Gary D. Libecap, Common Property, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 317, 318 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (explaining that "[c]ommon-pool losses define the gains
that are possible from negotiations among competing parties" through assigning rights or otherwise
regulating access).
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How might the parties get from the Figure 2 matrix to the Figure 3 ma-
trix? We might imagine that one enterprising "prisoner" caught in the di-
lemma above, if able to communicate, bargain with, and effectively bind the
other prisoner, could try to "buy up" the other prisoner's right to defect.
Doing so would yield a surplus for the two parties that, in theory, they
could contract to share. If circumstances make the beginning phases of
such dealing feasible, a possible surplus might hove into view. The stage
would then be set for a Chicken Game, as the parties maneuver for larger
shares of the surplus that their mutual cooperation will create.'62
3. Multiplayer Games, Heterogeneous Players.-A slightly more
complicated example will spell out some additional dimensions of the blin-
dered decisionmaking and bluffing behaviors that characterize the commons
and anticommons problem. Imagine that four people (A, B, C, and D) live
in apartments that each share a wall with a common party room. Initially,
the party room was open to any of the four residents to use for throwing
parties; no permission was required from anyone. Consequently, each of
the four threw a party whenever the benefits of the party outweighed the in-
ternalized costs. In other words, decisions were made in a blindered fash-
ion, without regard for the externalities they produced. Sometimes this
decisionmaking produced results that were indistinguishable from those that
would have been produced had the party-thrower internalized all of the
costs-these were efficient parties, whose benefits outweighed the total
costs.'63 In many other cases, however, the celebrations were inefficient
ones, in that the benefits they produced were not sufficient to outweigh the
costs inflicted on the other residents. This presented a standard tragedy of
the commons or Prisoner's Dilemma. Everyone saw that they would be
better off if everyone could be made to stop throwing these inefficient shin-
digs, but no resident had any incentive to curtail her own inefficient parties.
Sensing unrest, the building manager created a rule: No one may use the
party room without the permission of A, B, C, and D.
D, as it happens, was just about to throw her annual birthday bash. Be-
cause she has been throwing the party in the same room for many years, and
because the view the room affords of the city triggers many nostalgic pangs
in host and guests alike, there are no good substitutes. As a result, the bene-
fits she and her guests derive from use of the party room are fully large
enough to swamp the costs imposed on A, B, and C. Hence, it would be ef-
ficient for A, B, and C to reach a deal with D about the use of the party
162 In the original Prisoner's Dilemma, such gaming would be impossible; the prisoners would be
sentenced by the state and could not reallocate their shares of the reduced sentence. But in contexts in
which sharing of the surplus might be feasible, an interaction that begins as a Prisoner's Dilemma can
turn into a Chicken Game. There are, however, some intervening steps that I am eliding here. See infra
Part II.C.3.
163 They may, however, have had unfortunate distributive impacts. The person inconvenienced by
even "efficient" noisemaking on the other side of the wall would likely not view the situation as benign.
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room. But if each of the other residents tries to get a disproportionately
large share of the surplus that will be generated by the deal, D's efforts may
fail."6 This would be the worst result for all involved. Figure 4 shows the
interaction.
Figure 4: Chicken Game with Multiple Players
Total7Surplus
As shown in Figure 4, the total surplus associated with the consolida-
tion of the fragmented permission required to use the room forms an upper
boundary on the aggregate demands for surplus that the fragment-holders
may make.'65 The total surplus is the amount by which D's benefit from us-
ing the party room exceeds the sum of the true reservation prices of A, B,
and C. 66 Players A, B, and C all compete for a larger share of that surplus
in a multiparty game of Chicken. As the arrows suggest, each attempts to
164 A structurally identical situation would be presented if the building manager had never made a
rule restricting access, and one of the residents, such as A, wished to ensure that the room would be left
empty on a given evening so that she could complete a take-home exam in her apartment without distur-
bance. This would require buying up the free partying privileges for that evening from B, C, and D,
which might well turn out to be impossible. Once again, this demonstrates that the anticommons prob-
lem does not always result in the underuse of a resource.
165 D is also part of the competition over surplus. But because no deal can go through if the de-
mands of the fragment holders equal or exceed the amount of surplus available, the amount D stands to
gain supplies an upper bound on the surplus demands of the other players.
166 See Arrow, supra note 85, at 218 (defining surplus in an analogous scenario as "the excess of the
producer's profits over the sum of the reservation prices").
Player A
Pe 4
Player C
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expand her share of the surplus by cutting into the surplus of the other play-
ers. 6 7 The worst result for all, eventuating in loss of all of the surplus, is a
set of demands that exceeds the total surplus associated with the deal.
One might imagine that the players would converge on a fair three-way
split of the surplus.'68 However, the players in the game (unlike we omnis-
cient onlookers) cannot discern with certainty how much total surplus will
be generated, or what percentage of that surplus each player will enjoy un-
der various possible divisions. Because the private value placed on an enti-
tlement by a given player is unknown to the other players, they cannot be
sure that the sale of it at a particular price will generate any surplus for the
player, much less an excessive or unfair one. If private valuations are very
heterogeneous and are unknown to others, then it will be impossible for one
player to tell whether another player is acting greedily or is merely attempt-
ing to recover a scintilla of value above her true reservation price.'69
A rule that each player will receive the same dollar value for relin-
quishing a fragment would provide one solution, but it would risk the trans-
fer of fragments at prices lower than some sellers' true reservation prices
and would potentially deliver an unfair surplus to others in the interaction.
Provided that the aggregation was efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, we
might dismiss this as a problem of distribution only. But it will be impossi-
ble to tell whether the aggregation is efficient without knowing the sum of
the true reservation prices of the group, and learning this information will
be difficult because of the strategic interests of the players. Subjective
valuations cannot be verified or disproved, and even objective measures of
value, such as the amount of financial damage parties will suffer by surren-
dering their rights, are vulnerable to distortion.17
167 Each player's attempted expansion of her own surplus reduces the surplus available to all of the
other parties, not just the parties directly adjacent on the diagram. Hence, player A's surplus demands
shrink the surplus available to both B and C; likewise, player C's surplus demands compress the total
demands that can be made by A and B.
168 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 17, at 232 (suggesting, based on experimental evidence, that
entitlement holders would typically be able to reach agreement about "division of the pie"). As Lewin-
sohn-Zamir recognizes, however, the success achieved in laboratory experiments may not translate into
real-world settings where people enter the game with conflicting beliefs about their entitlements to
shares of the pie-beliefs that are likely influenced by cognitive phenomena such as the "self-serving
bias." Id. at 233; see infra note 171 and accompanying text.
169 For obvious reasons, the players cannot rely on each other's representations of their private
valuations. See Arrow, supra note 85, at 218 (explaining that individual landowners holding rights to
clean air will be tempted to overstate their reservation prices to a factory owner who is attempting to buy
up all such rights so as to gain a larger share of the available surplus).
170 See Libecap, supra note 161, at 321 (discussing how deception and other forms of opportunism
can keep parties from agreeing on institutional changes to resolve commons dilemmas) (citing O.E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975)).
Mechanisms designed to elicit truthful valuations depend on veiling the implications of the valuation, so
that the risks of a too-high and of a too-low valuation are matched. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at
582-84; Ayres & Talley, supra note 17, at 1029-31.
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Where heterogeneity among the players rules out any straightforward
solution to the problem of dividing up surplus fairly, it also leaves room for
cognitive biases to color perceptions of fairness. 7 ' The problem is not
merely a theoretical one, as Gary Libecap's study of oil unitization illus-
trates. 7 1 Despite the huge gains that are available through unitization, ne-
gotiations are difficult, slow, and sometimes unsuccessful.'73 Heterogeneity
significantly complicates the parties' attempts to arrive at rules for sharing
production revenues and costs.'74 To reduce the risk of holdout problems,
most states allow compulsory unitization on less than unanimous consent. 75
C. Complications and Elaborations
While a focus on the respective roles of blindered decisionmaking and
strategic bluffing in blocking efficient resource use offers a useful first cut
in slicing up the universe of common interest tragedies, this simple dichot-
omy leaves a number of rough edges remaining. Here, I work through
some of those. Far from undermining the initial functional distinction
drawn above, however, these complications and elaborations actually rein-
force the usefulness of making strategic patterns the taxonomic focus.
1. Blinders and Bluffs in Enforcement (and Beyond).-The func-
tional dichotomy developed above can be used to differentiate between va-
rieties of underenforcement that can emerge in a common interest context.
Recall that the second tragic tendency associated with the anticommons in-
volves the underenforcement of the power of exclusion from the resource.
Any one of the people holding an entitlement necessary to an interloper's
legitimate use of a resource would have the power to stop that interloper,
171 See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 701 (discussing the potential role of cognitive bi-
ases, including the overvaluing of one's own assets and the undervaluing of those of others, in causing
impasses in patent bargaining); Thompson, supra note 32, at 241 (discussing conflicting perceptions of
fairness, and discussing role of cognitive biases); Wade-Benzoni, supra note 107, at 119-23 (presenting
experimental results on the role of "egocentric interpretations of fairness" in resource dilemmas in which
parties are heterogeneous in the benefits they derive from resource use and the burdens they will bear
from resource degradation).
172 See Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 33, at 142, 156-65 (citing and discussing empirical studies). Unitiza-
tion is a means of placing under common control oil reservoirs that underlie a number of separately-
owned parcels and thereby avoiding loss of value through wasteful extraction races and the like. Id.; see
supra note 32 (describing how oil extraction can constitute a tragedy of the commons).
173 Libecap, supra note 172, at 158. Even when agreement is eventually reached, the lengthy nego-
tiating delays have often dissipated many of the gains. Id.
174 Id. at 161-65 (discussing the role of various sorts of heterogeneity). Interestingly, negotiations
are much easier during the "exploration" phase, when the parties are effectively behind a veil of igno-
rance. See id. at 161 (explaining that simple formulas, such as those based on surface acreage, will suf-
fice during this stage "[s]ince no party knows whether the formula is to its particular advantage or
disadvantage"). As more information becomes available, heterogeneities emerge, and parties draw dif-
ferent conclusions from the partial information, introducing new complications. Id. at 161-62.
175 Id. at 162-63. Texas, however, has no compulsory unitization law. Id. at 163.
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but doing so benefits all of the other entitlement holders at the same time.
On reflection, this tendency looks suspiciously similar to the "undercultiva-
tion" tendency discussed in the context of the tragedy of the commons.
Whatever the underlying property regime, enforcement (which includes
both monitoring and punishment) represents a collective action problem.'76
While each member of the resource-using community benefits from en-
forcement actions that protect entitlements, each would-be enforcer will
bear all of the costs while capturing only a share of the benefits. Hence,
each would prefer to free-ride on someone else's efforts. Unless the
group's efforts can be successfully coordinated, we would expect too little
enforcement to occur.177 Explained this way, underenforcement sounds like
the blindered decisionmaking characteristic of a commons dilemma.
We can distinguish between types of underenforcement problems,
however, based on whether the decision that produces the underenforce-
ment represents a blindered decision or an unsuccessful bluff. When an in-
terloper (which could include in this context any member of the
community) begins to use a resource improperly-either without the neces-
sary permissions in the case of an anticommons, or in violation of the rules
of resource-gathering that prevail in some other context-there are four
possibilities. First, it might be the case that the interloper is just not worth
stopping; that is, the costs of stopping her exceed the benefits that will ac-
crue to the entire group as a result.'78 The distributive realignment might be
deemed "tragic" by some, but it does not constitute a tragedy as I have been
employing the term here, because it does not generate a net loss, but rather a
change in distribution. People may make blindered decisions about whether
or not to stop the interloper, but these decisions are of the "benign neglect"
variety; on efficiency grounds, the interloper should not be stopped.
Second, we might have a situation where the cost of stopping the inter-
loper exceeds the internalized share of the benefit that will accrue to any
one individual, but the total benefit that the group would share if the inter-
loper were stopped exceeds the cost of enforcement. In such a case, each
individual makes a blindered decision that is inefficient; if the person were
taking into account all of the externalities, the decision would be a different
one. Hence, the players are trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Unless there
176 See, e.g., Krier, supra note 14, at 332-39 (describing how reliance on the "free market" or on
"government" to solve commons problems begs the question of how the coordination and enforcement
necessary to sustain a given regime came about); JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
SOCIAL ORDER 41 (1989) (explaining that punishment delivers diffuse benefits while concentrating costs
on the punisher).
177 This is arguably true even in a norms-based system. See Krier, supra note 14, at 336 (explaining
that because "ostracism itself takes time and energy" and provides collective benefits, "[tlhere is likely
to be an undersupply of nagging").
178 Cf Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968)
(observing that the costs of detection and punishment of crime, as well as the costs of crime itself, must
be taken into account in formulating an optimal approach).
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is a mechanism for assembling together the diffuse interests required, eve-
ryone is better off not contributing to the policing efforts, regardless of what
everyone else does.
Third, it is possible that stopping the interloper is "worth it" to each
and every member of the group individually.'79 The internalized benefit that
each person receives as a result of the interloper being stopped exceeds the
costs of personally doing the stopping. What then could explain underen-
forcement? Here, it becomes important that each member recognizes that it
is also "worth it" to the other members to take on the enforcement. Even
though each person is better off enforcing rather than letting the violation
slide, the surplus associated with the enforcement will be shared by the
whole group. Each member would therefore prefer to bluff someone else
into doing the enforcement, so that she can glean the benefits of having the
interloper stopped without personally bearing any of the stopping costs. 180
Thus, we have a game of Chicken: Each person hopes that another person
will stop the interloper, but the worst outcome for each person occurs if no-
body stops the interloper.
Finally, it is possible that the group is heterogeneous with regard to the
benefits they will derive from interloper-stopping, with some members
finding it fully worth the cost to stop the interloper on their own, and other
members finding it not worthwhile. Of course, a typical strategy in the
Chicken Game is to try to convince others that you fall in the latter cate-
gory, and hence are not susceptible to being bluffed into bearing the cost of
the enforcement. The use of false disinterest as a bluffing mechanism
greatly complicates the interaction by obscuring the nature of the dilemma.
This distinction between blinders and bluffs can also be used to clas-
sify other sorts of underinvestment decisions that exhibit similar features.18'
Consider the problem of replacing a burned-out light bulb in a community
laundry room. Quinn, a member of the community, visits the laundry room
one day, notices the problem, but does not replace the light bulb. His action
179 If providing the public good in question-here, enforcement-is entirely worth the cost to even
one member, the group is what Mancur Olson terms a "privileged group." OLSON, supra note 8, at 49-
50. According to Olson, the existence of a privileged group generates a presumption that the good will
be provided, although he adds a caveat to this point. See id. at 50 & n.70; infra note 180.
180 Olson notes the possibility of a situation in which providing a particular good is worth it to each
group member, but "each member of the group, knowing that each of the others would also be better off
if they provided the good alone than they would be if no collective good were obtained, would refuse to
contribute anything toward obtaining the collective good." OLSON, supra note 8, at 50 n.70. Olson
suggests the problem would be self-limiting, however. See id.; infra note 182.
181 In order for an underinvestment decision to potentially implicate the Chicken Game rather than
the Prisoner's Dilemma, the investment in question must be one that a single actor can make unilaterally
and that will, on its own, produce results for her that are sufficient to justify the cost. In order for the
latter condition to be met, the investment must produce a good that is not susceptible to overgrazing of
the sort that would nullify the investment. In addition, the bluffing that accompanies the Chicken Game
interaction requires the existence of a bluffable other for whom the investment is also independently
worthwhile. See infra Part II.C.2.
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could be a simple case of benign neglect. Perhaps enough light seeps in from
the street so that the investment isn't worth making even if the positive spill-
overs could be captured. In this case, he makes a blindered decision, but it is
an efficient one. It is also possible that Quinn does not internalize enough
benefit from the light bulb replacement to make it worthwhile for him, even
though he would find it worth undertaking the replacement if he could cap-
ture the positive externalities associated with it. In that case, Quinn makes a
blindered decision that yields an inefficient outcome. This fits within the
Prisoner's Dilemma template;. it is never worth it for the individual to invest,
regardless of what everyone else does, absent a mechanism for capturing the
positive externalities bestowed on others.
Finally, it is possible that the investment in light bulb replacement is
entirely worth it to Quinn (the benefits of the lighted room over the life of
the new light bulb would exceed the annoyance and trouble of buying and
installing the bulb), but he holds back on installing the bulb in the hopes
someone else will make the investment so that he can enjoy the benefits at
zero cost. In this case, Quinn is bluffing by pretending indifference through
his inaction. This strategy imposes short-term costs on him (sorting his
laundry is more difficult in an unlighted room), but will potentially earn
him a larger share of the surplus associated with the light bulb replacement.
The other members of the community may also be bluffing when they visit
the laundry room and fail to replace the bulb, or they may be making blin-
dered decisions that are actually in their individual self-interest.'82
The point can be generalized further. Recall that a Prisoner's Dilemma
differs from a Chicken Game only in the relative rankings of the "sucker's
payoff' (that is, the payoff one receives as a lone cooperator) and the "uni-
versal defection" payoff. Where the universal defection payoff is more at-
tractive to an individual than the sucker's payoff, noncooperation is
unambiguously dominant. Regardless of what everyone else does, and even
in the event that everyone else defects, one is still better off defecting than
cooperating and accepting the sucker's payoff. In that case, one makes a
blindered decision that not only ignores external impacts on others, but also
requires no predictions about what other people will do.'83 Where the
182 People who repeatedly interact can gain insight into each other's preferences and adjust their
own conduct accordingly. See HADDOCK, supra note 44, at 28 (recounting his decision to clean the
countertop in the faculty lounge, which was based on his observations of his colleagues' behavior and
his resultant belief that nobody else would ever clean the counter); OLSON, supra note 8, at 50 n.70 (sug-
gesting that group members for whom provision of a public good is individually worthwhile would not
long persist in withholding provision of the good out of the mistaken belief that other members would
provide the good instead).
183 See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass. L Interdependence, Group Heterogene-
ity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. Soc. 522, 540 (1985) (explaining that where the
cost of contributing to a collective good exceeds the benefits one will receive from the contribution
"predictions about others' behavior are irrelevant, for contributions are irrational no matter what other
people do").
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sucker's payoff is more attractive than the universal defection payoff, non-
cooperation is a bluff, because one would be better off taking the sucker's
payoff than defecting-at least under some imaginable circumstances (i.e.,
where everyone else defects). One's best strategy depends, in that case, on
what one expects other players to do.'84
The sucker's payoff could dominate the universal defection outcome
even in what we might think of as traditional "tragedy of the commons" set-
tings, making the game into one of Chicken. However, this will only occur
under rather special conditions involving binary choices by players who
have the ability to unilaterally secure a surplus for the group. For example,
imagine that five law students are about to head out into a heavy and unex-
pected rainstorm late one evening, after a marathon study session. They
plan to borrow umbrellas from an already quite depleted common umbrella
stash that an unknown administrative agent has helpfully placed near the
front door of the law school. When they reach the umbrella stand, they see
that there are exactly five umbrellas remaining. They remark on their good
fortune; each of them has a different itinerary, making umbrella-sharing in-
feasible. But as they reach for the umbrellas, they hear behind them the
slow footsteps of an emeritus professor of advanced years and frail health.
It is clear from his purposeful advancement towards the umbrella stash that
he intends to head out into the rainstorm himself and plans to secure an um-
brella for the trip. Each student must decide whether to take or leave an
umbrella.
Assume that each student would suffer crushing guilt if this most au-
gust member of the law school community were forced to go out into the
rain without an umbrella, a venture that could potentially trigger a danger-
ous bout of pneumonia. Here, the sucker's payoff of leaving an umbrella
behind for Professor Eminent while all of one's colleagues secure dry pas-
sage to their destinations is viewed by each law student as superior to the
option of leaving Professor E exposed to the elements. But each student
hopes that some other student will volunteer to accept the sucker's payoff.
In this case, each law student's purposeful grasping of an umbrella is a
bluff, and whether she follows through with the threatened umbrella extrac-
tion will depend crucially on what she expects the other players to do.
2. Steps and Slopes.-How can we distinguish the settings in which
players will be tempted to bluff from those in which their noncooperation is
simply the result of blindered decisionmaking? In order for a player to be
in a position to bluff, two things must be true. First, our bluffing player, if
put to the test, must have a preference for the sucker's payoff over the pay-
off achievable through universal defection. This means that the player's
184 See id. at 540-41 (explaining that individuals for whom provision of a collective good is inde-
pendently worthwhile will provide it if they do not expect anyone else to do so, but may attempt to get
others to provide it instead).
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unilateral cooperation must not only be capable of doing some good on its
own, but must do enough good to make it worth the price of the player's
cooperation in a world where everyone else defects. If the universal defec-
tion payoff dominates the sucker's payoff, then the player will simply de-
fect, and will not concern herself with trying to predict or influence the
actions of anyone else. Second, a successful bluff requires the presence of
some other player or players who share a preference for the sucker's payoff
over the payoff associated with universal defection, and who are therefore
bluffable.
Whether these requirements will be met in a given instance depends, in
part, on the shape of the production function for the surplus that cooperation
produces. 85 We can begin by contrasting two possibilities-a surplus that
continuously increases with each increment of cooperation, and a surplus
that is delivered all at once, in a sharp "step," when a particular level of co-
operation is achieved. First, consider a situation involving a continuously
increasing surplus. To keep the analysis simple, imagine that each member
of a ten-person group faces an "all or nothing" binary choice 8 -to contrib-
ute or not to contribute a lump sum of $5 to a common enterprise.'87 As-
sume further that all contributions made to the common pool will be
magically multiplied by three before being redistributed to the group on a
per capita basis.'88
In this situation, each person's contribution clearly makes a difference,
on its own, in the amount of surplus generated. Each $5 contribution gen-
erates a surplus of $10 for the group (the total of $15, minus the original
contribution of $5). But it does not make enough of a difference in any in-
dividual's payoff to justify the costs of cooperating-at least if we assume
that all of the relevant costs and benefits are captured by the dollars in-
volved. A person contributing $5 will receive back only one-tenth of the
resulting $10 surplus ($1) plus one-tenth of her initial $5 contribution (50
cents). Thus, in a world where everyone else defects, she ends up $3.50
worse off than in a world where she also defects. But even if everyone else
cooperates, she is still $3.50 better off defecting. If the nine other people
185 See id passim (discussing and illustrating various production functions for public goods);
MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 18, at 24-25, 58-100 (discussing importance of production functions
to collective action problems and analyzing their dynamics).
186 Many real-world cooperative choices are not binary-for example, one often chooses not only
whether to contribute, but also how much to contribute. See HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note
8, at 51 (distinguishing step or binary contributions from "continuous levels of individual contribution").
187 Even though this example is framed in terms of "contributions," the same analysis would apply
to choices about whether to refrain from extracting an excessive amount of a resource, or to refrain from
some other negative activity, such as polluting or littering.
188 Public goods experiments often involve similar contribution dilemmas. See Robyn M. Dawes &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 188 (1988) (explaining that a typi-
cal public goods experiment involves giving a sum of money to n players, allowing the players to keep
or contribute the money, multiplying the contributed money by a factor that is greater than 1 but less
than n, and distributing the product among the group members equally).
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contribute their $5 shares, this will generate $135 ($45 X 3), which will
then be spread among the ten participants. If our protagonist fails to con-
tribute, she keeps her $5 and also receives $13.50, for a total payout of
$18.50. If she also contributes, the total pot rises to $150 ($50 X 3), but she
only receives back one-tenth of that amount, or $15.00. The same analysis
holds for all intermediate points between universal defection and universal
cooperation-the individual is always better off defecting. The parties
therefore face a multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma in which noncontribution
is the dominant strategy. 8
9
A step good, in contrast, does not smoothly increase with inputs.
Rather, it delivers no benefits at all until a certain contribution threshold is
reached; it then delivers all of the benefits in a single lump upon reaching
that threshold, and delivers no additional benefits beyond that point. 19 In
some of the examples we have considered, one individual's unilateral coop-
erative action was both necessary and sufficient to secure the entire surplus
in question. In the umbrella example, the entire surplus associated with
leaving an umbrella for Professor E could be accomplished in one "step" by
the unilateral action of a group member, 91 and additional acts of coopera-
tion above that level did no additional good. In the fragment enforcement
and light bulb examples, the same was true.
Where this is the case, the individual must compare the personal bene-
fit she gains from cooperating to the cost she must incur. If her share of the
surplus is not enough to make unilateral cooperation worthwhile, she will
defect. But even if her share of the surplus is sufficient to make unilateral
cooperation worthwhile (that is, the sucker's payoff exceeds the universal
defection payoff), she may still try to bluff someone else into accepting the
189 The mere fact that the surplus associated with cooperation smoothly increases with inputs
does not, in itself, mean that the choice situation is necessarily a Prisoner's Dilemma. If the inputs
are multiplied by a factor that is greater than the number of people to whom the proceeds will be dis-
tributed, everyone will contribute as much as possible-again, without regard to what anyone else
does. To return to our earlier example, imagine that the contributions were multiplied not by three,
but by twelve. In that case, we would expect universal cooperation; each individual's contribution of $5
generates a personal return of $6. See Oliver et al., supra note 183, at 533-34 (explaining that linear
production functions yield contribution decisions that follow one of two patterns, depending on the slope
of the function-"[e]veryone will contribute either everything possible or nothing").
190 See, e.g., HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 8, at 55-61 (describing and analyzing step
goods); Ido Erev & Amon Rapoport, Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribu-
tion Mechanism, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 401, 403 (1990) (discussing "public or collective goods that
only exist after a substantial amount has been contributed to their production, and then do not increase in
quality or quantity if more contributions are made").
191 This is because no law student had any reason to expect or fear that any other law student would
attempt to extract more than just one umbrella for personal use. The binary nature of the extraction
choice (take one umbrella, or take no umbrella) distinguishes this case from a typical common pool re-
source setting, such as a fish pond. There, a person whose own forgone extraction might be sufficient to
keep a population from crashing if everyone else held their own extractions constant would have no as-
surance that personal forbearance would mean survival of the population. Such forbearance might in-
stead be matched by heightened extractions on the part of others.
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sucker's payoff. Where the players lack full communication and knowl-
edge of each other's actions, each may also fear that her own cooperation
will be superfluous. For example, joint owners of a commons might all ob-
serve from their separate bedroom windows that an interloper is on the
common property. Each might find it personally worth the costs of calling
the police to get the person ousted. However, each might prefer to have
someone else bear the costs of making the call. If each assumes that some-
one else has already made the necessary call, then she may be unwilling to
undertake that task herself.
The assembly of fragmented permissions to use a resource in a particu-
lar way is also a "step good." This time, however, the surplus comes all in
one lump upon attainment of the last necessary permission. Consider the
case of a lovely common park surrounded by a high wall that no member of
a 10-person group may enter or use in any fashion without obtaining a pass
from each of the other group members. Permission to enter the park is a
"step good," similar to a bridge. One must have the whole thing in order to
have anything; a partial bridge is no better than no bridge at all.'92 Here, no
group member can gain any surplus from assembling permissions unless
she is able to assemble all the fragments and gain admission into the walled
park."'93 This is depicted in Figure 5.
192 E.g., MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 18, at 23, 24. It is possible to quibble with this exam-
ple. See HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 8, at 59 (explaining that "bridges vary over a
near continuum from terrifying Himalayan rope footbridges to the stupefying Verrazano-Narrows
Bridge"). However, a bridge offers a reasonable intuitive image of what a step good is all about, if
one makes some simplifying assumptions that narrow the range of acceptable bridges in a given con-
text.
193 See Hovenkamp, supra note 160, at 522 (presenting a similar example, in which a "factory sur-
rounded by five landowners must purchase the right to pollute from all five or the right will be worth-
less").
959
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Figure 5: The Walled Park
Surplus
------------------------------- I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No. of Fragments Assembled
The vertical axis tracks the generation of surplus, while the horizontal axis
tracks the number of fragments assembled together. The dashed line repre-
sents the production function of the surplus. As we can see, the jump from
9 fragments to 10 is responsible for the entire surplus associated with the
assembly. Of course, each of the ten players would be expected to jockey
for as large a share of that surplus as possible. Or, to put it differently, each
player will try to be the last holdout, upon whose cooperation the entire deal
hangs. '94
There are many other possibilities aside from the step and continuous
production functions I have presented here, and I will revisit the question of
heterogeneous production functions presently.'95 Two related observations
are helpful at this stage, however. First, standard "tragedy of the commons"
problems are likely to tend more towards the continuous end of the produc-
tion function spectrum, making them more likely to yield a Prisoner's Di-
lemma interaction. Cases like littering, pollution, noisemaking, fishing, and
so on will probably not have smoothly increasing production functions, but
they may have large ranges in which no abrupt "steps" are present. In other
words, individuals are unlikely to see a sharp and direct connection between
their individual actions and the amount of surplus or deficit produced.
194 See Heller & Hills, supra note 90, at 5 (discussing the incentive for a landowner to be the last
seller in a land assembly effort).
195 See infra Part III.C.
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Where a person believes her actions will make no difference, defection is a
more likely strategy. 196
Second, the standard "anticommons" examples tend to involve goods
that, even where they do not present sharp "steps," are at least significantly
lumpy. 97 There is a tighter connection between an individual's cooperation
or noncooperation and the ultimate result. This connection heightens the
possibility that a person will find cooperation individually worthwhile. At
the same time, it sets the stage for bluffing among individuals. The threat
of the sharp and precipitous loss of all surplus in the event parties do not
"give in" and agree to share surplus creates a powerful dynamic that corre-
sponds to familiar holdout problems. Therefore, at least part of what drives
the functional distinction between commons and anticommons problems
has to do with the typical shape of the surplus at issue in the respective
cases.
3. Payoffs and Perceptions.-It would be inaccurate to suggest that
every strategic interaction involving a common pool resource looks like a
Prisoner's Dilemma or a Chicken Game.'98 These templates are based on
specific payoff patterns that cause players to rank their various options in a
particular order, yielding a strategic situation with certain identifiable fea-
tures.'99 If a player's perception of the payoffs changes, the game changes.
Factors such as altruism, reciprocity, or norms can alter perceived pay-
offs. °0 Such factors might make a person internalize (through social shun-
ning, a guilty conscience, or other means) the negative externalities she
visits on others, and can also permit a person to internalize (through pride,
group approval, a "warm glow" and so on) the positive externalities that her
benefits yield others. Indeed, studies suggest that people are often "condi-
tional cooperators" who will cooperate rather than defect if enough other
196 See ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 8, at 28-29 (linking the "condition of individual insignifi-
cance," where individual contributions appear to have no impact on the outcome, to heightened tenden-
cies to defect).
197 This lumpiness does not guarantee that the interaction will look like a Chicken Game, rather
than a Prisoner's Dilemma, however. Even if the production function is relatively lumpy, the Prisoner's
Dilemma logic will still hold so long as the individual does not internalize enough from the contribution
to make it worthwhile. See HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 8, at 57-58 (making this point,
and arguing that even a slight upward slope on the riser of what otherwise appears to be a "step good"
may still yield a Prisoner's Dilemma).
198 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 7, at 46-47 (discussing possible game structures, including the
Assurance Game); STEVEN J. BRAMS, THEORY OF MOVES 1 (1994) (noting that there are seventy-eight
unique game structures generated by the possible different ordinal rankings of outcomes by two players
faced with two strategies); id. app. at 215-19 (detailing the fifty-seven "conflict" games in which the
two players disagree on the best outcome).
199 See GOETZ, supra note 138, at 15-16 (explaining that categorizing conflict situations can high-
light distinctions between situations that might otherwise appear similar).
200 See, e.g., ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 8, at 36-37 (discussing how factors such as shame
and glory can impact payoffs).
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people do likewise.2"' Where this is the case, players may behave as if they
are engaged in an Assurance Game strategic interaction," 2 even where the
pecuniary payoffs are structured as a Prisoner's Dilemma." 3
Sometimes perceptions cut against cooperation. Perceived unfairness
has been shown in experimental studies to be a powerful motivator that of-
ten causes people to take actions that appear personally disadvantageous.2"
I have suggested that attempts to agree on a division of surplus typically
take on the character of a Chicken Game, where refusal to agree will de-
stroy all of the surplus for everyone. However, negative emotions toward
the other players that emerge in the course of attempting to agree on a divi-
sion of surplus may be so strong as to fundamentally alter one's perception
of the game. Perhaps one decides that the other parties' bargaining conduct
is so reprehensible that one would rather walk away from the deal than let
those parties enjoy an excessive surplus. In other words, universal defec-
tion might begin to look more attractive than the sucker's payoff, because
accepting the sucker's payoff would be bundled with a great deal of emo-
tional disutility associated with being bested by one's opponents. In such a
case, one may decide one is better off defecting (that is, demanding a su-
pernormal surplus) regardless of whether that means derailing the deal.0 5
It is also possible that a single resource-allocation setting could yield dif-
ferently-patterned interactions within different ranges. For example, a re-
source-allocation problem that looks like a Prisoner's Dilemma through some
range of resource depletion might turn into a Chicken Game when depletion
becomes so severe that universal defection will generate a catastrophic result.
201 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 84-85, 104-05 (1987); Urs
Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment,
71 ECON. LETTERS 397 (2001).
202 The Assurance Game differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma in that players who have achieved a
joint strategy of mutual cooperation are not tempted to defect; each player in an Assurance Game does
best by cooperating, as long as the other person cooperates. See Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance
and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114-15 (1967) (formulating the "assurance prob-
lem"). The Assurance Game is similar to, and sometimes presented as identical with, the Stag Hunt, an-
other game in which the best individual outcome can be realized by cooperating, as long as the other
person also cooperates. The distinction sometimes drawn between the two games involves the rank or-
dering of the choices of universal noncooperation and individual noncooperation while the other player
cooperates. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision
of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392-93 nn.39-40 and sources cited therein (describing the Assur-
ance Game and noting variations of it); see ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 8, at 121 & n.5 (discuss-
ing the Stag Hunt game).
203 See Fischbacher et al., supra note 201, at 398 (explaining that the experimental design that elic-
ited conditional cooperation among approximately 50 percent of the subjects was one that would have
been predicted to result in "complete free riding by all subjects" on standard economic assumptions).
204 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 103; THALER, supra note 103.
205 Needless to say, the ability to believably convey this attitude greatly enhances one's bargaining
position. Cf ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
99-101 (1988) (presenting a fictional example that shows how convincing one's adversary of one's own
irrationality can be useful).
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Alternatively, what begins as a Prisoner's Dilemma among individuals can
turn into a Chicken Game interaction among sets of individuals. If we posit
a minimum subgroup of people who, by cooperating, could generate a result
better than universal defection, the stage is set for Chicken Games among
all feasible subgroups of that minimum size.2"6 Moreover, as noted above,
heterogeneous communities may lead to games that are not symmetrically
structured; one person may confront the payoff structure of a Prisoner's Di-
lemma while another, perhaps due to a greater sensitivity to norms or a
more active conscience, faces an Assurance Game or perhaps simply feels
impelled to cooperate under all circumstances.2 °7
An additional set of problems tends to fall temporally in between the
two strategic interactions upon which I have been focusing. I have empha-
sized that an anticommons, usually characterized by the holdout or Chicken
pattern of interaction, may sometimes follow closely on the heels of a trag-
edy of the commons, usually characterized by a Prisoner's Dilemma strate-
gic interaction. But I have said little about the intervening steps that might
take a group from a position in which the surplus from cooperation is a dis-
tant dream to one in which the surplus from consolidation of entitlements is
real enough to be actively scrapping over.200 Someone must incur transac-
tion costs in order to span this chasm. Who will do it?
The most likely candidate would be someone who expects to glean a
larger-than-proportionate share of the surplus that will be generated. Yet
there is no assurance that the surplus can be attained at all, and even less as-
surance that the party who takes the lead in bringing it about will enjoy
much of it. Hence, the gains from assembling together property entitle-
ments may be forgone, not because of people strategizing for larger shares
of the surplus, but for lack of a willing assembler to get the process going.
It is also possible that a would-be assembler will become discouraged in
advance by the prospect of endless Chicken Games, or even by more mun-
dane sorts of transaction costs, such as the costs of communication, that of-
ten plague large-number interactions. 9
206 See ELSTER, supra note 157, at 28 (explaining that a point of "self-sustaining cooperation" is
reached when a cooperating group exists of a size sufficient to achieve better results than in a world of
universal defection, but going on to note that those who are not in such a cooperating group would do
"even better"); Taylor & Ward, supra note 18, at 355-57 (discussing the Chicken Game that results
when a subgroup is capable of providing a "lumpy" public good); Fennell, supra note 76, at 44 (present-
ing an example showing this dynamic); see also Oliver et al., supra note 183, at 537 (discussing "willing
subsets" capable of providing a collective good).
207 For a discussion of the impact of such heterogeneity, see Fennell, supra note 76, at 54-56.
208 These steps represent one piece of a well-noted puzzle about the origins of private property insti-
tutions. If individual selfishness explains the need for property, it is hard to explain how property insti-
tutions came about, given that setting them up requires a certain degree of unselfish cooperation. See,
e.g., Krier, supra note 14, at 337-39 & nn. 39, 44; Rose, supra note 103.
209 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism ", 99 YALE L.J. 611, 615
(1989) (describing three "functional categories" of transaction costs: "get-together costs," which in-
clude "the burdens of arranging physical and electronic connections among transacting parties"; "deci-
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This middle ground between the blindered chaos of the commons and
the bluffing standoffs of the anticommons is an important part of the puzzle
that must be taken into account in formulating solutions. It can perhaps be
best understood as bearing elements of both strategic interactions. It in-
volves both the anticipatory costs of the Chicken Game, which may block
assembly altogether," ° and the usual collective action problem associated
with making investments that are socially beneficial but individually
costly-in this case, investments in communication and coordination.
III. THE TAXONOMY'S TRACTION
The value of any taxonomy lies in its ability to enhance understand-
ing.2 ' In this context, greater understanding brings with it the promise of
innovative and creative approaches to difficult problems of resource use
and community life. In this Part, I show how taking a functional approach
to common interest tragedies can advance both an understanding of these
tragedies and a search for better solutions to them. In subpart A, I explain
how a focus on strategic patterns illuminates choices about the assignment
and protection of entitlements. In subpart B, I explore this point further
by demonstrating the inevitability-and, indeed, desirability-of frag-
mented interests in complex interdependent settings. Because solving one
problem of fragmentation often creates another, different problem of
fragmentation, a community sharing a common pool resource must choose
the least harmful way of slicing up interests. In subpart C, I show how the
heterogeneity among production functions associated with the assembly of
fragmentary interests provides a meaningful way of weighing these op-
tions. In subpart D, I draw together all of these lines of analysis with a
stylized example involving entitlement protection within a residential
neighborhood.2 2
sion and execution costs" incurred in "actualiz[ing] their agreement"; and "information costs" about the
parties and goods under consideration).
210 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipation of holdout problems).
211 See, e.g., Peter Birks, Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 27-
28 (1999) (discussing the significance of taxonomy in the law and drawing analogies to biological clas-
sifications); Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems,
45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5, 5-6 (1997) (discussing the importance of taxonomy in law and, in particular, its
importance in "transferring knowledge from one area of the law to another"); see also Heller, supra note
12, at 79-80 (observing that "static categories" and "familiar analytic tools" can be costly when they
"render[] new forms of property invisible").
212 A neighborhood is, in an important sense, a "commons within a commons" insofar as its formation
may involve strategic interactions. I have explored elsewhere some of the issues that are presented when
the formation of a group, as well as its internal actions, are the product of strategic interactions, see gener-
ally Fennell, supra note 76, but will confine my analysis here to the intemal workings of the neighborhood.
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A. Approaching the Cathedral
A key advantage of an approach that focuses on strategic patterns is
that it connects the problems of the commons and the anticommons to the
burgeoning literature on the allocation and enforcement of entitlements-an
area of study launched by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in a
pathbreaking article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral.2 3 The impressive analysis of entitlement pro-
tection has not been extensively applied to the commons and anticommons
problems, even though entitlements and their protection lie at the heart of
common interest tragedies.214 Unrecognized connections between the bod-
ies of literature are much easier to see when common interest tragedies are
catalogued according to whether they present a holdout problem (the bane
of property rule protections) or a problem of improperly-priced conduct (the
stumbling block of liability rules).
The chief complaint in a tragedy of the commons is a pricing flaw that
makes socially costly acts or omissions personally beneficial. Because of
inappropriate pricing, people act without regard for the full social cost (or
benefit) of their actions. In many cases, this can yield a Prisoner's Di-
lemma. The chief complaint in a tragedy of the anticommons is blocked
access to a unified entitlement-a blockage that stems from property rule
protection over the fragments held by the other parties. Because property
rule protection allows parties to stand on their rights and refuse transfers, it
sets the stage for the bluffing behaviors associated with the game of
Chicken. Liability rule protection would avoid the holdout problem just de-
scribed, because a unilateral transfer would be possible.215 However, trans-
fers might occur too cheaply (at less than the true social cost) if the price is
set too low, or might be blocked unnecessarily if the price is set too high (at
more than the true social cost).2"6
213 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17.
214 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 479 (describing the interdisciplinary work in the area of
collective action as an "area of inquiry pretty much ignored to date in the property rule-liability rule lit-
erature"). There have been some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zon-
ing: Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728-33 (1973)
(discussing choice of entitlement protections in the neighborhood setting); Robert P. Merges, Contract-
ing into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1293 (1996) (discussing choice of entitlement protection in intellectual property realm where it
may be necessary to assemble many entitlements together).
215 E.g., LESSIG, supra note 48, at 260, 332 n.26 (discussing of the use of damage remedies in patent
law to avoid holdouts, and providing citations to literature on this point); Dibadj, supra note 3, at 1113-
15 (discussing potential of liability rules to preclude anticommons problems); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra
note 17, at 226 (explaining that liability rules "remove the owner's holdout power").
216 The inverse relationship between externalities and holdout problems that is suggested by this
discussion is developed at length in Epstein, supra note 13. As Epstein explains, "[t]he essential di-
lemma is that often the effort to counteract one problem will only aggravate the other, for where both are
present, they stand in an inverse relationship with each other." Id. at 557.
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As parties react to a given entitlement regime, elements of the com-
mons and anticommons tragedies surface. For example, the person whose
interests are overridden too cheaply through a liability rule regime faces an
anticommons situation. If the liability rule regime gives each person an op-
tion to engage in some obnoxious behavior (say, noisemaking) upon pay-
ment of a preset price, an individual particularly sensitive to noisemaking
might wish to buy up all those options in order to enjoy silence. But as-
sembling the noisemaking entitlements from everyone in the community is
likely to be difficult, for standard anticommons reasons. A party who holds
an option to engage in behavior typically enjoys property rule protection for
that option, meaning that she does not have to give up her privilege to exer-
cise it unless she is offered a deal that she finds attractive. This permits dis-
ingenuous statements of valuation, and can result in bluffing. The rights of
the sensitive could be protected by granting everyone a property rule enti-
tlement to stop annoying noise, but a person who highly values noisemak-
ing would then have to assemble the right to engage in acoustic excesses by
buying up rights from everyone else-again, a potential anticommons situa-
tion. 217
When viewed from this perspective, the choice between liability rules
and property rules involves a choice between potential common interest
tragedies. The potential for tragedy is an inherent result of the fragmenta-
tion of entitlements that accompanies common resource situations. No mat-
ter how entitlements are rearranged among the parties in a commons,
fragmentation of some important interest is likely to remain. The next sub-
part explains.
B. Fear of Fragmentation
In recent years, property scholarship has emphasized the disadvantages
associated with the fragmentation of entitlements-whether along physical
or conceptual lines."' Although the points that have been made in this con-
nection are well taken, the implicit suggestion that we should avoid frag-
mentation qua fragmentation deserves closer scrutiny.219 It is easy to see
why fragmentation attracts angst-we have already noted its association
217 See notes 117-19 and accompanying text (discussing both sides of this problem).
218 E.g., Freyfogle, supra note 75; Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163 (1999); Heller & Hills, supra note 90, at 1; Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land
and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REv. 739, 785 (2002); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Par-
tition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard to Do, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000); Francesco
Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595 (2002).
219 The fact that there are better and worse sorts of fragmentation has not gone unrecognized in the
literature. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 218, at 1184 (noting, in the context of common interest commu-
nities, "the difficulty of distinguishing good from bad fragmentation"); Parisi, supra note 218, at 613 &
nn.62-63 (explaining that "dysfunctional fragmentation" is associated with forgone complementarities,
and observing that some kinds of fragmentation may be functional under some social and economic
conditions).
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with both the commons and anticommons tragedies. 2 1 Indeed, a number of
longstanding property doctrines can be understood as mechanisms to con-
trol the pernicious effects of fragmentation. 22' Add to this the intuitive sug-
gestion that smashing property into pieces is much easier than painstakingly
piecing the shards back together,222 and the case against property fragmenta-
tion looks airtight. Or so it does, until one asks: "Compared to what?"
Consider a modern urban or suburban neighborhood comprising a grid
of 100 lots, each occupied by a house, which is in turn occupied by a fam-
ily. Viewed from above, this is the very picture of fragmentation. There
are hundreds of separate lot boundaries, and one hundred separate owners.
But it is not the sort of fragmentation that usually troubles commentators or
judges. Why not? Well, one might say, each of these individual owners
holds unified use privileges and exclusion rights as to her own parcel. 23
But take a closer look and you will notice spillovers-visual, olfactory,
auditory, even floral and faunal 224-flowing freely across the property lines.
This seems normal and natural. In most neighborhoods, homeowners re-
ceive a standardized bundle of property rights that includes the right to en-
gage in many activities that will impose mild spillover effects on
neighbors.225
Bundling certain spillover-causing use privileges together with each
neighbor's fee simple, however, means that neighbors have no right to ex-
220 See supra Part II.A.
221 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 218, at 1170-74 (discussing antifragmentation mechanisms in real
property); Parisi, supra note 218, at 603-13 (providing an historical overview of antifragmentation doc-
trines); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1143 & n.137 (2003) (explaining that "[a] wide variety of rules in property law can be regarded as
preventing excessive fragmentation of several types").
222 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 218, at 1165-69 (noting the comparatively greater difficulty of as-
sembling fragmented entitlements); Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 218 (recognizing the costliness of re-
assembling excessively fragmented interests); Parisi, supra note 218, at 626-27 (observing that "the
reunification of fragmented rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs of a greater magnitude
than those incurred in the original act of fragmentation" and noting the "one-directional stickiness in the
fragmentation process"). But see Smith, supra note 221, at 1143--44 (querying whether sunk costs might
not provide another explanation for enduring fragmentation).
223 See Parisi, supra note 218, at 613 n.62 (arguing that "[u]se and exclusion rights are a paradig-
matic example of strict complements in the bundle of property").
224 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 27, at 167 (observing that dividing land into privatized parcels does
not, in itself, keep animals from crossing borders).
225 See Bernard E. Jacob, The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Exceptional Packages, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1369, 1385 (1982) (observing that land packages held by neighboring landowners include "mu-
tual privileges to which no one has the right to object"). Control over uses of the land can be divided
between the individual landowner and the community in any number of ways. See, e.g., William A.
Fischel, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL'Y 301, 304 fig. l (1979) (present-
ing a "restriction index" that graphically represents the possible divisions of entitlements); WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 343 fig.9.1 (1995) (same); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18-19 & fig. 1 (2000) (depicting and describ-
ing possible divisions of entitlements between the community and the landowner).
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clude the spillovers from their property. Hence, with regard to the spill-
overs, each neighbor has use privileges without exclusion rights. Moreover,
we can understand this problem as one of fragmentation. Bundling the enti-
tlements to certain spillover-causing activities along with each property
owner's estate means splintering the converse entitlement to live in a
neighborhood free of those spillovers. For example, if each of my
neighbors can do as she pleases with regard to lawn care, then I cannot live
in a uniformly landscaped neighborhood unless I buy up each neighbor's
privilege to control lawn care and assemble in my own hands an entitlement
to "uniform landscaping. "226
Transferring more property entitlements from the individual home-
owners to the community resolves one fragmentation problem, but intro-
duces a new one-the fragmentation of the entitlement to engage in certain
spillover-producing behaviors among the many neighbors affected by those
spillovers We can see this by considering the implicit fragmentation
wrought by those land use entitlements already firmly under the commu-
nity's control. For example, in surveying this neighborhood, we are
unlikely to see any pig farms. There is a simple reason for this: the resi-
dents of the neighborhood have an entitlement to keep out pigs. As a result,
no person in the neighborhood can have a pig farm-even an efficient pig
farm-without gaining the consent of the other members of the neighbor-
hood.228 In other words, as to the activity of pig-farming, the neighbors
have exclusion rights without use privileges.229
If a would-be pig owner would get a tremendous amount of value from
a pig farm and the neighbors care little about the aesthetic impact of pigs,
the pig-farming potential of the land may well be underused. Again, we can
blame fragmentation: I might complain that my Blackstonian prerogative
226 It is possible that norms could generate a uniform effect. See Ellickson, supra note 214, at 686
n.17 (noting the ability of some Vermont towns to maintain consistent aesthetic schemes through
norms). In such a case, we might say that the community has de facto control over individual aesthetic
choices.
227 See infra Part Ill. For an extended analysis of this point, see Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting
Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming).
228 This is a simplification. If restrictive covenants constituted the only obstacle to the pig farm,
universal releases would be both necessary and sufficient. Unanimous consent by neighbors might be
neither necessary nor sufficient to undo the prohibition on a given land use worked by nuisance law or
zoning. However, because neighbors generally have a great deal of say in what land uses get zoning ap-
proval, and because neighbors could also agree not to bring nuisance actions, we might understand the
neighbors to have something approaching alienable veto rights. See FISCHEL, supra note 225, at 251
(describing the impact of a California Supreme Court decision that gave many parties the right to stop
development); Heller, supra note 218, at 1186 (observing that "zoned communities can create a tragedy
of the anticommons by giving too many neighbors veto rights over reasonable uses of land or by em-
powering too many overlapping jurisdictional bodies").
229 See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 114, at 768 (observing that when the law designates
some activity as a nuisance, such as operating a casino or brothel, it means that no person has the privi-
lege of engaging in the activity, while every person holds a right to not be exposed to the activity).
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to keep pigs has somehow, without my consent, been dispersed in the form
of veto rights among my many neighbors within smelling range. The frag-
mented pig-farm entitlements could be brought back under each land-
owner's control, but only at the price of splintering another interest that
homeowners hold dear: the right to breathe air untainted by pigs. Were
homeowners given back their pig-farm entitlements, any homeowner that
wished to breathe pig-free air would have to potentially buy up the pig
farming rights from everyone else.
The point should be clear by now: Fragmentation of entitlements is a
virtual inevitability in complex interdependent society.23 Fighting frag-
mentation in such a setting is a bit like fighting gravity. If the entitlements
in the neighborhood I have described do not seem as fragmented as those
that might be generated through reconfiguring the entitlements, this is only
because cultural understandings and engrained expectations cause us to
think of certain kinds of property entitlements as properly or naturally be-
longing together.23" ' As a result, the fragmentation of such "unified" enti-
tlements may be more salient to observers, including legal scholars and
judges.232 It is possible that the bundles (and corresponding fragments) that
seem "natural" to us do so because they happen to embody certain econo-
mies of scale, so that they actually represent a more efficient way of divid-
ing up the world of entitlements233-- or did at the time they gained
230 There is a tight connection between this point and the "Law of Reciprocity of Entitlements and
Exposures," formulated by Kennedy and Michelman. This principle, distilled from Wesley Hohfeld's
work on jural relations, holds that "[flor every legal entitlement there is an equal and opposite legal ex-
posure." Id. at 760. Because property rights are in rem, the correlative duties associated with them are
necessarily fragmented among the multitudes. Likewise, any limitation on those rights spreads privi-
leges to those same multitudes. See HOHFELD, supra note 129, at 36 (setting out system ofjural oppo-
sites and correlatives); id. at 73 (discussing the meaning of rights in rem). Once we posit a somewhat
densely populated and interdependent social setting, the reciprocal sets of rights, duties, privileges, and
"no-rights," see id. at 36, create unavoidable coordination problems, regardless of the configuration cho-
sen. As Kennedy and Michelman explain, "[eixposures can be shifted but not changed in number....
The books are double-entry and they have to balance." Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 114, at 760.
231 Cf Heller, supra note 2, at 671-72 n.228 (noting the difficulties in defining the "normal bounda-
ries of an object"). But see Parisi, supra note 218, at 613 n.62 (suggesting that "we can easily think of
other essential attributes of a property right [aside from use and exclusion rights] that are meant to be in
the control of a single individual" (emphasis added)).
232 In addition, there can be advantages associated with recognizing a limited number of standard-
ized forms of property and protecting those bundles from decomposition or reconfiguration into less
readily recognizable bundles. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 114, at 764 (discussing the limits
our legal system places on decomposition of property interests); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1
(2000); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Nu-
merus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002) (arguing that lim-
its on the division and variety of property rights are designed to facilitate verification by requiring
appropriate levels of notice).
233 Cf Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games, 70 J.
POL. ECON. 241, 243-44 & n.8 (1962) (discussing the notion of "natural units" in industry that might be
achieved through merger and citing George J. Stigler on this point).
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dominance. Nevertheless, these consolidated bundles of property rights of-
ten implicitly depend upon the fragmentation of some other entitlement.
Fragmentation is neither as negative nor as avoidable a phenomenon as it
might at first appear.
We can imagine efforts to make property in a neighborhood or village
less fragmented across the board. One person (or the government) could
buy up all the land and the residents could become tenants. Aside from
questions about whether this consolidation of land ownership is desirable,234
this would still fragment the fee simple temporally by granting a term of
years to tenants, and would create incentive problems along that dimension.
Alternatively, the "neighborhood commons"--that is, the shared aspects of
the environment that are subject to spillovers caused by the exercise of
landowner privileges-could be brought under the control of a central deci-
sionmaking body, such as a homeowners association. However, this would
fragment decisionmaking powers into the individual voters' hands (or con-
centrate it into the hands of some of them) and potentially present new con-
cerns. Fragmentation of one sort or another cannot be avoided, and efforts
to avoid a particular kind of fragmentation may create another kind that is,
on balance, worse.
Nor can we even say that all fragmentation that generates independ-
ently useless fragmentary entitlements is something we should necessarily
avoid. Fragmentation is sometimes important for the very purpose of relin-
quishing power over a given resource without granting power over the re-
source to anyone else, perhaps as a form of precommitment. For example,
when car ignitions are keyed separately from car doors, a partygoer who
fears overindulgence might entrust the ignition key to a friend while retain-
ing the door key herself; this would give the friend control over the driving
of the partygoer, but would afford the friend no actual access to the car
without the partygoer's consent. Fragmentation also works to temporally
spread negotiations so that they encompass more generations or at least
more "selves" who are exposed to more information.235 For example, grant-
ing a continuing veto power over use of a resource, such as a park, to a
number of different people forces the parties to negotiate each use among
their then-current selves, using then-current information, whenever an issue
regarding the resource's use arises.236 For a variety of reasons, this may be
234 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984) (relating the findings of the Hawaii
legislature that "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee
simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare"); cf. Davis & Whin-
ston, supra note 233, at 261-62 (noting the ability of merger to internalize externalities, but observing
that this may change the market structure in ways that generate a welfare loss).
235 The effect, and perhaps also the intention, is likely to be stability of the resource over time. See
TONY HONOR, MAKING LAW BIND 187-88 (1987) (suggesting that many splits of property interests are
"directed towards continuity by maintaining in being a physical thing, collection, or fund in order that it
may serve a family, business, or association over a substantial period").
236 Cf Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5-6, 34-37).
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preferable to holding an auction today that would place full power over the
park into a single individual's hands.
None of this is to deny that certain manifestations of fragmentation can
yield suboptimal--even tragic-results. The trick is to distinguish the sorts
of fragmentation that cause the most harm from their more benign counter-
parts. It is to this task that I now turn.
C. Heterogeneous Tragedies
While the preceding discussion suggests that something like an anti-
commons is lurking around the corner of every commons, and that frag-
mentation is both ubiquitous and unavoidable, it is important to recognize
that not all problems involving fragmented interests are equivalent. What
perhaps matters most is the shape of the production function for the surplus
or deficit involved."7 Recognizing these heterogeneities points the way to-
wards choosing wisely among possible tragedies.
In order for a fragmented entitlement situation to yield "tragedy" at all,
there must be complementarities among fragments so that their assembly-
in and of itself-generates surplus. Notwithstanding this complementarity
requirement, it is not always the case that the value of a set of fragments is
literally zero up until the point at which all the fragments are assembled.238
Differences in the production functions for the surplus associated with as-
sembly yield differently-structured dilemmas.
In the walled park example presented above, the surplus associated
with aggregation of property fragments was a step-level good featuring a
single sharp and well-defined "step." '239 However, it is not always essential
that all of the fragments be assembled in order for any of the surplus to be
enjoyed. Compare a jigsaw puzzle, which might be enjoyed (albeit subop-
timally) by a group of children even if one piece is missing, with a machine
that will absolutely not run without all of its parts. In both cases, comple-
mentarities are present, but the surplus associated with assembly does not
follow the same curve in both cases.24 Vivid examples of development
around holdouts (or holdins) suggest that something short of unanimous
237 See MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 18, at 25 (observing that in their analyses "the nature of
the production function emerges as the most important determinant of the outcome of a potential collec-
tive action").
238 See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 160, at 8-10, 18-19 (presenting and discussing the results
of a study designed to test the impact of varying degrees of complementarity on reservation prices);
Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 605 (discussing instances in which exclusion rights exhibit "less than per-
fect complementarity").
239 See supra fig.5 and accompanying text.
240 Parchomovsky and Siegelman allude to this point when they discuss differences between
"[c]lassic holdout settings," in which all properties must be acquired, with pollution situations in which
a polluter can block an injunction with something less than a unanimous buyout. Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 91, at 128; see Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 160, at 8-10, 18-19 (studying
the effects of altering the degree of complementarity).
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consent is often sufficient to achieve at least a significant part of the avail-
able surplus associated with land assembly.24" ' Where the consolidator's
need to obtain unanimous consent is not present, bluffing on the part of a
fragment-holder becomes riskier and hence self-limiting.
Figures 6 and 7 provide two examples of different production functions
associated with the surplus from assembling fragmented entitlements. In
both cases, surplus is associated with the assembly of the entitlements, but
unlike the situation depicted in Figure 5, it is not realized in one large jump
when the last piece is added. Figure 6, "Golden Silence," shows the surplus
that might result from one person's assembly of the rights of other group
members to make annoying noises.242
Figure 6: Golden Silence
Surplus
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
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No. of Fragments Assembled
As the shape of the dotted line shows, buying up one group member's right
to make noise would have little impact on the overall noise levels, but there
would be a cumulative effect as more "doses" of silence were added to the
mix, so that a significant surplus might result from putting together a half
dozen such entitlements. Eventually (in this example) things become quiet
241 See ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUJTS! (1984) (illustrating this point through
photographs and text); Cohen, supra note 76, at 358-59 (recounting the true story of a residential hold-
out in Atlantic City whose plan backfired when a casino-builder finally stopped making escalating offers
and built his casino around the resident's home, lowering its value below the pre-negotiation point).
24 have depicted this as an S-curve, although the actual shape would depend on the specific pref-
erences of the would-be assembler and the persons who presently hold the entitlements to make the an-
noying noises. In some cases, noisemaking could take on the character of a "step" bad. See HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 8, at 5 1 (characterizing a neighbor operating a power mower on a
Sunday momning as a step public bad).
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enough that there is a diminishing marginal surplus associated with adding
each additional noise right to the set.
Figure 7 shows yet another possibility-a curve that might be associ-
ated with the assembly of a path between two public parks along private
beachfront property.
Figure 7: The Beach Path
Surplus '
J
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No. of Fragments Assembled
In this example, the complete path yields the largest surplus and is much
better than a nearly-complete path. Therefore, we have a large jump in sur-
plus when the last fragment is added. Similarly, there is little surplus asso-
ciated with putting together just two or three fragments. However, as the
incomplete path grows, it begins to generate larger surpluses. A partial path
beginning at either park will let parkgoers stroll along the beach for some
distance, and even a short assembled segment that connects to neither pub-
lic park still generates (let us posit) some surplus for those with access to
the private property.
There are obviously many other possibilities associated with the as-
sembly of fragmented entitlements, and a full explication of the various im-
plications of these configurations is beyond the scope of this paper. What is
important for present purposes is to note that assembly problems take a va-
riety of forms, and that the strategic interactions they present will vary. In
short, not all problems of this genre are equally problematic. The kind of
assembly problem presented in Figure 5 is probably the trickiest to solve
because the stakes of getting all the pieces together is the highest (the total
surplus), and the return from dealings falling short of that are the lowest
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(zero). As noted earlier, even parties who attest a joint interest in a "fair"
division of the surplus may disagree vehemently about what that means,
and the heterogeneity of preferences makes it difficult to tell greed from a
mere desire to break even on the deal.243
This same difficulty is present in assembly problems that take a differ-
ent shape, but there is less risk of bluffing in those instances. Because
much of the surplus can be achieved without a particular individual's coop-
eration, those falsely attesting to higher valuations run a risk that they will
be simply left out of the deal, at relatively little cost. For example, some
land assembly problems might take the shape of Figure 6, as where a devel-
oper has significant latitude about exactly what portion of an existing
neighborhood to use for a cluster of, say, new shops. In these cases, the
surplus associated with one's contribution to the assembly shrinks rather
than grows as more of one's neighbors accept offers; this could trigger a
rush to sell within a certain range, rather than attempts to hold out and be
the last seller. 21 We should worry less about the risk of Chicken Game in-
teractions leading to inefficient results in such cases, other things equal. Of
course, other kinds of strategic problems may exist in such a case, perhaps
stemming from a clamor to sell as quickly as possible.
A focus on the shape of production functions is also useful for sizing
up and distinguishing among tragedies of the commons. As noted above,
the stage is set for a tragic outcome when the actions of purely self-
interested parties yield a lower amount of social value overall than would be
achievable if the parties took account of the externalities of their actions.
But the increment by which private interest and group interest diverge is not
a constant value in a given resource-allocation setting. Consider the case of
overfishing. When the members of a commons are merely extracting fish
for personal use from the pond, there may be no net social cost associated
with the fishing because it does not deplete the fish population enough to
reduce the overall amount available for someone in the group to enjoy. As
fishing intensifies (perhaps in response to a developed market for fish), ex-
tractions begin to produce larger social costs by reducing the replenishment
rate of the pool and causing fishers to have to spend more time getting fish
out of the pond.24 As the replenishment rates drop dramatically, fishers
reach a point at which they cannot depend on future generations of fish be-
ing present in the pond, and, unless the impulse is checked, race to extract
all the existing fish they possibly can before someone else does. This ful-
243 See supra fig.4 and accompanying text and notes.
244 Cf Cohen, supra note 76, at 361. Cohen observes that a holdout problem is unlikely to develop
when only a majority of shares is required to change a corporate board; even if the raider's plan becomes
known before the majority is acquired, the remaining stockholders' realization that the plan requires the
participation of only a fraction of them is "more likely to induce a mad rush to sell" than efforts to hold
out. Id.
245 See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 351-52 (positing that the emergence of markets for furs led to
rapidly escalating rates of hunting and increasingly costly externalities).
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fills the fear that there will not be a continuing population of fish in the
pond and leads to a tragic result.
The precise relationship between fishing behaviors and the sustainabil-
ity of the fish population is ultimately an empirical question; mathematical
models cannot provide answers without good inputs from those with spe-
cialized knowledge of the resource and the many factors impacting it.246
But assuming for the sake of argument that the facts are roughly as I have
just posited them, the course of the tragedy might look something like Fig-
ure 8.247
246 There is a substantial literature on such questions. See, e.g., Thomas Dietz et al., The Drama of
the Commons, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 8, at 3, 9-11 (summarizing the literature on
modeling fishing); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fish-
ery, 62 J. POL. EcON. 124 (1954) (attempting to model impact of fishing on yields over time); Dean
Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S609, S616-17
& fig.2 (2002) (modeling bison population dynamics); Rose, supra note 34, at 241 (explaining how fac-
tors such as "weather patterns, shifts in water temperatures and currents, [and] alterations in food
sources and predators," cast doubt on "the idea of a smoothly curved relationship between human activ-
ity (e.g., fishing or pollution) and resources stock levels (e.g., bountiful fish or clean air)"). In natural
resource contexts, assumptions about the total size of various resources or about the impacts of human
activity on those resources are constantly subject to revision. See, e.g., Gordon, supra, at 126-28 (dis-
cussing cyclical shifts in opinion among biologists about the impact of fishing on fish populations);
Christopher Pala, Multiplication Problem Threatens Stock of Sturgeon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at D3
(reporting controversies over data on the beluga sturgeon population in the Caspian Sea); Jos6 Ramirez,
Revised Estimates of Whale Population, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003, at A10 (reporting a study estimating
that the population of humpback whales before commercial whaling began may have been as high as 1.5
million, not 100,000 as previously believed); Andrew C. Revkin, Ozone Layer Is Improving, According
to Monitors, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at All (reporting that studies show "the first sign that the phas-
ing out of chemicals that harm the ozone layer is having a restorative effect"). For an essay addressing
the problem of uncertainty associated with natural systems, see James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty,
Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, su-
pra note 8, at 327.
247 See Taylor & Ward, supra note 18, at 353 (presenting diagram showing two possible relation-
ships between the use value of a fishery and its rate of exploitation). Although Figure 8 differs some-
what in format and shape from the graphs shown in the Taylor & Ward diagram, it grows out of similar
assumptions and has similar implications.
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Figure 8: The Fish Pond
Net Social Loss
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The horizontal axis tracks the intensity of extraction, and the vertical axis
represents the deficit imposed on the group as a whole as a result (the dif-
ference between the private benefit achieved and the public cost it inflicts
on the others). Over some range, there is no deficit produced. 4 On the
contrary, the benefits internalized by the extractor exceed the costs imposed
on the whole group, so that extraction is beneficial on balance. This might
be the case where fishing is done for personal consumption only. As fish-
ing intensifies, costs rise slowly and then climb at an increasing rate until
they sharply peak at the point where the pond loses viability .24 ' As we
move to the right on the graph, each fisher suffers a larger and larger cost as
a result of the deficit that is inflicted on the group, and each will intensify
her own extraction efforts in an effort to defray that deficit by pulling out
some benefits of her own. Of course, this exacerbates the situation.
On the other hand, heightened externality costs could create pressures
towards changes in property rights capable of overcoming the collective ac-
tion problem. 5 One possible solution is suggested by the large "step" at
248 See id (observing that "[elcological systems such as lakes, rivers, the atmosphere, fisheries and
so on can normally be exploited up to some critical level while largely maintaining their integrity and
retaining much of their use value").
249 See id (suggesting there is often a point at which exploitation generates a catastrophic drop in
use value for resources such as fisheries).
20See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 351-52 (suggesting that property rights developed in response to
changes in the fur tirade that increased the costs associated with externalities). Such changes require collective
action, however. See supra note 208 (noting the difficulty property theory has in explaining how selfish parties
can cooperate to a sufficient degree to establish property rights that are designed to restrain selfishness).
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the end, just before the fish pond's demise. If increasing intensity (moving
from left to right on the curve) raises the social cost sharply within that final
range, this also means that decreasing intensity from the point of total disaster
(moving from right to left on the curve) would generate a sharp drop in costs
(or a gain, relative to the baseline of the pond's destruction). If each number
on the intensity scale represented the all-out efforts of an individual fisher,
then any one of the fishers would be able to unilaterally achieve a significant
improvement (an intensity drop from 10 to 9) by abstaining from fishing.
While it is unlikely that the internalized share of this improvement would be
enough to motivate such an action, the other fishers might find it worthwhile
to "buy out" the tenth fisher's fishing privileges, so as to preserve the viabil-
ity of the pond. This would work if the other fishers were already operating
at top capacity and could not expand their own operations. Otherwise, keep-
ing Fisher 10 out of the pond would only enable intensified fishing efforts on
the part of the other nine fishers, potentially leading to disaster once again.25" '
Not all tragedies are shaped like this one. To turn again to the example
of noise pollution, it might be the case that a little bit of extra noise does little
or no harm, but as noise levels increase, extra increments become additionally
harmful to the overall ambience of an area. At some point, however, the
noise is so great that extra increments add very little to the overall cacophony.
This might be depicted by an S-curve, as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Annoying Noise
Net Social Loss
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Doses of Annoying Noise
251 This distinguishes this example from the umbrella example given earlier. There, each student
faced a discrete choice to take a single unit (one umbrella) and had no incentive to intensify extraction
above that level in response to the sacrificial action of one of the students.
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Notice that this is exactly the converse of Figure 6, Golden Silence.252
If the community (or an individual) buys back the rights to each increment
of annoying noise, the effects on the overall cost curve can be seen by mov-
ing down the curve from right to left (reducing from 10 increments to 9 in-
crements of noise, and then from 9 to 8, and so on). If the gains thereby
achieved were plotted as "surplus," the result would look like Figure 6.
Finally, how might we map the tragedy of underinvestment? Here, we
can draw on the literature assessing the production functions of public
goods, which suggests an S-curve of the sort shown in Figure 9 is a possi-
bility.253 The first few efforts to contribute to, say, the intellectual life of a
group may generate relatively little surplus. As things begin to improve,
however, each addition does more and more good. In these cases, the chal-
lenge is to get the investment off the ground in the first place. Once it gets
going, the large visible gains associated with additional increments of in-
vestment may encourage those investments.254 Even a purely self-interested
individual who takes no account of the externalities bestowed on others will
receive a larger benefit when the total returns associated with her invest-
ment are larger, and will be somewhat more likely to make the investment,
other things equal, than she was when her efforts generated smaller personal
returns. Ultimately, however, a level is achieved at which additional inputs
of intellectual investment generate only small positive externalities. Once
the returns begin to diminish, so too will the incentive to contribute.255
Again, it becomes important to consider whether the good being pro-
duced through investment has the nonrival character of a public good (as
would the intellectual climate example just mentioned) or is one from
which units can be subtracted at will (as would be the case if one were in-
vesting-through restrained extraction-in a replenishing resource). In the
latter case, one cannot be sure that larger returns from action will mean a
larger share for oneself, at least insofar as the group members have the in-
centive and ability to increase their demands on the system. In the former
case, however, an increasing benefit for the group will necessarily mean an
increasing benefit for oneself. Successfully comparing tragedies therefore
requires an awareness not only of the shape of the production function, but
also the amounts at stake, and the characteristics of the underlying resource.
252 This reiterates the point made earlier, supra note 45, that the same activity can be characterized
either as producing a harm or failing to bestow a benefit.
253 See MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 18, at 58, 60-61 (quoting Anthony Oberschall and discuss-
ing his assumption that S-curves are typical in collective action).
254 This pattern exists whenever a production function is accelerating (as the S-cuve is in its early
phase). See Oliver et al., supra note 183, at 542 (noting that it is difficult to get initial contributions go-
ing where a collective good exhibits an accelerating production function, but that cooperation "tends to
snowball" once it gets underway).
255 See id at 547 (explaining that "once the later, flatter portion of the curve is reached, it is ruled by
the dynamics of deceleration, and the less interested cease contributing").
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D. Choosing the Lesser Tragedy
In this last subpart, I will illustrate how the analysis developed in the
subparts above might be used to make better decisions about entitlement as-
signment and protection in a common resource context. To do this, I use
the example of a residential neighborhood, where homeowners must neces-
sarily share overlapping environments. The overall neighborhood ambience
can be understood as a common pool resource against which costly draws
may be made through land uses that produce negative externalities, and to
which valuable contributions may be made through land uses that produce
positive externalities." 6
1. Entitlement Options.-Figure 10 uses the schema developed by
Calabresi and Melamed and their successors to lay out a menu of options
for addressing matters of neighborhood ambience.257 I use two examples
throughout the chart to show the practical implications of each rule in this
context: one involves an activity-putting a plastic flamingo in the
yard-often thought to generate negative externalities; the other involves
an activity-landscaping-generally believed to generate positive exter-
nalities. The words "flamingo" and "landscaping" in each example could
be replaced by anything that generates negative and positive spillovers,
respectively, within a commons.
256 To be sure, not everyone will agree about the impact of certain uses, and views of a given use
may change over time. The possibility of disputes about the sign (positive or negative) associated with
externalities generated by particular activities introduce difficulties that are very important, although not
unique to the realm of neighborhood aesthetics. Beliefs about the value of (and implicitly about the ex-
ternalities generated by) many other land and resource use arrangements have changed over time. See,
e.g., Robert Bruegmann, Urban Density and Sprawl: An Historical Perspective, in SMARTER GROWTH:
MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES FOR LAND-USE PLANNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 155, 177 (Randall G.
Holcombe & Samuel R. Staley eds. 2001) (discussing past preference reversals regarding matters such
as power generation, public housing, urban renewal, and zoning); Mahoney, supra note 218, at 759-63
(describing how cultural changes can transform aesthetic sensibilities and alter the desired patterns of
land use).
257 This table is adapted from ones generated by other authors. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 17, at 8
tbl.1; Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 17, at 6 fig.2. The first four rules are those discussed by Calabresi and
Melamed; the last two were added by later scholars. See Morris, supra note 17, at 854-56 (discussing "re-
verse liability" or "put" options); see also Avraham, supra note 17, at 7 & nn.10-1I (describing history of
Rules 5 and 6 and providing citations to work developing them). In some scholarly discussions of these
rules, numbers 5 and 6 are reversed. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 17, at 7 n. 13.
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Figure 10: Neighborhood Ambience: A Menu of Choices
RULE ENTITLEMENT How EXAMPLES
HELD BY PROTECTED?
I Community Property Rule flamingos are forbidden;
landscaping is required
2 Community Liability Rule flamingos are taxed;
(Individual failure to landscape is taxed
Holds Call
Option)
3 Individual Property Rule flamingos are permitted;
landscaping is optional
4 Individual Liability Rule the community can remove
(Community the flamingo by paying the
Holds Call individual a removal fee; the
Option) community can require land-
scaping by paying the indi-
vidual a landscaping fee
5 Individual Put Option individual can keep the fla-
mingo or get rid of it and
collect a removal fee;
individual can go without
landscaping, or landscape
and collect a fee
6 Community Put Option community can demand the
flamingo's removal or col-
lect a flamingo tax;
community can demand
landscaping or collect a tax
for failure to landscape
In the next section, I will discuss Rules 1 and 3, entitlements protected
by property rules. These are entitlements that can only be transferred by
mutual consent at a mutually agreeable price, and hence present one set of
concerns. In section 3, I will take up liability rules (which can also be char-
acterized as "call options") that enable unilateral transfers of an entitlement
upon the payment of a specified fee or tax, and "put options" that offer par-
ties a choice between keeping their entitlement or forcing the other party to
buy it at a specified price.
2. Property Rule Options.-Rules 1 and 3 in Figure 10 represent two
possible ways of handling a neighborhood's conflicts over ambience
through entitlements protected by property rules. In Rule 1, the community
holds the entitlement for flamingo display, and this entitlement is protected
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by a property rule. This means that the community can enjoin flamingo
placement in front yards. The individual who wishes to place flamingos in
her front yard must buy the right from the community at a price satisfactory
to the community, and the community can refuse to accept any and all of-
fers. Rule 1 could also be applied to an affirmative obligation like land-
scaping. If the community holds an entitlement to landscaping protected by
a property rule, it could force the individual to landscape her yard. Under
Rule 1, the community would be entitled not just to damages if the individ-
ual failed to landscape, but to specific performance.
Under Rule 3, the individual holds the entitlement to control flamingo
display and may place flamingos in her yard if she pleases. If the commu-
nity, or any members within it, want her to remove the flamingo (or if they
want to prevent flamingo placement in advance) they must purchase the in-
dividual's flamingo placement entitlement at a price she finds satisfactory,
and the individual can refuse to sell her flamingo privileges at any price if
she so chooses. Likewise, the individual controls her own landscaping enti-
tlement, and can landscape or not, as she chooses. If the community, or any
members within it, want her to landscape (or want to make sure in advance
that she can never stop landscaping) they would have to buy the individ-
ual's entitlement over her own landscaping at a price she finds satisfactory,
and she can refuse to sell at any price.
Although private developments governed by restrictive covenants and
areas zoned for historical preservation represent a growing class of excep-
tions, in most places the homeowner retains control over a significant set of
draws from, and contributions to, neighborhood ambience. Thus, most
neighborhoods in the United States represent Rule 3 regimes: People have
an entitlement to put objects of their own choosing, such as plastic flamin-
gos, in their front yards, and that entitlement is protected by a property rule.
They cannot be compelled to give it up unless offered a price acceptable to
them. The Rule 3 regime potentially represents a tragedy of the commons.
Because people do not internalize the full cost associated with yard art, but
do internalize the full benefit, they are likely to do too much of it from an
allocative efficiency standpoint. In other words, they will be tempted to
"overgraze" the visual or aesthetic field.
One possible response would be to shift to a Rule 1 world in which
flamingos are banned. The shift itself would be very costly to achieve
without a coordinated mechanism for bringing it about; it would require
every member of the community to relinquish his or her own flamingo-
placing privileges to every other member of the community, while simulta-
neously gaining rights over the flamingo placement of each other member.
This would require hundreds or thousands of separate covenants." 8 How-
258 See Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 914-15 (1988)
(observing that 4,950 pairwise covenants would be required in a 100-person community if it were not
possible to handle covenants through a central party such as a developer).
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ever, homeowners in private communities can overcome this coordination
problem by entering into covenants through the central figure of the devel-
oper.259 Each homebuyer automatically binds herself to each other neighbor
and automatically receives the benefit of covenants with each other
neighbor when she enters the community. Thus, a Rule 1 world (flamingos
forbidden) can be readily established through the use of covenants."'
A Rule 1 regime avoids the tragedy of the commons just described, but
introduces two new concerns. First, a collective action problem may arise
around the enforcement of the community's entitlement. However, if the
community can devise a collective enforcement mechanism (such as the
managing board of a homeowners association), this problem can be obvi-
ated. 6' Second, the flamingo ban may stop efficient flamingo placement.
For example, it is possible that some people enjoy putting art in their yards
to such a great degree that the benefits they enjoy as a result outweigh the
associated costs, including those imposed on other members of the commu-
nity.262 If so, that person will face an anticommons situation in attempting
to gain permission to place her flamingo.
For example, consider Bella, who values flamingo placement at $700,
where the costs imposed on the entire community are only $500. In a world
free of transaction costs,263 she could buy her way out of the restriction. In
the real world, however, things are more difficult. Bella could, for example,
attempt to assemble permission from each and every neighbor in order to dis-
play her flamingo in violation of the ban.26" Given the surplus to be had, eve-
ryone is better off if she is successful in obtaining permission to place the
flamingo. Moreover, let us assume that the community has an excellent
online communication system to which every member is linked electronically
in real-time, reducing nearly to zero the mundane costs of communicating
and negotiating over entitlements. So far, the picture seems promising.
259 See id.
260 Although this is a very convenient way of establishing a massive network of reciprocally bind-
ing covenants, it also means that homebuyers do not consider covenants separately, but rather accept
them as part of a bundled deal that includes a home on a particular parcel of land in a particular location.
For a discussion of this point, as well as other potential disconnects between homebuyer choices in pri-
vate communities and the maximization of value for those homebuyers, see Fennell, supra note 227.
261 Collection of uniform dues for purposes of undertaking enforcement will, however, introduce
potential mismatches between individual valuations of the enforcement and the amount that each indi-
vidual is required to pay.
262 See supra Part lI.B. I (discussing possibility that activities with externalities may nevertheless be
efficient).
263 This sort of world is often described as Coasean, although Coase himself recognized, and em-
phasized, that the real world features large transaction costs. See generally Ellickson, supra note 209.
264 If the ban were implemented through reciprocally binding covenants, then this would involve
negotiating a release with each of her neighbors; a single holdout neighbor could block the deal and ob-
tain injunctive relief against the breach of the covenant. See, e.g., Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195
(N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (refusing to override the interests of a single landowner who would not release
nearby land from covenant restrictions that benefited her).
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However, conflict over the division of the surplus is likely to thwart
Bella's quest to collect the necessary permissions. Even if Bella is prepared
to pay $699 to the other community members (she is willing to "swerve" in
advance in the game of Chicken by gleaning only a $1 surplus), the "com-
munity" is not a single person but rather an amalgamation of different inter-
ests. How should the remaining surplus be divided? An even division is
unlikely to be satisfactory. Consider the case of Sneed. Not only does he
find that the sight of flamingos interferes with his digestion, but his break-
fast nook looks directly onto Bella's proposed flamingo placement site.
Sneed is likely to have a reservation price that is quite high. Bella would be
willing to pay Sneed's true valuation, as well as the true valuations of the
other community members, so highly does she value her flamingo entitle-
ment. Yet, other members of the community, seeing the price that Sneed is
asking for his grant of flamingo permission, will be inclined to ask for simi-
lar amounts. Further, given the nature of subjective valuations, it is impos-
sible for anyone to tell whether a given neighbor really has the reservation
price of a Sneed, or is just pretending to have such a price. The result may
well be that Bella cannot gain the privilege to place her flamingo.265 Hence,
in attempting to address a tragedy of the commons associated with "over-
grazing" of neighborhood ambience, the community has created an aes-
thetic anticommons into which even efficient incursions are impossible.266
The Rule 1 solution to the commons tragedy risks the creation of an
anticommons tragedy by precluding efficient draws against neighborhood
ambience. Because Rule 1 gives each person in the community the right to
set her own price for putting up with Bella's flamingo, it protects people
with unusually high subjective valuations.267 But the protection that it pro-
vides for people with genuinely high valuations also provides protective
cover for people without abnormally high valuations, who are merely inter-
ested in capturing a larger surplus from the sale. This presents the well-
known difficulty of telling people with genuinely high valuations from
those strategically holding out in the hopes of a better deal.
265 Can the community solve this problem by appointing a representative or body to deal with enti-
tlement transactions, instead of leaving matters to be handled neighbor by neighbor? This is certainly
possible, but one of two things will be true of any effort to solve the problem in this way. Either the rep-
resentative or body will be empowered to make decisions on less than unanimous consent, in which case
some interests will be overridden against individuals' wills, or the representative or body will be permit-
ted to act only after gaining the unanimous consent of the group, in which case the problems already de-
tailed will likely hamper transactions. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 65-73 (Liberty Fund 1999)
(1962) (describing the tradeoffs between easier decisionmaking and protection of oneself from adverse
decisions in choosing the level of consensus required for a decision).
266 For application of the anticommons notion to covenants in common interest communities, see
Heller, supra note 218, at 1185.
267 See Ellickson, supra note 214, at 736 n.192 (observing that "[b]argaining permits subjective,
idiosyncratic assessments of value").
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However, it is important to recognize that a similar set of problems
may exist even if the community were to adopt (or keep) Rule 3, in which
individuals hold entitlements over flamingo use. Consider now the case of
Nora. Nora highly values an environment free of yard art; indeed, she val-
ues that environment more than the aggregate amount of value that all of
her neighbors derive from their various lawn items. She would like to have
an entitlement to keep any yard art from assaulting her eyes when she is in
her neighborhood, but under Rule 3 there is no single person from whom
she can purchase that entitlement. Instead, the right to control yard art in
Nora's visual field is presently fragmented among all of the neighbors
within viewing distance of her home. The difficulties that Nora will face in
obtaining the efficient result-a consolidation of the yard art rights in her
own name-is similar conceptually to the anticommons problem faced by a
person who must secure permission from everyone in the neighborhood be-
fore placing art in her own yard.
However, there are differences between the anticommons situations
potentially faced by Bella and Nora that become apparent when we com-
pare the production functions associated with the surplus available in the
two cases.268 Nora may greatly value a flamingo-free neighborhood, but it
is still likely that she derives some benefit from flamingo reduction, even if
she is unable to accomplish complete flamingo eradication. In other words,
the production function for the surplus she will glean from buying up fla-
mingo entitlements probably does not look like Figure 5; it more likely re-
sembles the s-curve shown in Figure 6, or some other curve in which
significant surplus is available short of assembling all of the entitlements.
In contrast, a person who desires to put a flamingo in the yard but is forbid-
den from doing so until she obtains permission from every neighbor (or a
community acting on behalf of all neighbors) faces a situation more like the
one shown in Figure 5, in which the surplus is a step good that requires as-
sembly of all the entitlements.
Nora's anticommons problem looks easier to solve than Bella's, but
this does not decide matters on its own. We still must consider the impacts
of the various rules on the community members who have more run-of-the-
mill preferences. A Rule 3 world allows not only Bella's (efficient) fla-
mingo, but also the many flamingos that generate net social costs. We can
learn something about the costs of allowing these inefficient flamingos by
examining the shape of the production function of harm generated by them.
268 In theory, Bella and Nora could not logically coexist in the same community. If one person
(such as Bella) so highly values flamingo placement that she could pay everyone else off and still come
out ahead, there is by definition no person (such as Nora) in the community who so hates flamingos that
she could pay off everyone to not place them and still come out ahead. However, it will often be unclear
in setting entitlements whether a Bella or a Nora exists, and the possibility that a community member
will acquire the preferences of either a Bella or a Nora over time complicates matters. In addition, the
original assignment of entitlements may have wealth or cognitive impacts of its own that will determine
whether a person with Nora's or Bella's preferences exists in the resulting regime.
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In this case, the harms are probably self-limiting; after a time, more flamin-
gos stop hurting the community much, just as was the case with annoying
noise in Figure 9. In other settings, inefficient behavior continues to esca-
late to a crisis point at which the resource is wholly destroyed, as was the
hypothetical fishery shown in Figure 8. In the latter setting, the Rule 3 re-
gime is not workable at all, and the Rule 1 regime, although still quite im-
perfect, represents some improvement.
Figure 11 summarizes the differences between Rules 1 and 3 in the
neighborhood context, noting the potential for Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)
and Chicken Game (CG) problems under each rule. We must consider the
costs associated with strategic dilemmas created by the original assignment
of the entitlement (which will be suffered if transfer cannot occur), as well
as those that would be encountered in attempting to transfer the entitlement
(which will determine whether' transfer is likely to occur). In addition, to
the extent a successful switch occurs from Rule 1 to Rule 3, or vice versa, it
will potentially bring in its wake the problems associated with that rule. 69
As noted above, some of these strategic problems could be ameliorated if a
centralized figure, such as a homeowners' association or developer, coordi-
nated a response to the problem.
Figure 11: Property Rule Options
RULE ENTITLEMENT EXAMPLES DILEMMA AS DILEMMA IN
HELD BY ASSIGNED? TRANSFERRING?
(TYPE OF (SHAPE OF
PROBLEM) SURPLUS)
1 Community flamingos are PD or CG CG
forbidden; (underenforce- (step)
landscaping ment)
is required
3 Individual flamingos are PD CG
permitted; (too many (non-step)
landscaping flamingos; too
is optional little landscap-
ing)
3. "Calls " and "Puts ".-Of course, the community is not limited to
property rule solutions. Liability rules can operate to appropriately "re-
price" the use, taking into account external impacts."' Entitlements vested
269 The fact that a transfer has occurred suggests that the entitlement lies with the party who values
it most highly, at least at the time of transfer, so that the problems associated with further transfers
would seem unimportant. But preferences can change over time, leading to new inefficiencies.
270 This approach is known as Pigouvian, after its pioneer, Arthur Pigou. See PIGOU, supra note 45,
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in one party and protected by a liability rule (Rules 2 and 4) effectively
grant the other party a "call option" to unilaterally buy the entitlement at a
specified price. 27' A famous case law example of Rule 2 is Boomer v. At-
lantic Cement Co.,2 2 where the court held that the cement plant could con-
tinue to pollute (that is, it could obtain the entitlement over the air) by
paying "permanent damages"-a court-determined amount-to the parties
injured by the pollution.273 A call option can work in the opposite direction
as well; the polluter might be given the entitlement to continue polluting,
but the victim might be given an option to buy up that pollution right at a
specified price. A close case law analog is Spur Industries v. Del E.
Webb.274 In that case, a developer who had constructed and sold residences
uncomfortably close to a cattle feedlot was able to secure an injunction
against the continued operation of the feedlot, but at the price of covering
the cost of the feedlot's relocation.275  A regulatory regime that grants au-
thorities the power to "buy back" fishing rights from fishers at a specified
price constitutes another example of this rule.276
at 159-62, 168-70 (suggesting that "divergences between private and social net product" might be re-
moved by the State through taxes or bounties). While Coase showed that such a system of public inter-
vention into prices through the tax system was not necessary to achieve efficient results in the absence
of transaction costs, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), it remains a
potentially useful option where transaction costs are positive-which of course, they always are.
271 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 17, at 1041 & n.49 (observing that under a liability rule,
the defendant holds a call option); Morris, supra note 17, at 852-54 (discussing liability rules as call op-
tions); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2178-79 (1997) (observing
that a liability rule is the equivalent of a property rule combined with an option).
272 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
273 Id. at 875.
274 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
275 Id. at 707-08. It is not entirely clear that the developer, Del E. Webb, actually had an option to
permit the pollution to continue, if the losses it caused him were less than the price of moving the feed-
lot. The court noted that this was a public nuisance affecting many individuals who were not parties to
the lawsuit (i.e., the homeowners); hence, it does not appear that the feedlot could have continued its
operations in such close proximity to housing in any event. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER 5TH, supra note
6, at 776 (discussing this question); Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 445 n.23 (observing that "the
court's judgment implies that Del Webb must pay and that Spur Industries must move"). But see id. at
470 (suggesting that "[diespite such an ultimatum, however, Spur Industries and Del Webb would pre-
sumably remain free to bargain after the liability-rule judgment was entered, just as they would have
been free to do so after a property-rule judgment"). In any event, the remedy was a highly unusual one.
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 409-10 (3d ed.
2002) (discussing the Spur case and observing that the remedy it provided "appears to be unique, both
unprecedented and never repeated").
276 See John L. McMullan & David C. Perrier, Lobster Poaching and the Ironies of Law Enforce-
ment, 36 LAW & SOC. REV. 679, 685 (2002) (explaining that the regulatory regime governing lobster
fishing in Nova Scotia included a proviso entitling the government to "buy back boats and to retire li-
censes" when a Class A licensed boat stopped lobster fishing) (citing A. SCOTT & M. TUGWELL, PUBLIC
REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES IN CANADA-THE MARITIME LOBSTER FISHERY (Economic
Council of Canada, Technical Report No. 16, 1981)).
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Conversely, it is possible to vest in the same party both the entitlement
itself and the option to make the other party buy the entitlement at a speci-
fied price (Rules 5 and 6). In both cases, the party holding the entitlement
also holds a "put" option to force its sale at an established price.277 For ex-
ample, a party harmed by another party's conduct can choose to stop the
harmful conduct or to receive court-calculated damages in exchange for
continuing to suffer from it. This was precisely the choice offered to the
plaintiff in Pile v. Pedrick,2 7' a case involving a minute encroachment of a
wall upon the land of another. Alternately, the party causing the harmful
conduct could be given a "put" option. Under such a rule, a party like Spur
(the feedlot operator) would be given a choice between continuing its op-
eration unimpeded or accepting a judicially determined amount of money in
exchange for moving away. Retirement incentive options offered to em-
ployees are a close analog if offered in situations where employees' contin-
ued employment generates costs for the organization, but the employees
hold entitlements to stay on the job.279 Subsidies for behavior that produces
positive externalities (or that reduces negative externalities) represent famil-
iar incarnations of this entitlement regime.28°
Figure 10 illustrates all four of these options (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6) in
the context of neighborhood aesthetics. All of these options permit unilat-
eral transfers of entitlements, and hence avoid the anticommons or holdout
problems often associated with property rule protection. If the exercise
prices are set accurately, they also solve the tragedy of the commons prob-
lem by making each individual's personal payoff match up to the social
payoff of her behavior. But setting the prices accurately will be difficult,
especially if the community is heterogeneous and the impact of each suc-
cessive draw or contribution is not uniform. Because the transfers can oc-
277 See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998); Krier & Schwab,
supra note 17; Morris, supra note 17, at 854-56. A "put" can also be understood as a type of liability
rule, because it permits a unilateral entitlement transfer. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 17, at 6.
However, the term "liability rule" has been traditionally associated with call options rather than puts,
and I will retain that usage here.
278 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895); see Ayres, supra note 277, at 815-16. The plaintiff in Pile elected injunc-
tive relief that required the defendant to tear down a wall in order to rectify a tiny incursion into the
plaintiff's property. A possible concern is that spite might cause a party holding a "put" to choose the
option most harmful to the other party, rather than the one most beneficial to the choosing party. Insis-
tence upon injunctive relief could also constitute a bluff, a prelude to further negotiations in which the
plaintiff hopes to capture a larger amount of damages than the court originally specified. See Ian Ayres
& Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 45, 49-50 (1999) (noting that plaintiffs like the one in Pile would have an incentive to choose in-
junctive relief to enhance their bargaining position, when the damages expected from the court are sig-
nificantly lower than the costs the injunction would inflict on the defendant).
279 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimina-
tion?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 814-15 & n. 176 (1997) (describing the
use of retirement incentive plans to remove costly older workers from the workforce).
280 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 17, at 854-55 (providing example of the St. Louis police department's
gun buy-out program, which provided payment on a "no questions asked" basis for each gun turned in).
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cur over the objections of the other party to the transaction, the person exer-
cising the option need only take account of the exercise price, not the other
parties' true reservation prices. If we cannot tell how much the parties are
really harmed or benefited by the exercise of an option, the possibility
arises that a tax or subsidy may be either insufficient or excessive relative to
the impact of the option's exercise on the other parties. In either case, the
tax or subsidy replaces one set of flawed "prices" with another.
The results of these pricing flaws echo the commons and anticommons
problems already discussed. Suppose a community adopts a flamingo tax
(Rule 2). If the tax is set too low (for example, $100 when the true social im-
pact is $500), then we can expect the same basic tendency towards overgraz-
ing that existed in a Rule 3 world where flamingo placement was free. This
is a standard commons dilemma. Of course, the tax reduces the divergence
between personal payoffs and social payoffs and in that way improves mat-
ters over a Rule 3 regime. Another possibility is that someone in the commu-
nity (such as hypersensitive Nora) values a flamingo-free environment highly
enough that it would be efficient for her to buy up everyone's "call options"
to engage in flamingo placement. Her effort to buy up those call options pre-
sents the same kind of anticommons situation described earlier. Of course,
the existence of the tax reduces the value of the call option to the individuals,
and also acts as a check on any tendency to strategically place flamingos in
an effort to annoy Nora into buying up their rights at higher prices.
If the tax is set too high (say, $800 when the true social cost is $500)
then an echo of the anticommons is produced: Some efficient incursions into
the aesthetic space of the neighborhood may be blocked. Recall Bella, who
values flamingo placement at $700, an amount higher than the true social
harm ($500) but lower than the tax. She could attempt to assemble permis-
sion from everyone in the community to proceed with flamingo placement
without paying the tax, and in theory she should be able to do this at a price
somewhere between $500 and $700. However, familiar holdout difficulties,
as well as mundane transactions costs, render this result unlikely.
If setting the tax precisely is impossible, should the community err on
the side of making it too high or setting it too low? Again, it is helpful to
consult the production functions involved and consider the strategic interac-
tions likely to follow from particular kinds of errors. We can see that the
anticommons problem faced by Nora is easier to solve than the one faced
by Bella, which has a step-level shape. This might seem to argue for setting
the tax low. However, we must also examine the costs associated with the
inefficient behaviors that a low tax would permit. If we imagine that we are
within a range where each additional increment of activity causes increasing
marginal harms, then a too-low tax may have quite bad consequences.
Comparing the stakes associated with errors in different directions, the
shape of the production functions involved, and the prospects for correcting
errors through further trade yields insights into the advantages and disad-
vantages of different entitlement regimes.
Common Interest Tragedies
4. Some Qualifications.-There are many considerations that affect
the choice of how entitlements should be assigned and protected, including
the interplay of cognitive factors and wealth effects with entitlement
choices,28" ' the impact of entitlement regimes on preexisting and evolving
norms,282 and the costs of administering the system.283 Common resource
settings also present special considerations that are obscured in the usual
"injurer-victim" examples that dominate the entitlement literature, 284 and
these considerations must be taken explicitly into account in choosing enti-
tlement regimes.285
The example I have developed here sheds light on only one comer of
the overall question of appropriate entitlement assignment and protection in
a commons. However, it is a quite important comer, and the light that the
analysis sheds demonstrates the payoff of this Article's taxonomy of com-
mon interest tragedies. That taxonomy prompts us to focus on the strategic
dilemmas that various legal rules trigger and resolve, and to recognize the
size and shape of the harms potentially associated with those dilemmas.
Doing these things can ease the decisionmaking task and spur innovation in
designing entitlement solutions.
281 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293,
305-06 (1992) (discussing the impact of wealth effects and the endowment effect on outcomes and effi-
ciency); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998) (discussing experimental results showing endowment effects and other factors that affect the
trading of entitlements); Stewart Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists
Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1178 (1989) (discussing the implications of wealth effects associated
with assignment of legal entitlements).
282 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 227 (discussing ways in which covenants and enforcement regimes
might interact with the development and deployment of norms in private communities); Paula A. Franzese,
Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL.
L. REV. 553 (2002) (discussing the potential of private covenant arrangements within common interest
communities to erode social capital); Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 464 (suggesting that a legal regime
that does not intervene to overcome bargaining difficulties is more likely to lead to better bargaining, over
the long run, as the parties learn how to reduce transaction costs); Michelman, supra note 1, at 34 (recogniz-
ing the possibility that "particular private property arrangements sanction and reinforce trustlessness").
283 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17, at 741-43 (comparing the administrative costs of
property rules and liability rules).
284 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 442, 479 (introducing stock example that pits a polluting
factory against a resident and observing a relative lack of application of these ideas to questions of col-
lective action).
285 For example, in a commons, group members are prospective injurers and victims at the same time.
Although heterogeneity among group members complicates the picture, the overlap between the restrainers
and the restrained has important implications for designing entitlement solutions. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Re-
considering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single-Activity Accidents, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 41 (1990) (presenting a bilateral account of tort risks, in which individuals are simultane-
ously potential victims and potential injurers, and explaining how it yields results that differ from those
produced by a conventional unilateral risk model that assumes each person is either a victim or an injurer).
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CONCLUSION
Common interest tragedies are enormously important and tremen-
dously difficult to solve. A better classification system and streamlined vo-
cabulary for discussing these problems cannot substitute for the
painstaking, context-specific work of fashioning workable solutions to each
resource-allocation problem as it exists in situated reality.286 Yet this diffi-
cult and important work is made lighter by a theoretical framework that lays
bare, rather than obscures, the specific strategic tendencies likely to stand in
the way of efficient solutions. This is particularly true in modem urban set-
tings where law will, of necessity, play a central role in ordering the rela-
tionships between people with respect to resources.
The anticommons literature, despite having come a phenomenal dis-
tance in a very short time, is still evolving. I hope that this Article will help
advance that literature by showing the anticommons tragedies' structural
connections to the more familiar commons problems and to basic strategic
templates. The schema that I have developed here should be viewed as a
provisional one that takes its place in an ongoing dialogue about how best
to think about this crucial set of problems. If this Article generates further
interest in this important area, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
990
286 See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 27, at 163 (noting the complexity of land and suggesting that
we might usefully turn for assistance to scientists who have long investigated "the land's mechanisms of
production").
